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REPORTS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Mindfulness – a Time Perspective? Estonian Study
Riin Seema1
Institute of Psychology, Tallinn University, Estonia
Anna Sircova
Department of Psychology, Umeå University, Sweden
Abstract
This article examines if mindfulness measured with the MAAS (Brown  & Ryan, 2003) 
has characteristic components of the time perspective construct measured with the ZTPI 
(Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) in Estonian. Study 1 assessed the reliability and validity of the Estonian 
scales used with adult students at different levels of education (N = 610). Factor analyses with 
combined items of these two scales showed MAAS to be the first factor. Multidimensional scaling 
indicated that the ZTPI and MAAS together reflect attitude and orientation towards time. Our 
results showed that mindfulness ratings are higher for those with Balanced Time Perspective. 
Study 2 in a clinical sample with people in psychotherapy (N = 49) confirmed that subjective 
well-being, mindfulness and time perspectives are related. Mindful attention and awareness of 
current perceptions seems to be complementary to Future/conscientiousness. We propose that 
possibly, paradoxically, mindfulness is both a time perspective, and also awareness of one’s own 
time perspectives. 
Keywords: mindfulness; time perspectives; awareness of time; self-esteem; subjective well-being
Introduction
The human mind is capable of ´mental time travel´ that allows people to project 
themselves at different points on a time continum (Tulving  & Kim, 2007). Zimbardo 
and Boyd (2008) have argued that people differ in whether they spend more time on 
thinking about the past, present or future, and whether their thoughts are positive or 
negative during this process. They called these mostly unconscious attitudes, beliefs, 
and values that people have related to time – time perspective (TP) (Zimbardo & Boyd, 
1999; Boyd & Zimbardo, 2005). 
In order to investigate whether people’s cognitive temporal ´bias´ is primarily 
past, present or future oriented with positive, negative, fatalistic or hedonistic attitudes, 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) devised a scale, the Zimbardo Time Perspectives Inventory, 
ZTPI. The ZTPI measures a time perspective profile, and consists of five subscales: 
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Past Positive (PP), Past Negative (PN), Present Hedonistic (PH), Present Fatalistic (PF) 
and Future (F). 
Several studies have shown that the time perspective is connected with subjective 
well-being, self-esteem and depression. The strongest, although negative, association 
has been found between subjective well-being and the Past Negative time perspective 
(Boniwell, 2005; Drake, Duncan, Sutherland, Abernethy,  & Henry, 2008; Sircova  & 
Mitina, 2008; Boniwell, Osin, Linley, & Ivanchenko, 2010). A link was found between 
subjective well-being and both the Past Positive and the Present Hedonistic time 
perspective (Drake et al., 2008; Boniwell et al., 2010; Zhang & Howell, 2011). The Future 
perspective was not related to well-being (Drake et al., 2008; Boniwell et al., 2010). At 
the same time Romero and Uomoto (2009) found that Future and Present Fatalistic 
TP were consistent predictors of lower well-being and Present Hedonistic TP did not 
predict higher positive well-being.
Time perspective and self-esteem research has shown that Past Positive and 
Future perspectives are associated with high self-esteem, whereas Past Negative and 
Present Fatalistic perspectives with low self-esteem (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999; Sircova, 
Sokolova,  & Mitina, 2008; Anagnostopoulos  & Griva, 2012). There is no association 
between Present Hedonistic perspective and self-esteem (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
Investigations have shown that Past Negative perspective is correlated with 
depression (Zimbardo  & Boyd 1999; Roseanu, Marian, Tomulescu,  & Pusta, 2008; 
Roseanu et al., 2008; Sircova, Sokolova, & Mitina, 2008; Anagnostopoulos & Griva, 2011). 
Positive perception of the past is inversely correlated with depression (Zimbardo  & 
Boyd 1999; Anagnostopoulos & Griva, 2011), as is Future time perspective (Zimbardo & 
Boyd 1999; Anagnostopoulos  & Griva, 2011). Individuals with Present Fatalistic trait 
(Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999; Roseanu et al., 2008, Anagnostopoulos & Griva, 2011) and 
Present Hedonistic trait (Roseanu et al., 2008) have more frequent depression.
Different research demonstrates that the combination of moderate to high 
scores on PP, PH and F subscales and relatively low scores on PN and PF indicate the 
healthiest TP profile (Boyd  & Zimbardo, 2008; Drake et  al., 2008; Sircova  & Mitina, 
2008; Boniwell, et  al., 2010; Zimbardo, Sword,  & Sword, 2012). Authors have called 
this special combination of ´biases´ a Balanced Time Perspective (BTP). Drake and 
colleagues (2008) found that BTP participants were not only significantly happier, but 
also more mindful. 
Zimbardo and Boyd (2008) discuss that mindfulness is a type of time perspective 
which they call Holistic Present. Mindfulness is originally a Buddhist concept that has 
spread in Western psychological science, and there have been several attempts to connect 
this concept to already existing psychological concepts (Schmidt, 2011). Zimbardo 
and Boyd (2008) have suggested that mindfulness could be a healthy time perspective. 
However, they have not performed any empirical studies on this relationship. 
The main purpose of this study was to test the idea that mindfulness could be an 
aspect of time perspective. More specifically we assessed if mindfulness measured with 
the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) has characteristic components of the time perspective 
construct as measured with the ZTPI (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) in Estonian language. 
Our aim was to explore the relationship between mindfulness, time perspective, BTP 
and well-being indicators. 
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Time perspectives and mindfulness
In the case of mindfulness there are components that are characteristic of time 
perspective – orientation to time and attitude about time. Brown and Ryan (2003) 
have described mindfulness as open or receptive awareness and attention to what is 
taking place in the present. Zimbardo and Boyd (2008) discuss that mindfulness has 
orientation towards the present, but contains the past and future with a fully open 
attitude. Self-regulating attention to the present helps to be aware of mind-wandering 
toward past experiences and potential future paths for reaching personally important 
goals (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Mindful attention and awareness as a personality trait varies in strength among 
people. Low trait mindfulness means that a person pays attention and awareness 
to the present moment infrequently and operates more on unconscious ´automatic 
pilot´. Such mode of mind is related with depression. High trait mindfulness means 
that mindful states are more frequent or continuous, and this is positively related to 
subjective well-being (Segal, Williams & Deasdale, 2002; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, 
Ryan & Creswell, 2007). 
To date little research has been conducted on the relation between mindfulness and 
time perspective. Brown and Vansteenkiste (2006) (as cited in Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 
2007) have suggested that mindfulness is inversely related to hedonism, fatalism, and 
a lack of consideration of future consequences. Drake and colleagues (2008) found 
mindful attention and awareness correlated positively with PP and negatively with PN, 
PH, and PF. In their study the relationship between F and MAAS was positive, but not 
significant.
The connection between TP and mindfulness is important in relation to well-being 
and goal attainment. Researchers have questioned whether orientation toward the 
present or the goal directed and future oriented behaviour is more adaptive, or maybe 
even complementary (Sternberg, 2000; Brown & Vansteenkiste, 2006, as cited in Brown, 
Ryan  & Creswell, 2007). Gruber, Gunningham, Kirkland and Hay (2012) argue that 
people need to consider the past and future to make adaptive long-term decisions, and 
being ´stuck in the present´ is a core problem associated with mania. 
One aim of the current study was to investigate if the most popular measure of 
mindfulness, namely the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), measures both components of 
time perspective – attitude as well as orientation to time. Brown and Ryan (2004) have 
stated that the scale focuses on the construct of presence, but subsumes an acceptance 
of what occurs. Still, there are authors who think that the MAAS is an instrument only 
focusing on attention and awareness, without assessing acceptance (Trousselard et al., 
2010). There are even authors who doubt that the MAAS measures orientation to the 
present moment (Grossman & Van Dam, 2011).
Prior to addressing our research question we set out to adapt and validate the 
Zimbardo Time Perspectives Inventory (ZTPI, Zimbaro & Boyd, 1999) in Estonian. The 
original ZTPI translated into Estonian had been used once previously in a cross-cultural 
study (White, Valk, & Dialmy, 2011), however, reliability and validity of the Estonian 
ZTPI translation had not been confirmed. 
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Method
Process of adaptation
Adaptation of the ZTPI took place as part of a larger project. The original 56 
items (Likert scale) Zimbardo Time Perspectives Inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 
1999) was translated from English to Estonian by four linguists, and by one author 
of the current article, together with an independent scholar. Two individual linguists 
translated the Estonian versions back into English. R. Valk granted permission to use 
their translated version of the ZTPI as one possible translation. Russian verison of the 
ZTPI (Sircova, Sokolova, & Mitina, 2008) was also taken into consideration. Experts’ 
meetings were carried out to compare the translations, back translations and the 
originals, and to adapt the questionnaire. The Estonian questionnaire was reviewed by 
an independent Estonian philologist. 
Pilot studies Pilot studies featuring a sample of a total of 117 adult students from 
different educational levels (Ns  =  32, 42 and 43) were conducted to ascertain the 
grammatical and psychological fitness of the expressions used in the scale. In addition 
to filling in the questionnaires the respondents were asked to provide a written feedback 
on the comprehensibility of the items and their linguistic correctness. Group and 
individual interviews were performed. Based on respondents’ feedback, modifications 
were made to the wording after each pilot study.
Study 1
Study 1 reports results of the ZTPI validation performed on a large sample of 
adult students at different levels of education. We explored the question of whether 
mindfulness is a time perspective, and assessed the levels of subjective well-being, 
mindfulness and self-esteem of the BTP group.
Sample and procedure The ZTPI scale was completed by 892 students from different 
cities in Estonia of whom 407 (39.8%) were acquiring higher education, 344 (33.6%) 
professional higher education, 129 (12.6%) vocational education and 12 persons (1.3%) 
who did not state their educational status. The majority of participants (76.4%) were 
female. Respondents’ ages were 18 – 54 years (M = 23.3 years, SD = 6.1).
The self-report measures were administered primarily through an internet survey. 
Some participants completed the measures on paper during class time. 
Measures
Estonian Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (E-MAAS; Seema et  al., submitted). 
The 15-item MAAS was used to measure trait mindfulness: the frequency of open 
or receptive awareness and attention to what is taking place in the present (MAAS; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003). The respondents’ scores of the adapted version were in reverse to 
the original, (6 almost always – 1 almost never), such that higher scores indicated lower 
mindfulness. Thus all items where reversed before analysis to permit comparability to 
the original scale. The internal consistency was (α = .89).
Self-esteem The 10-item Estonian Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (ERSES; Pulmann & 
Allik, 2000) was used to measure one’s overall evaluation of one’s worth or value 
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(Rosenberg, 1989) on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
The internal consistency in this sample was α = .89.
Psychological well-being The WHO-Five Well-being Index (WHO-5) (Estonian 
adaptation by Sisask, Värnik, Kõlves, Konstabel,  & Wasserman, 2008) was used to 
measure positive mood, vitality, and interest in things with five statements on a 6-point 
scale (never to always). Higher values indicate higher psychological well-being (sample 
α = .82).
Results
Factorial Structure of the Estonian ZTPI.  Factor analysis was performed on one 
part of the randomly split sample (N = 447). According to Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) 
the ZTPI scale contains five factors. In our analyses we left out all items that loaded on 
two or more factors, and also items with factor loadings below .4. The short 25 item 
version explained 52.08% of the variance, and the KMO indicator was 0.79. 
This structure of the 25 items was further confirmed with confirmatory factor 
analyses. The CFA was performed via maximum likelihood estimation with robust 
standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square statistical test using EQS 6.1. 
The results indicated that the model had an acceptable fit to the data: S-Bχ2 (N = 447, 
262)  =  486.098; RMSEA  =  .044; CFI  =  .90; NNFI  =  .886. Therefore in our following 
analysis we used the short 25 items ZTPI.
Reliability. In this sample the scale internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas) for the 
E-ZTPI subscales were as follows: PN = .83, F = .74, PH = .73, PP = .69, PF = .68. The 
test-retest reliability of the Estonian version of the ZTPI subscales was assessed with 
54 adult students over a 2-week period. The correlations were as follows: PN .83; F .64; 
PH .62; PP .88; PF .71, all p < .001. 
Correlations between Estonian ZTPI, MAAS, self-esteem and psychological well-
being. Correlations between the ZTPI subscales, MAAS, WHO-Five Well-being Index, 
and the Estonian Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale are shown in Table 1. The MAAS was 
significantly negatively related to PN, PH and PF and positively related to F. At the same 
time self-esteem was positively related to F, PP and MAAS, but negatively related to 
PN and PF. Well-being was positively related to F, PH, PP, and MAAS, but negatively 
correlated with PN and PF.
Table 1. Pearson Correlations between ZTPI, MAAS, and Well-Being Scales  
in the Adult Students’ sample (N = 610)
PN F PH PP PF MAAS
MAAS  -.32**  .23**  -.12**  .02  -.21**
RSES self-esteem  -.50**  .26**  .07  .18**  -.26** .34**
WHO-5 well-being  -.32**  .27**  .20**  .19**  -.14** .27**
Notes. The Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI); Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS); Estonian 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES); WHO-Five Well-being Index (WHO-5) ** p < .01.
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Factor structure of combined items from the ZTPI and the MAAS scales. Zimbardo & 
Boyd (2008) argue that mindfulness is a type of time perspective. We combined items 
of the adapted short ZTPI and the MAAS scales into one data set (see also Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietemeier, & Toney, 2006) to test for the empirical existence of six factors 
or dimensions, and to explore the order of these dimensions (Table 2). The Oblimin 
rotation test indicated that the factors were not tightly correlated (-0.256 ≤ r ≤ 0.193). 
The MAAS was the first factor. Varimax rotation showed that all items in each factor 
are with factor loadings over .40. Only one item loaded on two factors at the same time 
with a factor loading over -.3. The MAAS item `I get buried so deep in thought about 
the past or future, that I do not notice what is happening around me` loaded also into 
the PN factor with factor loadings -.32. For the combined item pool KMO indicator was 
0.85. The 40 items model explained 47.2% of the variance.
Table 2. EFA factor structure of combined items from the ZTPI and the MAAS scales  
in the adult student’s sample (N = 697)
Subscales and items Factorloadings
Subscale: MAAS mindful attention and awareness Factor 1
 8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. .757
 10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I’m doing. .751
 12. I move places on “automatic pilot” and then wonder why I went there. .694
 7. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness of what I’m doing. .684
 14. I do things without paying attention to them. .654
 9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I’m doing right 
now to get there. .645
 3. It is difficult for me to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. .581
 15. I snack without noticing what I am eating or how it tastes. .580
 13. I get buried so deep in thought about the past or future, that I do not notice what is hap-
pening around me. .548
 1. I could be caught up in some emotion and not be conscious of it until some time later. .540
 6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time. .482
 4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying attention to what I experi-
ence along the way. .461
 2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of some-
thing else. .455
 11. While listening to someone with one ear, I am doing something else at the same time. .451
 5. I do not notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they become really 
strong.    .429
Subscale: Past Negative Factor 2
 50. I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past.   .803
 16. Painful past experiences keep being replayed in my mind.   .802
 34. It’s hard for me to forget unpleasant images of my youth.   .799
 25. The past has too many unpleasant memories that I prefer not to think about.   .781
 4. I often think of what I should have done differently in my life.   .549
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Subscales and items Factorloadings
Subscale: Future Factor 3
 40. I complete projects on time by making steady progress.   .733
 56. There will always be time to catch up on my work.  – .689
 13. Meeting tomorrow’s deadlines and doing other necessary work come before tonight’s 
play.   .686
 45. I am able to resist temptations when I know that there is work to be done.    .676
 10. When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means for reaching 
those goals.   .649
Subscale: Present Hedonistic Factor 4
 42. I take risks to put excitement in my life.  .833
 31. Taking risks keeps my life from becoming boring.  .760
 26. It is important to put excitement in my life.  .686
 17. I try to live my life as fully as possible, one day at a time.  .558
 8. I do things impulsively.  .509
Subscale: Past Positive Factor 5
 29. I get nostalgic about my childhood.  .740
 2. Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells often bring back a flood of wonderful  
memories.  .686
 7. It gives me pleasure to think about my past  .678
 20. Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind.  .665
 49. I like family rituals and traditions that are regularly repeated.  .485
Subscale: Present Fatalistic Factor 6
 39. It doesn’t make sense to worry about the future, since there is nothing that I can do 
about it anyway.  .738
 38. My life path is controlled by forces I cannot influence. .720
 14. Since whatever will be will be, it doesn’t really matter what I do. .686
 37. You can’t really plan for the future because things change so much. .529
 3. Fate determines much in my life. .474
Two dimensions reflected by the Estonian MAAS and ZTPI scales We tested the 
hypothesis – both the MAAS and the ZTPI reflect characteristic components of the time 
perspective – orientation to time, and positive or negative attitude. Multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) was used to visualize the two underlying dimensions of the MAAS and 
ZTPI subscales (Figure 1). The scales as points are closer together the more positively 
they are correlated or the more similar they are (Borg  & Groenen, 2010). Euclidean 
distances were created from the standardized interval data. Stress value for the matrix 
was .066, RSQ = .97, that means a good fit (Kruskal & Wish (1978) (as cited in Giugėre, 
2006). One of the dimensions (x axis) reflects positive versus negative attitude or 
valence (see also Anagnostopoulos  & Griva, 2012). The other dimension (y axis) is 
more complicated, and seems to be diagonally mirrored between the left and right side 
of the figure. On the positive affect side the y axis expresses the time continuum from 
the past to the present to the future. The MAAS reflects orientation towards the present, 
as it is located between the positive past and future. Concurrently the time continuum 
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expressed with the y axis on the left or negative affect side seems to be upside down. PN 
is located at the left upper corner, PH at the bottom corner, and PF is located between 
them. PH scale is diagonally mirrored by F. This MDS analysis seems to indicate that the 
scales reflect two dimensions, but in an idiosyncratic sense in that the time orientation 
depends on attitude or vice versa.
Negative or positive attitude
210-1-2
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to
w
ar
ds
 ti
m
e
1,0
0,5
0,0
-0,5
-1,0
-1,5
PN
PF
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PH
F
MAAS
e Estonian MAAS and ZTPI subscales in two dimensional space
Euclidean distance model
Figure 1. Euclidian distance model; representation of (dis) similarities of the ZTPI  
sub-scales and MAAS scale in two-dimensional space. For matrix Stress = .09; RSQ = .93.  
Adult student´s sample (N = 697)
The BTP group and their mindfulness, well-being, and self-esteem To explore if 
mindfulness is a component of the BTP we entered the ZTPI, mindfulness, well-being 
and self-esteeem data to k-means cluster analysis, as our sample was large (Table 3). 
Table 3. K-Means Cluster Groups with ANOVA Results in the Adult Students’ Sample  
(N = 598)
 Cluster groups
 
Non-BTP
N = 57 N = 219 N = 114
BTP
N = 208 F
Past Negative 3.9 2.9 3.0 2.1 123.6***
Future 2.6 3.1 3.7 4.0 100,7***
Present Hedonistic 2.8 3.4 2.4 2.9 56.6***
Past Positive 3.6 4.0 3.6 4.0 18.5***
Present Fatalistic 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 30.2***
MAAS 2.5 3.9 3.5 4.4 71.9***
Self-esteem 1.7 3.3 2.3 3.7 215.5***
Well-being 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.4 225.4***
Note. (p < .001***)
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Further, this analysis means assuming the number of clusters in the variables 
based on a priori knowledge (Corunescu, 2011). Like in the Boniwell, Osin, Linley 
and Ivanchenko (2010) study, a four-cluster model was chosen, as one of those groups 
showed the balanced ZTPI profile. Our aim was to identify the group of individuals 
with balanced ZTPI scores as suggested by Wiberg, Sircova, Wiberg and Carelli (2012), 
and to assess their mindfulness, self-esteem and subjective well-being levels. We also 
tested for two-, three- and five-cluster models, and found that despite the fact that these 
analyses show different numbers of cluster-groups with different number of individuals 
in each group, people with the highest MAAS, self-esteem and subjective well-being 
scores, had also lowest PN and highest F. At the same time the groups with lowest 
MAAS, self-esteem and subjective well-being levels, had opposite results; they had the 
highest PN and lowest F. The PP, PF and PH had lower ability to distinguish between 
groups.
The results of this study showed that the short Estonian ZTPI has a clear factor 
structure; however, the internal consistency of PP and PF, and test-retest reliability of 
F and PH scales are not high. As predicted the ZTPI scale showed several significant 
correlations with mindfulness, self-esteem and subjective well-being, and the BTP 
group had high scores of the well-being indicators. The factor analyses with combined 
items of the ZTPI and the MAAS scales showed empirical existence of six latent traits. 
The ZTPI and MAAS together express two dimensions – attitude and, idiosyncratically, 
orientation towards time.
Study 2
Study 2 explored the relation between mindfulness, time perspective, BTP, and 
subjective well-being in another purposefully chosen sample of people who have turned 
to psychotherapy. It further addressed the issue of mindfulness being a time perspective. 
The approval to conduct the study was granted by the Tallinn Medical Research Ethics 
Committee (application nr. 1022, resolution adopted 20 Dec. 2010).
Sample 
The sample for this study consisted of 49 people who had started some form of 
psychotherapy (e.g. Cognitive-Behavioural therapy, Psychodrama, Family therapy, NLP, 
Breathing therapy or Gestalt-therapy). At the moment there are no mindfulness-based 
therapies in Estonia. Fortyfive respondents were females and 4 were males. The average 
age was 41.1 years (SD = 10.6). These people were working with various problems and 
issues: depression, anxiety, burn-out, woman´s role, relationships, eating problems, 
trauma and self-growth. For treating emotional problems 11 people were taking 
medications. Most of the participants had engaged in psychotherapy before. Previous 
therapy had continued for more than a year for 19 people. 
Measures
The same measures as in the Study 1 were used. One additional scale was introduced 
due to the specifics of the sample (psychotherapy clients). 
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Depression Scale (DEPS; Salokangas, Poutanen, & Stengard, 1995) in the Estonian 
language (Aluoja, Shlik, Vasar, Luuk,  & Leinsalu, 1999) is a 10-item self-rating scale 
for screening of depression. The symptoms of experiencing depression during the past 
month are rated on a 4-point scale (not at all to extremely).
Results
Correlations between the Estonian ZTPI, MAAS and well-being indexes in the clinical 
sample. Most of the correlations between these scale scores in the clinical sample were 
similar to those in Study 1. The PNwas highly positively correlated with depression 
(r =  .62, p <  .01**), and negatively correlated with well-being (r = -.43, p <  .01**), self-
esteem (r = -.50, p < .01**), and the MAAS (r = -.34, p < .05*). In the clinical sample, self-
esteem as well as well-being was more related to the PP than in the non-clinical sample.
The BTP cluster group in the psychotherapy sample Four-group k-means cluster 
analysis showed that in the psychotherapy sample 11 persons out of 49 had the BTP 
profile proposed by Wiberg, Sircova, Wiberg, and Carelly (2012). They had high self-
esteem, mindfulness, and well-being scores and low depression scores. At the same 
time 23 people in this psychotherapy sample qualified for diagnosis of depression as 
measured with the DEPS (Aluoja, 2002). People with the highest PN and PF and the 
lowest PP, self-esteem and mindfulness had the highest depression scores (p < .05*) The 
PH and F traits did not differentiate groups in this sample.
Two underyling dimensions of the MAAS and ZTPI subscales Multidimensional 
scaling analysis (MDS) was used to test the hypothesis that mindfulness has two 
components characteristic of time perspective – orientation to time, and negative or 
positive attitude. The euclidean distances were created from the standardized interval 
data (Borg & Groenen, 2010). The analysis revealed two dimensions as seen in Fig 2. 
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Figure 2. Euclidian distance model; representation of (dis) similarities of the ZTPI sub-
scales and MAAS scale in two-dimensional space. For matrix Stress = .09; RSQ = .93. 
Psychotherapy sample (N = 49)
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One of the dimensions clearly reflects positive versus negative attitude or valence. 
The nature of the other dimension is not so obvious. It seems to convey mindful 
present and/or future orientation versus present satisfaction orientation (see also 
Anagnostopoulos & Griva, 2012). The MAAS and F scale are located in the right upper 
corner of the plot, and together they represent positive, future goal oriented behaviour. 
The PN and PF are located on the left and middle region, and probably reflect negative 
attitude towards present and future based on negative past experiences. The PP and 
PH time perspectives are situated in the lower part of the right corner of the plot, and 
expressing the wish to get present satisfaction either with doing exciting things or 
remembering positive experiences. The Stress value for matrix was .09, RSQ = .93, that 
means a good fit (Kruskal & Wish (1978) (as cited in Giugėre, 2006).
Discussion
The current research explored the relationships between mindfulness, time 
perspective, BTP, and well-being. In this article we present findings of two Estonian 
studies that examined the hypothesis that mindfulness could be an aspect of time 
perspective. 
As the first step we assessed the reliability and validity of the Estonian ZTPI. The 
ZTPI has been adapted in many countries, and the variability of its structure cannot be 
ignored. For example, Kolesovs (2009) found seven factors for the Latvian version and 
seven factors for the Russian version of the ZTPI in Latvia completed by the Russian 
ethno linguistic group. Nevertheless, the original 5 factor ZTPI seems to have some 
amount of core items that show a similar factor structure between 24 countries (Sircova 
et al., submitted). In the current study we substantially shortened the ZTPI to get a clear 
model of five latent traits, as our further goal was to explore how mindfulness relates to 
the original 5 factor theory of time perspective (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). We took as 
an example those studies which have used a shorter version of the ZTPI scale (Adelabu, 
2007; Yu-Jing, 2011). Most of the Estonian ZTPI sub-scales had good to acceptable 
internal consistency. However, the fact that we shortened the scale raised the question 
if the adapted ZTPI measures the TP construct as theoretically defined. We assessed the 
construct validity, and found that the Estonian ZTPI subscales had correlations with 
other well-validated scales, mostly in expected directions. Similarly, like in all previous 
studies, we have shown that the highest, but negative, correlation exists between PN and 
the well-being indicators. As the focus of this article is on the relationship between TP 
and mindfulness, we were especially interested in the relationship between the ZTPI 
and MAAS. We found that PN, PH, and PF have negative correlations with mindfulness 
similarly as in earlier studies (Brown and Vansteenkiste, 2006, as cited in Brown, 
Ryan & Creswell, 2007; Drake et al., 2008). We did not find a correlation between PP 
and MAAS, but we found a significant positive correlation between F and MAAS. We 
further assessed not only the validity of the Estonian ZTPI, but also of the Estonian 
MAAS (Brown  & Ryan, 2003), while exploring the relationships between TP and 
mindfulness in several ways. 
Since Zimbardo and Boyd (2008) have stated that mindfulness is a holistic aspect 
of time perspective containing the past and future, we explored if the MAAS measures a 
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latent trait that is separate from the other TP subscales. The EFA analysis of the adapted 
ZTPI and the MAAS together showed existence of six latent traits (see Table 2). At 
the same time the MAAS mindfulness items made up the first factor. This first factor 
explained the greatest proportion of variance from the entire data set (Haynes, Smith & 
Hunsley, 2011). This implies that mindfulness explains the biggest variance in time 
perspectives. This result is in line with the concept that individual differences in how 
we explore our memory of the past, our experience of the present and our anticipation 
and freedom to imagine the future, is a function of mindfulness (Siegel, 2009). PN as 
the second extracted factor explained the most variance remaining after the shared 
variance from the first factor was removed (Haynes, Smith,  & Hunsley, 2011). The 
third factor in our analysis was Future. Problem solving and the imagining of events 
in the future implies memory of the past (Tulving, 2005; Toomela, 2010). It may be 
counterproductive when thoughts about negative past experience impede one’s ability 
to find solutions for a better future, and are processed unconsciously. Being aware of 
and relating with the acceptance to one´s thoughts and feelings is vital for better mental 
health (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
The correlational analysis between the ZTPI and MAAS, and the combined EFA 
analysis showed that mindfulness and time perspectives seem to be conceptually related, 
but separate at the same time. Next we explored similarities and differences between 
these constructs and scales. We examined if both scales reflect characteristic components 
of time perspective: orientation to time and positive or negative attitude. We used the 
multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) for visualizing the complex data of the MAAS 
and ZTPI in two dimensional spaces. Still, MDS means simplification, it is useful for 
exploring, but it is not possible to make strong interpretations based on this analysis 
(Giugėre, 2006). The analysis performed on the students’ sample showed that the scales 
together reflect two dimensions; positive or negative attitude and orientation towards 
time (see Figure 1). The MAAS mindfulness, as a present orientation, was located 
between positive past and future. Interestingly, depending on the positive or negative 
attitude, the direction of the time orientation seemed to be inverted; on the negative 
attitude side the PN was located at the left upper corner, while in the positive attitude 
side the F was at the right upper corner. Still, the MDS analysis does not allow identifying 
the causal relationship between the time orientation and attitude or valence. Smallwood 
and O´Connor (2011) experimentally studied the relationship between unhappy mood 
and the temporal focus of mind wandering, and they found that an unhappy mood leads 
the mind to wander to the past. Via the induction of a positive mood a small increase in 
future thought was observed in individuals low on depression scores. 
Our multidimensional scaling analysis showed that Present Hedonistic was 
diagonally mirrored by F (Figure 1) Interestingly, Arnold, Dermott, and Szpunar 
(2010) found that the Present Hedonistic subscale, as a pleasure-seeking, risk-taking 
orientation, predicted differences in the phenomenological experience underlying 
remembering and episodic future thinking even more than the ZTPI Future subscale. 
At the same time the Present Hedonistic and Future were negatively related (r = –.35). 
If we compare results shown by Arnold, Dermott, and Szpunar (2010) with our results 
in the Figure 1, we can see the Future scale is inherently almost opposite the Present 
Hedonistic. 
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With MDS we explored once more the relationship between the MAAS and ZTPI 
subscales, and tested to examine if mindfulness reflects characteristic components 
of time perspective in a small and heterogenuos psychotherapy client sample. In this 
psychotherapy sample the x-axis again showed positive or negative attitude or valence, 
and the y-axis reflected either present satisfaction orientation or mindful future 
orientation. Our MSD analyses showed that the MAAS mindfulness located quite high 
on the positive attitude dimension. Mindfulness has been considered as an open and 
accepting awareness (Brown & Ryan, 2003), therefore, we expected a neutral position. 
This location in the positive dimension can be explained by the fact that mindfulness has 
been found to be closely related to positive emotions, higher self-esteem and subjective 
well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Based on the literature mindfulness has been considered to be present oriented 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). In our second MDS analysis the MAAS mindfulness was located 
close to the Future scale (see the Figure 2). The F scale measures future related behaviour 
or personal strategies (Boniwell, Osin, Linley,  & Ivanchenco, 2010), not only future 
related thoughts. Nevertheless, Tulving (2005) has proposed that between future related 
behaviour and future oriented thought (cognition) there should be a clear conceptual 
distinction. To measure thoughts about the future, the items should be connected to 
either episodic memory or predictions about the future enriched by characteristics such 
as temporality, contextuality and affective richness (Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2009) 
(e.g. “I often imagine that several bad things will happen to me in the future”; “I 
frequently dream about my happy future”). As with the PN and PP subscales, Future 
time perspective subscales should measure how often a person imagines the future, and 
if these thoughts are positive or negative (see also Carelli, Wiberg, & Wiberg, 2011). The 
current Estonian Future subscale is similar to the conscientiousness construct. Crockett, 
Weinman, Hankins and Marteau (2009) came to a similar conclusion with their London 
study: based on factor analysis they named one part of the original F scale of the ZTPI 
as ´conscientiousness´. The F scale was found to be highly positively correlated with 
conscientiousness (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999; Kairys, 2010; Zhang & Howell, & 2011).
In our studies mindfulness was related to the Future/conscientiousness scale. Based 
on the literature, mindfulness is related to conscientiousness (Thompson & Waltz, 2007; 
Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011). Atance and Meltzoff (2007) have stated that one of 
the most adaptive features of future thinking in humans is that we can experience in 
the present a desire or goal state and work tirelessly to achieve it. Mindfulness directs 
attention to present experiences and events, including one’s thoughts, feelings and 
desires at a given moment (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Thus, mindful attention 
and awareness of current perceptions seems to be complementary to the Future/
conscientiousness orientation. Sobol-Kwapinska (2009) also found that active focus 
on the present is associated with formulating and achieving goals, whereas Present 
Fatalistic and Hedonistic Present time orientations are associated with limiting the 
temporal perspective to the present. Our results indicate that mindfulness reflects a 
very different attitude towards the present and future compared to the PH or PF. Being 
mindful means having a positive attitude towards the present as well as the future, while 
the Present Hedonistic perspective means focusing towards immediate gratification 
and not considering future consequences. The Present Fatalistic perspective shows 
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a negative attitude towards one´s present as well as future. We agree with Brown and 
Ryan (2004) that the MAAS scale stresses the present construct and also subsumes an 
accepting and open attitude. 
If we look at time holistically and take into consideration the Balanced Time 
Perspective theory, the meaning of the previous MDS figures becomes clearer. The 
analysis based on BTP theory shows connections between all of the time perspectives, 
mindfulness and subjective well-being. The BTP group had the highest levels of 
subjective well-being, self-esteem and mindfulness, high scores on PP, a moderately 
high F, moderate PH and low scores on PN and PF. In both Estonian samples, the ZTPI 
scores of the BTP group were in the ranges proposed by Wiberg, Sircova, Wiberg and 
Carelli (2012). However, in our sample the BTP group was larger compared to the other 
studies (Table 3). 
So far there have been several attempts to operationalize BTP (Drake et al., 2008; 
Sircova & Mitina, 2008; Boniwell et al., 2010; Wilberg, Sircova, Wilberg & Carelli, 2012; 
Zhang, Howell & Stolarski, 2013), and different methods result in different group sizes. 
Nevertheless, all studies so far have shown that despite differences between languages, 
cultures and measurement methods the BTP pattern predicts well-being. We could 
conclude that time perspective together with mindfulness, self-esteem and subjective 
well-being are functional universals; meaning that the shape of the relationship 
between variables is the same, even if the strength of the patterns differs across 
cultures (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). We showed that it is important to incorporate 
mindfulness within the TP and BTP model; the MAAS expresses components of the 
time perspective, explains the biggest variance in the factor analysis of MAAS and TP 
scores, and differentiates the BTP and non-BTP groups even better than the PH, PP 
or PF subscales. Our study indicates that mindfulness is a Holistic Time Perspective, 
containing the past and the future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008), and it helps to understand 
the (B)TP construct. A primarily positive, accepting and open attitude towards one´s 
past, present and future is healthy. Psychological well-being is related to mindful 
attention and awareness towards the present that is related to conscientious and future 
goal oriented behaviour.
Conclusions
Our studies showed that 1) Mindfulness measured with the MAAS fits well 
as a separate factor in the TP construct in combination with data from the ZTPI 
2) Mindfulness is complementary to the future orientation; 3) Mindfulness has a very 
different attitude towards the present and future compared to the present hedonistic 
or the present fatalistic perspectives; 4). Mindfulness ratings are higher for those with 
Balanced Time Perspective We propose that mindfulness as a holistic time perspective 
is paradoxically a time perspective and also awareness of one´s time perspectives.
The present research offers evidence for the validity of the adapted MAAS and the 
ZTPI scales in healthy as well as clinical populations in Estonia. This research carried out 
in a small cultural and language group, represents a unique possibility to demonstrate 
the relationship between mindfulness, time perspectives, BTP and well-being for testing 
criterion validity of these constructs. 
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Limitations and Future Research. The current studies are limited by their cross-
sectional nature and by the fact that respondents were mostly female. The psychotherapy 
sample was small. Future research focusing on the time perspective, BTP, mindfulness 
and mental health relationships should use longitudinal designs in the psychotherapy 
context. Future research to design positive and negative future episodic imaginations 
scales in Estonian is recommended.
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Abstract
The Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (TCT-DP; Urban  & Jellen, 2010) is an 
open-ended drawing test for measuring creative potential. The original version of the TCT-DP 
consists of 14 criteria which form the total score. Various criteria as indicators of creative 
potential makes this test eligible for utilization in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), which 
requires appropriate indicators with good psychometric properties. A number of studies have 
confirmed cultural fairness, good reliability and validity of TCT-DP. However, there is no clear 
evidence of factor validity, and two of the criteria – Humour/Affectivity and Unconventionality 
B – previously have shown insufficient inter-rater reliability. The present study explores the 
problems of reliability of these two criteria and offers a solution. It also proposes 10 new criteria 
for assessment of creative potential in drawings, and provides empirical evidence that they can 
be added to the original criteria. The results were obtained with TCT-DP from 316 students, ages 
18 to 34 years, 71% females. Assessment of test criteria was done by three experts thus providing 
possibility to use SEM methodology for precise calculation of reliability and convergent validity 
of both improved and new criteria. The results suggest that insufficient reliability of the two 
problematic criteria of the TCT-DP can be improved by dividing them into sub-criteria. All of 
the proposed new criteria had high inter-rater reliability and good convergent validity making 
them valuable for future research.
Keywords: creative potential, indicators of creative potential, assessment, reliability, validity
Introduction 
The assessment of creativity in the context of individual differences is one of the 
most challenging tasks in psychometric science because a creative person cannot be 
defined by a few specific traits or abilities. This could be the reason why psychometric 
approaches that concentrate solely on a specific ability (e.g. divergent thinking) or a nar-
row definition of the creative person usually are accompanied by serious problems in 
regard to low reliability, unstable estimates and insufficient validity (Baer, 2011, Silvia 
et al., 2008). In the context of assessment it is more appropriate to concentrate on creative 
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potential (Piffer, 2012; Ivcevic, 2009) instead of the creative person, since creativity in the 
person is difficult to localize – it seems ambiguously scattered among personality traits 
(Fiest, 1998; Barron & Harrington, 1981), abilities (e.g., Mednick & Mednick, 1967; Guil-
ford, 1959), cognition (e.g., Zabelina & Robinson, 2010; Schmajuk, Aziz, & Bates, 2009) 
and values (e.g., Kasof, Chen, Himsel,  & Greenberger, 2007; Runco  & Nemiro, 2003) 
involving different approaches of psychological research. The term creative potential 
might also sound somewhat ambiguous and obscure, and although not new in the field 
of creativity research, it is necessary to explain its meaning and use in the context of this 
research. Runco (2006) describes creative potential as a creative capacity constituted by 
traits and abilities of a person, which is widely distributed in the population. He points 
out that, by definition, creative potential has not yet been expressed, or else it becomes 
creative performance. Creative potential can be assessed with various instruments, i.e., 
divergent thinking tasks or personality inventories which focus on personality features 
necessary for creative production. It is reasonable to distinguish potential and actual 
observed performance which requires motivation, ego strength and a knowledge base.
Moreover, manifestation of creative potential in creating the creative product 
happens almost solely under favourable circumstances, thus marking its dependence on 
situations (Amabile et al., 1996). The best way to assess creative potential seemingly is 
to use many indicators that cover its different aspects. This kind of attempt is embodied 
in the Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (TCT-DP) elaborated by Klaus 
Urban and Hans Jellen (Urban  & Jellen, 2010). Based on a componential model of 
creativity developed by Urban & Jellen (2010), it contains a series of different qualitative 
and quantitative indicators of creative potential measured through the use of a drawing 
task. The purpose of the test is to provide a culturally-fair, easily administrable measure 
applicable to wide range of age. A number of independent studies have affirmed the 
proposed qualities of the test, showing evidence of culture-fairness, good validity, high 
reliability and applicability to various populations (Karwowski  & Gralewski, 2012; 
Dollinger, Urban,  & James, 2004; Rudowicz, 2004; Chae, 2003; Cropley  & Cropley, 
2000; Wolanska & Necka, 1990). However, some drawbacks pertaining to the reliability 
of some indicators (Rudowicz, 2004) and factorial validity (Kalis, Roke,  & Krumina, 
2013) have been noted. The factor structure of the TCT-DP is described as being 
ambiguous. The authors of the test have proposed a structure of six factors that explain 
the relationships between criteria. Nonetheless, other researchers have found different 
factor structures (Lubart, Pacteau, Jacquet, & Caroff, 2010; Dollinger, Urban, & James, 
2004; Rudowicz, 2004; Cropley & Cropley, 2000). Thus, further efforts to examine its 
construct validity are needed. 
The test material consists of a frame drawn on an A4 paper sheet with 5 incomplete 
stimuli inside the frame and one outside of it. The first part of the instruction directs 
the test taker in an intriguing way to continue the incomplete drawing. Remaining 
instructions encourage the test taker to be free in the form of action.
Originally the TCT-DP provided a composite score that drew upon fourteen criteria 
(Urban & Jellen, 2010) that were applied to the completed drawing: Continuations (1), 
Completions (2), New elements (3), Connections made with a line (4), Connections 
made to produce a theme (5), Boundary breaking that is fragment dependent (6), 
Boundary breaking that is fragment independent (7), Perspective (8), Humour and 
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affectivity (9), Unconventionality A (10), Unconventionality B (11), Unconventionality 
C (12), Unconventionality D (13), Speed (14). The number of evaluation categories varies 
depending on specific criterion. Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 14 have seven categories 
with values ranging from 0 to 6. Criterion 13 has four categories with values ranging 
from 0 to 3. Criteria 6 and 7 have three categories with following possible values: 0, 3 
and 6. Criteria 10, 11 and 12 have two categories with following possible values: 0 and 3. 
Using the test guidelines proposed by the authors, both criteria scores and the total 
score of the TCT-DP show high inter-rater reliability in studies from different cultures 
(Rudowicz, 2004; Chae, 2003; Cropley  & Cropley, 2000; Wolanska  & Necka, 1990), 
with the exception of two criteria (9 and 11). They have the lowest inter-rater reliability 
(r = .615 and .675), thus decreasing the reliability for the composite score (Rudowicz, 
2004). 
The present study examines issues related to the reliability of the criteria Humour-
Affectivity (9) and Unconventionality B (11) and proposes solutions, as well as 
introduces additional criteria that capture different aspects of creative potential and 
thus may improve the measurement of creative potential. 
Problematic Criteria of the TCT-DP
The adaptation of the TCT-DP in Latvia (Kalis, Roke, & Krumina, 2013) identified 
problems in reference to the same two criteria (9 and 11) as was found in a study in 
Hong Kong (Rudowicz, 2004). Criterion 9 originally was defined as a drawing that 
elicits a humorous response, shows affection, emotion, or strong expressive power. 
Criterion 11 was defined as having “surrealistic, fictional and/or symbolic elements, 
themes or drawings” (Urban & Jellen, 2010). We found some similar characteristics for 
these criteria, for example, both of them have a subjective nature (Rudowicz, 2004), and 
both are defined with more than one feature, thus making them ambiguously perceived 
by evaluators, leading to an increase in the possibility of error caused by subjective 
interpretations. A possible solution to the problem is to separate corresponding criteria 
into sub-criteria. 
It was proposed to separate criterion 9 into three sub-criteria: 9-1 (Humour), 9-2 
(Emotions), and 9-3 (Expressiveness). The test taker receives up to six points in Humour 
if a drawing or its separate elements are created in a funny, witty, surprising, paradoxical 
or ironic way or if the test taker’s title is unexpected, thus making the drawing laughable, 
witty, or paradoxical. Zero points are given if there is no hint of humour in the drawing. 
Criterion 9-2 relates to emotions and affective states which the test taker assigns to the 
units. The test taker receives up to six points if the theme of the drawing is permeated 
with emotions or if units of the drawing express some emotional state (e.g., anger, joy, 
surprise), one or two points are given when minor sings of this criterion are observed 
(e.g., smiling faces). In regard to the sub-criterion Expressiveness, the test taker receives 
points if a drawing effectively demonstrates special expressive power and delivers the 
author’s idea by affecting the evaluator’s feelings or thoughts. Zero points are given if 
the drawing is completely inexpressive. One or two points are given if some expressive 
elements become central units of the drawing or if the complete drawing has a central 
idea but not sufficiently elaborated for the evaluator to be affected by it. Three to 
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four points are given if the drawing has a common theme or prominent unit(s) and 
is elaborated in such a way that affects the evaluator’s feelings or thoughts. Five to six 
points are given when the expressive features of the drawing are more pronounced and 
the evaluator can grasp a clear, intense, and effective message created by the author. 
Criterion 11 was separated into three sub-criteria: 11-1 (Symbolism), 11-2 
(Surrealism), and 11-3 (Fiction/fantasy). The test taker receives zero or three points 
in these sub-criteria. In Symbolism (11-1), three points are given if the test taker 
deliberately has utilized a symbolic theme that helps reveal the deepest meaning of the 
drawing. In Surrealism (11-2), three points are awarded if the test taker deliberately 
depicts units in a surrealistic, odd, and/or stylized way as well as if the portrayed units 
form a joint theme in an odd and intuitive way. In Fiction/fantasy (11-3), test taker 
receives three points if he or she depicts unrealistic themes, things, creatures, as well as 
images from fairy tales, myth, or one’s own imagination. 
New Criteria for the TCT-DP 
The score of the TCT-DP could be interpreted as the sum of the various 
manifestations of creative potential expressed by a person engaged in the specific task. 
Therefore, we assumed that the inclusion of additional relevant creativity indicators 
could contribute to the validity and precision of the instrument, thus leading to a better 
understanding of the creativity construct. The idea of additional criteria originally came 
as a result of scrutinized analysis of several hundred drawings of 9th grade students and 
university students, by integrating the expert’s observations with theoretical assumptions 
from different approaches to creativity. The ten additional criteria we propose are based 
on the components model of creativity (Urban & Jellen, 2010) and prior efforts in the 
assessment of creative potential (e.g., Goff & Torrance, 2002): synthesis of stimuli (N1), 
an image interrupted by border (N2), manipulation with the frame (N3), abstractness 
of the title (N4), agglutination (N5), realistic effects (N6), richness of imagination 
(N7), exaggeration (N8), movement (N9), personification (N10). The following section 
includes a brief description of each proposed criterion. More information about these 
criteria and examples for evaluation can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
Synthesis of stimuli in one complete gestalt (N1) could be interpreted as an 
attribute of the creative personality (e.g., Schmajuk, Aziz, & Bates, 2009; Baughman & 
Mumford, 1995; Rothenberg, 1986) since it embodies a tendency to discern something 
whole and meaningful in seeming chaos and thus to make synthesis possible. This 
tendency is assessed also with the Abbreviated Torrance Tests for Adults (ATTA; Goff & 
Torrance, 2002). This criterion also points to the person’s tendency to recognize an 
integral picture instead of concentrating on details (Barron, 1955, 1957). In contrast to 
criterion 5 (Connections made to produce a theme) which is similar in some respect, 
this new criterion deals with connections made to compose one object, not to unite 
several separate objects or images into one composition. Indications for evaluation are 
as follows: one point is given for each stimulus that is united in a joint image. When 
following this principle the smallest score for joined stimuli would be two therefore the 
one point should be subtracted from the total score of this criterion. Thus, the minimal 
value for this criterion is one, but the maximum value is five. It is not necessary to 
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connect all stimuli with lines in order to create a joint image. A test taker may receive 
five points for this criterion even in cases when none of stimuli are joined with a line. 
Points are not given if the stimuli are united in one image but the image is too abstract, 
incomprehensible or without concrete character (e.g., all stimuli combined create an 
abstract road or river). 
An image interrupted by the border (N2) refers to imagery as an important 
characteristic of creative potential (Houtz & Patricola, 1999). It also reflects a tendency 
to go beyond the border of the frame, thus releasing space for additional manipulation 
with stimuli. In this sense the criterion is somewhat similar to the original criterion 7 
and could be treated as its minor expression that illustrates stimulus freedom (Dacey & 
Lennon, 1998) but without its unconventional nature. Indications for evaluation: three 
points are given if a test taker draws an image that is interrupted by the frame as if the 
rest of it continues beyond it or exists in his imagination. Points are awarded only if the 
border of the frame interrupts an essential part (or more than half) of the image. Points 
are not given in this category if an interrupted image is too abstract, incomprehensible, 
or without concrete character. 
Manipulation with the frame (N3) reflects an important quality of the creative 
person, namely, an alternative application of a given element originally meant for 
another purpose. This criterion assumes the use of the big frame as a stimulus (in 
addition to the given six stimuli). It is associated with freedom from functional fixedness 
(Dacey & Lennon, 1998), and courage to overcome the traditional use of the frame as a 
line which should not be crossed. Indications for evaluation: the test taker receives three 
points if he or she employs the frame as a stimulus and makes it a part of the drawing 
(e.g., creates an image from it or uses it as part of the larger image). 
Abstractness of the title (N4) could indicate an attempt to elaborate on the theme 
and/or a tendency to assign deeper meaning to the drawing. This criterion is adapted 
from the ATTA (Goff  & Torrance, 2002). Indications for evaluation: the test taker 
receives zero points if the drawing has no title or is very simple and concrete (e.g., a dog, 
a house). One point is given if the title is applied in order to name some attribute of the 
illustrated object or to describe what is depicted in the drawing (e.g., charming house; a 
boy is going to the school). The test taker is awarded two points if the title is somehow 
abstract but not enough to be categorized as fully abstract. Three points are given if the 
title is abstract, and complements and enriches the drawing by revealing its deepest and 
covert meaning (e.g., “The time of my life”). 
Agglutination (N5) reflects a direct manifestation of imagination that indicates 
an ability and tendency to connect completely different things in one united image 
(Rothenberg, 1999). 
Indications for evaluation: the test taker receives three points if he or she connects 
two or more completely different things in one joint image (e.g., a human being with 
wings; a dog house with wheels, running flower). Points are not given for minor 
manifestations of this criterion (e.g., sun or flower is depicted with simple human-like 
face). 
Realistic effects (N6) in drawings could be considered as indicators of creative 
potential since a tendency to elaborate an image as if it were real involves certain aspects 
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of imagery (Houtz & Patricola, 1999). Indications for evaluation: the test taker receives 
up to six points if the drawing impresses the evaluator by making him or her feel that 
the depicted things are real because they touch one’s senses (e.g., taste, smell, vision). It 
could also be described as an ability to revive things with realistic effects. Zero or one 
point is given when the drawing is made in a very schematic or plain way. Two to four 
points are given when some images have pronounced qualities of this criterion. Five or 
six points are given when the complete drawing or specific units resemble things as they 
are in reality.
Richness of imagination (N7) illustrates significant characteristic of creative 
potential since it involves a tendency to change conventional thing into salient ones 
through the effects of vivid elements and odd attributes (Singer, 1999), to create objects 
and images which are enriched with unique features. Indications for evaluation: the 
test taker receives up to 6 points if an image or complete drawing is impressive by 
its uniqueness, singularity and vividness. Zero or one point is given when an image 
or objects are depicted in a traditional and stereotypical way. Two to four points 
characterize drawings with partial manifestation of vividness and uniqueness. Five and 
six points are given to drawings that are clearly salient due to pronounced attributes of 
this criterion. A high score in this category is possible even if a low score is obtained on 
the criteria of realistic effects (N6).
Exaggeration (N8) in drawings is interpreted as an unconventional way of 
displaying imaginative expressions or emphasizing some idea, mainly by stressing or 
highlighting some part of the drawing or some of its qualities. Indications for evaluation: 
the test taker receives three points if she or he applies a principle of exaggeration (i.e., 
deliberately diminishing or increasing some detail of the image or the complete image 
in relation to other parts of the image or other objects). Exaggeration could be attributed 
also to other phenomena (e.g., a man screams so loud that dishes break; a girl’s tears 
create a river).
Illustration of movement (N9) in drawings is the aspect of elaboration that 
emphasizes action and thus makes the drawing more expressive, dynamic and alive. 
Illustration of movement is an indicator included also in the ATTA (Goff & Torrance, 
2004). Indications for evaluation: the test taker receives three points if an illustration of 
movement is profound (e.g., jumping dog, falling rocks). One point is given when some 
minor sign of movement is discerned or some process is depicted. If more processes are 
depicted the test taker receives 1 point for each process (e.g., raining, snowing, glowing 
light-bulb or smoking chimney) but no more than three points can be received. 
Personification (N10) is an aspect of imagination also related to fantasy and 
agglutination, yet is autonomous since it implies a specific view of things, animals 
or even natural phenomena, attributing human qualities to them. Indications for 
evaluation: the test taker receives three points if he or she ascribes human qualities to 
things, animals or phenomena, making them human-like (e.g., the Republic of Latvia 
is represented in the image of a woman dressed in a national costume). Points for this 
criterion are not given for stereotypically depicted faces in the sun or flower.
The purpose of this study was to examine the inter-rater reliability and convergent 
validity for the proposed criteria while employing structural equation modelling (SEM). 
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SEM allows one to divide observed values into true variance and error variance that 
is essential for accurate calculation of reliability (Raykov  & Marcoulides, 2011) and 
estimation of correlation between constructs in order to gain better evidence of their 
validity. 
Method
Participants 
Three hundred sixteen students, ages 18–34 (M = 20.87, SD = 1.96), 71% female, 
from 25 subgroups representing various university study programs and high schools 
of Latvia participated in the study. In order to involve students in the research we 
contacted heads of study programmes and asked them to organize some time before or 
after lectures for addressing students about participation in the study. 
Measures
Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (Urban & Jellen, 2010). Test has 
two forms (A and B) but only one form was used in the study. In the test adaptation 
study in Latvia a very high interrater reliability was found (ρ  =  .972, 99% confidence 
interval .963-.980, lowest factorial weight (WLSMV method) was .949) as well as very 
high stability of obtained scores (Friedman χ2 (2, N  =  212)  =  2.197, p  =  .333) in the 
total result of test (Table 2). Interrater reliability was suitably high also in the separate 
criteria: ρ = .830 – .986 (Kālis, Krūmiņa, & Roķe, 2012). 
Procedure
A short instruction was given before the testing: “Today you will have an 
opportunity to participate in the study of adaptation of a psychological test. Please 
work individually – it is very important for us to have your individual work”. After this 
introduction every participant received a form A of the TCT-DP and instructions were 
read aloud. 
Three trained researchers in the field of creativity evaluated each criterion of 
TCT-DP for 316 cases. Criteria Humour/Affectivity (9) and Unconventionality B (11) 
were calculated from 3 sub-criteria representing relevant features of each criterion. 
In order to adhere to the original computation of total score of the test, the score in 
corresponding criteria was obtained as a maximum value of its sub-criteria. We assumed 
that this strategy which employs maximum value provides similar results as the original 
evaluation since points for these criteria are given if any of its features are apparent. 
The same number of cases as in the reliability study were used to establish convergent 
validity of sub-criteria of 9 and 11 and new criteria by correlating them with total score 
of the TCT-DP. 
Strategy for analyses
Reliability usually is defined as a proportion of true variance in relation to observed 
variance of measurement, thus indicating precision of an instrument (Brown, 2006). 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is often used as the estimate of reliability 
irrespective of strong assumptions supposing that the errors of items are uncorrelated 
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as well as that all items are uniformly and highly related to the construct. If these 
assumptions are not met, then Cronbach’s alpha can markedly underestimate composite 
reliability (Raykov  & Marcoulides, 2011). An alternative way to estimate reliability 
is to base calculations on estimates of a factor model. This approach was initiated by 
McDonald (1978, 1999) who proposed two kinds of omega (ω) coefficients as estimates 
of reliability in case of several factors (ωt) and in case of a general factor (ωh). Raykov & 
Marcoulides (2011) offer indications for calculation of reliability employing (MLR) 
estimation procedure in Mplus. The approach suggested by them is appropriate when 
variables are continuous. When variables are categorical the most effective approach 
for calculation of estimates is to use a robust weighted least squares estimator using 
diagonal weight matrix (WLSMV) that operates with tetrachoric or polychoric 
correlation matrixes (Flora & Curran, 2004). As squared factor loadings calculated with 
WLSMV estimator in completely standardized solution represent proportion of variance 
explained by factor, these can be used for calculation of reliability. The reliability was 
calculated with WLSMV estimator, following the procedure suggested by Stone, Otten, 
Ringlever, & Hiemstra (2013). Three estimates of reliability are provided in this study 
for illustration purposes, but only coefficient ω calculated with WLSMV is considered 
to be the most appropriate estimate of reliability since all criteria are evaluated with 2 to 
7 categories. 
All data were structured according to the measurement model where each evaluator 
represents an indicator of latent variable and correlations between errors equal 0 (see 
figure 1). 
Estimation of reliability was done according to Measurement model 1 depicted in 
Figure 1. Correlations between sub-criteria of criteria 9 and 11 were estimated according 
to the Measurement model 2 illustrated in Figure 1 where latent variable A represents 
one facet of the original criteria 9 or 11, while latent variable B represents other aspect 
of relevant criteria. Calculation of correlations between other criteria and the total score 
of the TCT-DP was accomplished in a similar way following Model 2 in Figure 1. 
Note. X1, Y1, Z1 represents indicators of latent variable A (e.g., total score of TCT-DP) which are assessments of three 
evaluators but X2, Y2, Z2 correspondingly represents indicators of latent variable B (e.g., criterion humour (9-1)) 
assessed by the same evaluators.
Figure 1. Measurement Model for Estimation of Correlation between Constructs.
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As correlations are calculated by employing the model approach, it is important to 
evaluate how well the model fits for observed data since the estimates resulting from 
model with poor fit could be implausible. The evaluation of model fit used various fit 
indices – root mean square error approximation (RMSEA; Browne  & Cudeck, 1992; 
Steiger  & Lind, 1980), comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), tucker-lewis index 
(TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973) and weighted root mean square residual (WRMR; Muthén, 
1998-2004). The WRMR is an alternative to the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) and is appropriate for use with categorical data. Hu and Bentler (1999) 
proposed following cutoff values minimizing type I and type II errors: for TLI and 
CFI > .95, for RMSEA < .06. Simulation studies have shown that the same cutoff values 
are appropriate for models with categorical variables (Muthén, 1998-2004). For WRMR 
cutoff value is less or equal than 1 (Yu, 2002).
All estimates of measurement models were calculated with Mplus version 7 
(Muthen & Muthen, 2012).
Results
Criteria 9 and 11 consist of different aspects that represent one measure. Thus, 
it is important to test whether these different aspects are related to each other within 
relevant categories. All facets of criteria 9 are significantly related to each other (see 
Table 1). Nonetheless, correlation of sub-criterion 9-3 with other two facets could be 
considered as too small for making a parcel (Graham  & Tatterson, 2000). The same 
problem but more pronounced was observed for criterion 11 where sub-criterion 11-1 
was not significantly related to other two sub-criteria. 
Table 1. Correlations between Sub-criteria
Humour
(9-1)
Emotions
(9-2)
Symbolism
(11-1)
Surrealism 
(11-2)
Emotions (9-2) .83 (.03)*** - - -
Expression (9-3) .46 (.06)*** .26 (.06)*** - -
Surrealism (11-2) - - -.06 (.08) -
Fantasy (11-3) - - .28 (.31) .54 (.12)***
Note. *** p < .001.In parentheses standard error of an estimate is shown. 
Analysis of reliability (see Table 3) using Cronbach’s alpha and ωh coefficient 
calculated with MLR estimator shows that almost all criteria except criterion N8 reach a 
generally accepted level of reliability (i.e., .7) (Kline, 2000). When WLSMV estimator for 
categorical variables is applied estimates essentially increase indicating high reliability 
for all criteria.
Table 2 provides information about models fit (Model 2 in Figure 1) where 
correlations between criteria and the total score of the TCT-DP are investigated. Data 
on comparative fit indices (CFI, TLI) and absolute fit index (WRMR) suggest that all 
models have good fit. RMSEA index which incorporates penalty function for poor 
parsimony (Brown, 2006) suggests that one model for criteria 9-3 has some problems 
with fit. Considering the fact that all remaining fit indices give evidence of good fit 
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and also that we are not interested to evaluate parsimony of model we assumed that 
estimates of this model are not substantially biased. 
Table 2. Goodness of Fit Indices
Categories χ2 df p RMSEA Cfit CFI TLI WRMR
Separated criteria:
9-1) Humour 5.58 8 .70 .00 .95 1.00 1.01 .24
9-2) Emotions 13.00 8 .11 .04 .53 1.00 1.00 .41
9-3) Expression 29.94 8 .00 .09 .02 .99 .98 .45
11-1) Symbolism 10.59 8 .23 .03 .69 .99 .99 .46
11-2) Surrealism 12.23 8 .14 .04 .58 .99 .98 .50
11-3) Fiction 14.09 10 .17 .04 .67 .99 .99 .55
New criteria:
Synthesis of stimuli (N1) 18.11 9 .04 .06 .34 1.00 1.00 .33
 Image interrupted by border 
(N2) 6.46 8 .60 .00 .92 1.00 1.00 .25
Manipulation with the frame 
(N3) 13.57 8 .09 .05 .49 .99 .99 .50
Abstractness of the title (N4) 13.01 8 .11 .04 .53 1.00 .99 .37
Agglutination (N5) 12.58 10 .25 .03 .76 .99 .99 .48
Realistic effects (N6) 9.28 8 .31 .02 .77 1.00 1.00 .24
Richness of imagination (N7) 16.90 8 .03 .06 .31 .99 .98 .31
Exaggeration (N8) 4.13 8 .85 .00 .98 1.00 1.02 .16
Movement (N9) 20.45 10 .03 .06 .32 .99 .99 .52
Personification (N10) 4.06 8 .85 .00 .98 1.00 1.01 .15
9-2) Emotions2 11.08 8 .20 .04 .66 1.00 .99 .44
9-2) Emotions3 10.70 8 .22 .03 .68 .99 .99 .46
9-2) Emotions4 5.04 8 .75 .00 .96 1.00 1.02 .20
Note. Cfit (Closeness of model fit) is probability that RMSEA is greater than .05; In models with 9 and 10 degrees of 
freedom, an additional degree of freedom was obtained specifying equal factor loadings for two or all three 
evaluators. Additional restriction to the model was done in the case of negative latent variable covariance matrix 
due to correlation greater than 1. Restrictions were retained if problem of negative psi matrix was solved and the 
model had good fit. 
Correlations between criteria and the total score of the TCT-DP could be considered 
as an indicator of convergent validity. Criteria in the context of this test are indicators of 
one general measure of creative potential. Thus, correlation coefficients between them 
should be statistically significant. Criteria of Emotions (9-2) and Symbolism (11-1) that 
are sub-criteria of criteria 9 and 11 did not meet these requirements (Table 3). 
Deeper investigation of criterion 9-2 revealed that the reason for low correlation 
with the TCT-DP could be the shortcomings of indications for evaluation that assign 
one or two points if the test taker identifies in the drawing weakly pronounced features 
of this criterion, such as faces with a stereotypical smile. The low correlations led us 
to look at this criterion more critically, assuming that such minor signs in regard to 
emotion expression was rather related to a stereotypical way of drawing humans 
or animals than to a deliberately elaborated expression of emotions of the depicted 
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subjects. Therefore, we recoded the rating categories of this criterion in three ways in 
order to test for the most appropriate approach. 
The first modification of this criterion, denoted as emotions2, was done by merging 
the first two categories 0 and 1 and assigning them the meaning that no sign of the 
criterion is observed. The remaining two modifications were made similarly, merging 
the first three (emotions3) and first four (emotions4) categories (see the last rows of Table 
2 and Table 3). When the first two (emotions2), three (emotions3) or four (emotions4) 
categories of criterion were merged, correlations became greater and statistically 
significant (see last rows in Table 3), thus providing empirical support that such minor 
expressions of emotions were inappropriate for separate scoring. All three alternative 
approaches had significant correlations with the total score of the TCT-DP, with the 
highest correlation for criterion emotions4 in which categories 0, 1, 2, 3 were merged 
into one category with value 0. Both convergent validity (see Table 3) and frequencies 
of categories were utilized in order to choose the most appropriate approach (see 
Table 4). If the evaluation starting only from category 4 (emotions4) is included in the 
analysis, then only 1% of sample receives points in this criterion. Thus, the selection of 
the category with value 3 as the starting point for evaluation seems reasonable so as to 
provide opportunity for about 3% of sample to receive points.
Table 3. Reliability and Convergent Validity for Sub-criteria and New Criteria
α ωh MLR  ωh WLSMV
(CI 95%)
corr. with TCT-DP 
(SE)
N 316 316 316 316
Separated criteria:
9-1) Humour .71 .73 .86 (.81-.90) .28*** (.06)
9-2) Emotions .87 .90 .94 (.93-.96) .10 (.06)
9-3) Expression .88 .88 .90 (.88-.92) .76***(.02)
11-1) Symbolism .70 .73 .95 (.89-.99) .09 (.16)
11-2) Surrealism .73 .74 .91 (.86-.96) .29***(.09)
11-3) Fiction/fantasy .72 .72 .90 (.80-.99) .30***(.10)
New criteria:
Synthesis of stimuli (N1) .93 .93 .99 (.97-.99) .43***(.06)
Image interrupted by border (N2) .87 .87 .97 (.95-.99) .32***(.07)
Manipulation with the frame (N3) .79 .79 .97 (.94-.99) .50***(.08)
Abstractness of the title (N4) .87 .87 .95 (.93-.97) .34***(.07)
Agglutination (N5) .75 .76 .96 (.90-.99) .43***(.12)
Realistic effects (N6) .83 .85 .88 (.85-.91) .56***(.04)
Richness of imagination (N7) .78 .79 .87 (.84-.90) .68***(.04)
Exaggeration (N8) .66 .67 .89 (.83-.96) .23**(.12)
Movement (N9) .83 .85 .93 (.91-.95) .38***(.06)
Personification (N10) .80 .80 .98 (.95-.99) .36**(.09)
9-2) Emotions2 .76 .83 .90 (.86-.95) .21***(.06)
9-2) Emotions3 .63 .67 .82 (.81-.96) .34***(.08)
9-2) Emotions4 .65 .66 .91 (.82-.99) .44***(.10)
Note. **  p < .05; ***  p < .001. CI – confidence interval; SE – standard error.
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Counting the frequencies of categories for each criterion provides a way to 
analyse the quality of criteria. Frequency in each category of criteria shows how many 
respondents have the corresponding value, thus giving approximate information about 
the difficulty of this category or the criterion itself (see Table 4). We calculated them 
as the rounded-off average evaluation from all three evaluators in order to gain more 
reliable frequencies. Sub-criterion 11-1, and new criteria N3 and N5 is received by less 
than 5% of sample.
Table 4. Percentage of Sample Who Received the Following Scores in Regard  
to Each Criterion
Categories 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 >0*
Separated criteria:
9-1) Humour 80 8 8 3 2 0 0 20
9-2) Emotions 61 18 17 2 1 0 0 39
9-3) Expression 14 15 28 21 13 7 1 86
11-1) Symbolism 98 - - 2 - - - 2
11-2) Surrealism 88 - - 12 - - - 12
11-3) Fiction 95 - - 5 - - - 5
New criteria:
a) Synthesis of stimuli (N1) 82 12 2 2 2 0 0 18
b) Image interrupted by border (N2) 83 - - 17 - - - 17
c) Manipulation with the frame (N3) 98 - - 2 - - - 2
d) Abstractness of the title (N4) 73 11 11 5 0 0 0 27
e) Agglutination (N5) 99 - - 1 - - - 1
f) Realistic effects (N6) 58 15 11 9 4 2 1 42
g) Richness of imagination (N7) 58 20 14 5 2 1 0 42
h) Exaggeration (N8) 95 - - 5 - - - 5
i) Movement (N9) 63 25 9 3 - - - 37
j) Personification (N10) 94 - - 6 - - - 6
Note:* – this column shows percentage of sample who received more points than zero. 
Discussion
The results of this study are two-fold. They affirm the convergent validity of the 
new criteria. They also provide useful evidence as to the validity of the TCT-DP itself. 
All of the new criteria, representing various theoretically based indicators of creative 
potential, had positive and strong relationships with the TCT-DP total score, thus 
providing additional information about the measure’s satisfactory convergent validity. 
Analysis of correlations between sub-criteria (Humour, Emotions, Expressions 
and Symbolism, Surrealism, Fantasy) suggests that facets of criteria Humour/Affectivity 
and Unconventionality B are better evaluated separately as they barely represent 
one common measure. Thus, the measurement error can increase due to an obscure 
evaluation process. This explains why the problem of low reliability of these criteria was 
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met both in our previous research (Kalis, Roke, & Krumina, 2013) and in research of 
TCT-DP adaptation in Hong Kong (Rudowicz, 2004). 
High estimates of reliability indicate that both the sub-divided and the new criteria 
have clear instructions and are similarly understood by evaluators. With respect to 
convergent validity, the insufficient strength of correlations was found between the 
TCT-DP total score and two sub-criteria (Emotions and Symbolism). 
Additional analysis of the sub-criterion Emotions led to the conclusion that 
correlation with the TCT-DP total score increases when only very pronounced signs 
of emotional expression are scored. Such findings suggest that in future studies a seven 
category approach (as in original scoring) could be substituted with a two category 
approach where only the presence or absence of the criterion is evaluated. 
No significant correlation was found between the sub-criterion Symbolism (11-1) 
and the TCT-DP total score. This finding could be partly explained by the fact that only 
2% of the sample received points on this criterion, thus lowering the estimate by chance. 
If this criterion indeed is an indicator of creative potential and is evaluated properly, 
then the variance of the one factor model that stems from the original instruction, 
summing all criteria into total score, may not account for specific variance related to 
this criterion. Possibly criterion 11-1 would have a high and relevant factor loading if 
the relationships between the criteria of the TCT-DP were explained by a two or more 
factor model, rather than with the one factor model. 
With respect to frequency analysis, some of the new criteria (Symbolism, 
Manipulation with the frame, Agglutination) were identified very rarely (less than 
5%), but this does not necessarily mean that these criteria are not relevant since the 
full psychometric information of this item is yet unknown. The full information 
of these criteria could be estimated in a two parameter factor model. However, such 
research would require a larger sample size and reliable factor structure of the TCT-DP. 
If these criteria were found to have high correlation with the factor, they could serve 
as a valuable information source for the evaluation of individuals with high scores on 
the latent variable. Hence we suggest retaining these criteria until the factor structure 
of the TCT-DP is identified, thus making possible a more in-depth evaluation of the 
psychometric properties of all of the criteria. 
While the true factor structure of the TCT-DP is unknown, the proposed solutions 
for the evaluation of the problematic criteria and the newly developed criteria could be 
applied under the assumption of general factor of the TCT-DP.
The findings from this study can hasten future research on the factor structure of 
criteria of the TCT-DP. The true factor structure of the TCT-DP will give an opportunity 
to specify a measurement model of creative potential based on an expanded number of 
criteria (indicators), thus allowing to separate error variance from true measurement 
variance. Such research is topical in the field of creativity in order to gain more reliable, 
valid, and objective measurements of creative potential. 
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Abstract
This study focuses on the construct of global motivation. Vallerand (2000) portrays motivation 
as a three-level construct, manifesting at the global, life domains, and situational levels. 
Contrary to context-specific motivation, global motivation is described as a general tendency 
to base one’s actions on intrinsic/extrinsic motives. This hierarchical model of motivation is 
grounded on Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), which suggests that motivation 
to undertake certain activities ranges from externally controlled to self-determined and, thus, 
may be placed on the external-internal motivation continuum. This study aimed to test the 
psychometric properties of the Lithuanian version of the Global Motivation scale (GMS-28; 
Guay, Mageau  & Vallerand,  2003). It has seven subscales and is designed to measure global 
motivational orientations. Moreover, it can be used as a basis when developing other context-
specific motivation measures. 
The sample for this study was drawn from the Lithuanian population (N = 382). In order to test 
scale factorial validity, four alternative models were built. Confirmatory factor analysis has shown 
that a slightly modified 7-factor model fits the data best (RMSEA = .06; CFI = .90; TLI = .88). 
Item analysis has revealed that all items have high loadings (> .40) in their factors; moreover, 
adequate item-total correlations were obtained. Finally, scale internal consistency analysis has 
shown all the subscales to have acceptable reliability coefficients. Based on these results it is con-
cluded that the Lithuanian version of the scale is suitable for use in further Lithuanian studies.
Keywords: global motivation, self-determination theory, hierarchical model of motivation, 
psychometric properties
INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in investigating motivation. Motivation and self-regulation of 
behaviour has probably been one of the most widely investigated topics in the past few 
decades. The question of motivation addresses important issues both in fundamental 
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psychology (e.g. understanding motivation as part of personality self-regulation 
mechanisms) and within applied settings (e.g. evaluating and, possibly, enhancing 
motivation in school or work contexts). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been numerous attempts to define, ex-
plain, and assess this construct in a variety of ways. Traditionally, research on motivation 
has included the analysis of one or more of the following components: psychological 
needs satisfaction, internal and external incentives of individual actions, beliefs about 
one’s inner qualities, expectancies related to certain (un)favourable external conditions, 
etc. Self-Determination Theory (henceforth – SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000, 2008a; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000, 2006) is a recent theoretical approach integrating most of the above-
mentioned aspects and offering a novel and broad outlook on human functioning.
SDT, as defined by its authors, is a macro-theory (Deci & Ryan, 2008a). In order to 
explain human motivation, it encompasses a variety of phenomena, such as personal 
factors, self-regulation, basic psychological needs, social factors, etc. Numerous 
empirical research studies prove it to be applicable in a variety of settings. For example, 
it is used in investigating motivational factors in educational settings (Deci, Koestner & 
Ryan, 2001; Ratelle, Guay, Vallerand, Larose  & Senécal, 2007; Vansteenkiste, Sierens, 
Soenens, Luyckx & Lens, 2009; Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon & Deci, 2004), in 
work contexts (Deci, Connell & Ryan, 1989; Gagné & Deci, 2005), in counselling and 
mental health services (Ryan & Deci, 2008; Markland, Ryan, Tobin & Rollnick, 2005), 
or in research on psychological or social well-being (Deci  & Ryan, 2008b; Schmuck, 
Kasser & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Huta & Deci, 2008; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci & Kasser, 2004). 
Motivation and behaviour regulation in SDT. A significant feature of SDT lies 
in its focus on the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of motivation as portrayed by the 
continuum of autonomous vs. controlled types of behaviour regulation. This notion 
is important both from the theoretical and from the measurement perspective. 
According to Deci and Ryan (2008a) many earlier theoretical approaches preferred to 
measure the strength (or ‘magnitude’) of motivation when analyzing individual actions. 
Whereas within SDT it is implied that the type of behaviour regulation (controlled vs. 
autonomous) should be a better predictor of different behavioural outcomes. As a result, 
its evaluation should be more informative than the generic score of motivation strength.
According to SDT referring to the type of behaviour regulation that lies behind 
motivation can be labelled as autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, or 
amotivation (in detail, see Gagné  & Deci, 2005; Deci  & Ryan, 2000; 2008a; Ryan  & 
Deci, 2006; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). These are broad categories basically 
reflecting the underlying incentives of human actions. 
Based on the principles of SDT (Deci  & Ryan, 2008a; Ryan  & Deci, 2006), 
autonomous motivation can be treated as intrinsic, since when autonomously 
motivated, one’s actions are based on his/her own intrinsic incentives and volition. 
Controlled motivation is described as being more or less based on extrinsic regulation 
(i.e. extrinsic rewards and punishments). In this case, engaging in certain behaviours 
is related to one’s attempt to gain approval, to avoid shame, to maintain self-esteem, 
and the like (Deci & Ryan, 2008a). Finally, both autonomous and controlled types of 
motivation are substantially different from amotivation which means the absence 
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of purposefulness (Deci  & Ryan, 2008a; Gagné  & Deci, 2005) and, therefore, can be 
thought of as a relatively static condition. Nevertheless, as emphasized by Gagné and 
Deci (2005), SDT is not a stage theory, i.e., one need not go through all the sequence of 
regulation types to reach autonomy. 
Although SDT employs a much more complex classification of motivational 
types and behaviour regulation processes than presented above, in conceptualizing 
motivation it focuses on the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic motives. To be more 
precise, motivation can be pictured as a continuum where behaviour regulation ranges 
from completely autonomous (hence, called the true self-regulation) to externally 
controlled (Gagné  & Deci, 2005; Ryan  & Deci, 2006; Deci  & Ryan, 2000). SDT pays 
particular attention to explaining the processes of controlled and partially autonomous 
behaviour regulation, further categorizing behavior as externally regulated, introjected, 
identified, or integrated. External regulation can be placed at the extreme end of the 
motivation continuum and reflects the dependency of one’s actions on external factors, 
whereas integrated regulation means that one’s motives of certain actions are well 
integrated into his/her system of values and beliefs (Ryan  & Deci, 2000). Therefore, 
those activities that are based on either identified or integrated regulation can be 
considered as relatively autonomous (despite the fact that they would fall under the 
label of ‘extrinsic motivation’), whereas those activities that are extrinsically regulated 
or based on introjected regulation are considered to be non-autonomous (Deci & Ryan, 
2008a; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
As far as motivational types are concerned, SDT has accumulated substantial 
empirical support. Many research studies and critical reviews (e.g., Vallerand, 
Pelletier, & Koestner, 2008; Lavigne, Vallerand, & Miquelon, 2007; Lin, Tsai, & Chiu, 
2009; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2009; Vansteenkiste, Lens, de Witte, & Feather, 2005; 
Vansteenkiste, Smeets, Soenens, Lens, Matos,  & Deci, 2010; Weinstein, DeHaan,  & 
Ryan, 2010) support the idea that investigation of the above-mentioned motivational 
continuum provides a solid basis for explaining and predicting human behaviour. At 
this point it is important to note that SDT does not focus solely on the discussion of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation – this conceptualization is an integral part of broader 
theoretical considerations of human functioning that fall beyond the scope of this 
article. What SDT does is that it offers a framework for measuring motivation with 
regard to different types of behaviour regulation. The measurement issues are further 
discussed by introducing the Hierarchical Model of Motivation proposed by Vallerand 
(1997; 2000), and the Global Motivation Scale which is based on it.
Evaluation of motivational types in the Hierarchical Model of Motivation. The 
hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation proposed by Vallerand (1997) 
complements SDT and provides a promising approach for investigating motivation. In 
this model motivation is portrayed as a three-level (hierarchical) construct, manifesting 
at the global, life domains, and situational levels (Vallerand, 1997; 2000; Vallerand & 
Ratelle, 2002). Two important points have to be made referring to the evaluation and 
measurement of motivation.
First, according to this model, the above-mentioned levels of motivation and their 
measurement differ in specificity, the situational level to be considered the most specific. 
The analysis of motivation within the situational level mainly addresses the question 
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of why people do behave in one or another way in a specific situation. However, it is 
presumed that situational motivation is not a stable phenomenon, as it is influenced by 
many contextual factors. Furthermore, the life-domains level encompasses relatively stable 
motivational orientations manifesting in different domains of activity (a variety of domains 
may be listed, however, research studies point out learning, leisure and interpersonal 
relationships to be the most important for young adults). Although relatively stable, 
motivation at this level may nevertheless fluctuate depending on various (social) factors 
that vary according to each domain. Finally, at the global level, motivation is thought 
to be a relatively stable construct (in relation to the other levels) characterizing general 
motivational orientations of an individual (Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002; Vallerand, 2000). 
The latter is one of the most intriguing and yet somewhat challenging part of the model, 
both theoretically and methodologically. Holding to an assumption that motivation is a 
hierarchical construct, one may imply that, besides investigating motivation for specific 
activities, it is equally possible to determine one’s global motivational orientation. In other 
words, the hierarchical view on motivation suggests a framework in which motivation 
might be analyzed as a relatively stable personal characteristic. 
The second notion refers to the concept of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In 
accordance with SDT, the hierarchical model discusses a range of motivational subtypes 
(the so-called motivational orientations, which essentially correspond to the range 
of behaviour regulation subtypes in SDT). In total, seven subtypes are identified, as 
described in Table 1.
Table 1. Motivational Orientations in the Hierarchical Model of Motivation  
(taken from Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002, p. 42–43)
Title Description
Intrinsic motivation 
To know (IMK) Implies engaging in activities because of the pleasure and satisfaction 
derived from learning, exploring, and understanding new things
To accomplish (IMTA) Refers to engaging in activities because of pleasure and satisfaction derived 
from trying to surpass oneself, creating, or accomplishing something
To experience stimulation 
(IMES)
Operates when one is engaged in an activity because of the stimulating 
sensations associated with it
Extrinsic motivation 
External regulation (EMER) Acts are performed to attain a positive end state, which are separate from 
the activity itself. It is the least self-determined type of extrinsic motivation
Introjected regulation 
(EMIN)
The first stage of the internalization process, where individuals start to 
internalize the reasons for their behaviour. However, motivation is still not 
self-determined because this type of regulation deals with past external 
contingencies that have now been internalized. The person acts out of 
obligation, in order to avoid feeling of shame and internal pressure.
Identified regulation (EMID) The behaviour is regulated through the identification with the activity: 
the reasons to engage in an activity are internalized such that the activity 
is judged valuable by the person; the person performs the activity with 
a sense of choice. Although identification implies choice, the choice to 
engage in some activities is not necessarily coherent with other self-
structures. The person acting out of identified reasons is said to be 
relatively self-determined.
Amotivation (A) Relative absence of motivation
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Motivational orientations mentioned above can be measured by various 
instruments, depending on the context within which motivation is analyzed (i.e. which 
level is taken into account). In order to measure motivation at the global level, the 
Global Motivation Scale (GMS-28) was proposed by Guay et al. (2003).
The Global Motivation Scale (GMS-28). Initially constructed in French language 
and followed by its English equivalent, this scale has been widely used in various 
research studies (Guay et  al., 2003). In terms of application it has shown to be quite 
universal. For example, the Global Motivation Scale was used to collect empirical 
data aimed at testing the validity of the Hierarchical Model of Motivation (Guay et al. 
2003), as well as to analyze coping processes (Amiot, Blanchard  & Gaudreau, 2008), 
stress experiences among young adults (Julien, Guay, Senécal  & Poitras, 2009), and 
satisfaction with retirement (Stephan, Fouquereau & Fernandez, 2008), etc.
The Global Motivation Scale is a Likert-type scale including a variety of items that 
reflect possible motives for engaging oneself in certain actions. The structure of the scale 
corresponds to the conceptual definition of motivation provided in the Hierarchical 
Model of Motivation (Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002; Vallerand, 2000). It consists of seven 
subscales aimed at measuring the motivational subtypes identified in the model – three 
subscales measure intrinsic motivation, three subscales measure extrinsic motivation, 
and one subscale is aimed to measure amotivation. 
The scale has proven to have adequate psychometric properties, such as good 
construct and concurrent validity, as well as high internal consistency (for details, see 
Guay et al., 2003; Julien et al., 2009). However, reports on scale psychometric properties 
are mainly based on the original study by Guay and colleagues (2003) and there is little 
data so far on how it may work in different cultures. 
The aim of this study is to test the psychometric properties of the Global Motivation 
Scale and to discuss its applicability in the Lithuanian context. Doing this serves two 
purposes. First, by introducing the Lithuanian version of GMS-28, this study addresses 
the issue of lack of valid Lithuanian language instruments measuring motivational 
constructs. Second, it provides some empirical data on the cross-cultural applicability 
of the scale
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 382 Lithuanian residents: 111 were male 
(29.1%), 270 were female (70.7%), one respondent’s gender was undisclosed. The age 
of the respondents varied from 19 to 75 years (M = 32.2; SD = 12.5). A more detailed 
description of respondent distribution across gender and age groups is provided in 
Table 2.
The sample consisted of respondents from the following occupational groups: 
employed, self-employed, retired, and students. They came from various regions in 
Lithuania, the majority of them residing around two major Lithuanian cities, Vilnius 
and Klaipeda. The student subsample consisted of students pursuing their studies 
at Vilnius University, Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences, and Klaipeda 
University.
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Table 2. Respondent distribution across age and gender groups
Age group Distribution
Gender
Male Female Total
19
Frequency 6 19 25
% 24.00% 76.00% 100.00%
20-29
Frequency 64 113 177
% 36.20% 63.80% 100.00%
30-39
Frequency 18 49 67
% 26.90% 73.10% 100.00%
40-49
Frequency 15 44 59
% 25.40% 74.60% 100.00%
50-59
Frequency 8 41 49
% 16.30% 83.70% 100.00%
60-69
Frequency 0 3 3
% .00% 100.00% 100.00%
70-79
Frequency 0 1 1
% .00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total
Frequency 111 270 381
% 29.10% 70.90% 100.00%
Measures. The Global Motivation Scale (GMS-28; Guay et  al., 2003) was used 
in the study. With the author’s permission the scale was translated from English into 
Lithuanian. In order to ensure the quality of translation, it was concurrently made by 
two translators and then one final translation was agreed upon.
The original version of the Global Motivation Scale consists of 28 items, which are 
to be rated on a seven-point Likert type scale. It has seven subscales that measure the 
following types of motivation: intrinsic motivation to know, intrinsic motivation toward 
accomplishment, intrinsic motivation to experience stimulation, external motivation–
identified, external motivation–introjected, external regulation, and amotivation.
The scale is based on the propositions of both Self-Determination Theory (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000) and the Hierarchical Model of Motivation (Vallerand, 2000; Vallerand & 
Ratelle, 2002). It is aimed at measuring the global level of motivation which is described 
in detail in Vallerand and Ratelle (2002).
Procedure. Confirmatory factor analysis using MPLUS 3 software was conducted 
in order to check the structure (factorial validity) of the scale. This method was regarded 
as the most appropriate, as the structure of the GMS-28 had already been established 
in previous studies and the main goal of the current study was to replicate it in the 
Lithuanian sample. In addition, internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach alphas), 
item-total and subscale intercorrelations (using Pearson correlation coefficient) were 
computed. 
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Results
Four models of global motivation were constructed and analyzed in parallel in 
order to determine the optimal structure of the Lithuanian version of the scale. The first 
model consisted of seven factors and was identical to the structure of Global Motivation 
Scale proposed by Guay and colleagues (Guay et al., 2003). This was considered to serve 
as the base model when comparing all four models. 
Furthermore, two alternative models were constructed, both of them based on the 
concept of motivation described in Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and 
the Hierarchical Model of Motivation (Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002). To be more specific, 
both of these alternative models encompassed the intrinsic-extrinsic motivation 
continuum, but had fewer factors. In turn, the factors they included were somewhat 
broader than those in the base model.
The first alternative model consisted of three factors. Factor 1 referred to 
intrinsic motivation, factor 2 referred to extrinsic motivation, and factor 3 referred to 
amotivation. The second alternative model consisted of four factors. Factor 1 referred 
to the upper tier of intrinsic motivation (motivation to know and motivation toward 
accomplishment referring to the base model), factor 2 referred to the ‘margin’ between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (motivation to experience stimulation and identified 
motivation referring to the base model), factor 3 referred to the lower tier of extrinsic 
motivation (introjected motivation and external regulation referring to the base model), 
and factor 4 referred to amotivation.
Finally, a corrected base model was the last model included in the comparative 
analysis. In this model, several item residuals were correlated, moreover, two items 
(item  2 and item 19) were shifted from their original subscales to another one. See 
Table 3 for the above-described model fit indices.
Table 3. GMS-28 model fit indices
Model Chi-square df p RMSEA CFI TLI Chi-square significance test
7-factor model 
(base model) 931.85 329 < .001 .07 .86 .84
3-factor model 1713.41 347 < .001 .10 .68 .65 Δχ
2 = 781.56; Δdf = 18; 
p < .001*
4-factor model 1314.43 344 < .001 .09 .77 .75 Δχ
2 = 382.58; Δdf = 15; 
p < .001*
Corrected 
7-factor model 746.71 324 < .001 .06 .90 .88
Δχ2 = 185.14; Δdf = 5;  
p < .001*
Note: *compared to the base model
As shown in Table 3, the seven factor model has only satisfactory fit indices, they 
cannot be considered as good enough. First, Chi-square is statistically significant 
(p < .001) indicating that the model poorly fits the data. On the other hand, it is often 
stated that Chi-square is very sensitive to the sample size (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 
2008), therefore, it is not surprising that in relatively large samples it is statistically 
significant. 
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RMSEA index in the base model is higher than .05, which is again only satisfactory. 
Ideally, the RMSEA index should be  <  .05, although values lower that .08 are still 
considered to be acceptable (Byrne, 2001; Hooper et al., 2008). 
Finally, the values of CFI = .86 and TLI = .84 obtained in the base model indicate 
lack of model fit. According to the literature, CFI and TLI indices should be closely 
approaching 1, or at least should exceed .90 (Byrne, 2001; Hooper et al., 2008). 
A comparative analysis of the base model and two alternative models (three factor 
and four factor models described above) has shown the alternative models to have 
even lower fit indices than the base model. Furthermore, Chi-square significance test 
has revealed differences between the base model and both alternative models to be 
statistically significant (see Table 3). 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the GMS-28 corrected 7-factor model. Correlated 
residual errors are not represented.
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Based on the initial results, the most appropriate solution was to drop the alternative 
models from the subsequent analysis keeping the base model only, and to check whether 
it was possible to modify it to better fit the data. In order to do this, a corrected version 
of the base model (see Figure 1) was constructed: five residual correlations were added 
and two items were moved from their original factors to other ones.
The following item residuals were correlated: item  10 x item  17, item1 x item 2, 
item 8 x item 12, item 4 x item 13, item 7 x item 23. All of the above-mentioned items, 
with the exception of item1 and item 2, have similar meanings. For instance, item10 is 
worded ‘…because I chose them as a means to attain my objectives’ and item17 is worded 
‘...because I chose them in order to attain what I desire’. Both these items fall into the 
Extrinsic Motivation–Identified subscale. However, they express goal seeking motives 
more clearly than the rest of the items in the subscale.
Residual correlation between item1 and item 2 was included despite that these 
items are not very similar in their meaning. This choice was based on the logic that 
respondents may have marked similar responses due to the fact these were the very 
first items in the scale they read and subjectively they might have seemed similar to the 
respondents.
Furthermore, two items were dropped from their original factors and included 
into the other ones. Item 2 ‘…because I do not want to disappoint certain people’ was 
moved from the Extrinsic Motivation–External Regulation subscale to the Extrinsic 
Motivation–Introjected subscale; item19 ‘...because I force myself to do them‘ was moved 
from the Extrinsic Motivation–Introjected subscale to the Amotivation subscale. These 
changes were made based on modification indices in CFA, after evaluating whether they 
logically fit into their new subscales.
The corrected model had better fit indices compared to the base model 
(RMSEA = .06; CFI = .90; TLI = .88), the difference between these two models being 
statistically significant (Δχ2  =  185.1; Δdf  =  5; p  <  .001). Factor loadings and residual 
correlations in the corrected model are shown in Table 4. According to the results, all 
items have high loadings in their factors with the lowest value of .43.
Table 4. Estimates of the corrected GMS-28 model and corrected item-total correlations
Factor and item number Standartized factor loading Corrected item-total correlations
Intrinsic Motivation – To Know (IMK)
IMK1 (item 4) .59 .53
IMK2 (item 11) .81 .72
IMK3 (item18) .85 .76
IMK4 (item 25) .84 .74
Intrinsic Motivation – Toward Accomplishment (IMTA)
IMTA1 (item 6) .68 .54
IMTA2 (item 13) .73 .59
IMTA3 (item 20) .54 .46
IMTA4 (item 27) .58 .48
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Factor and item number Standartized factor loading Corrected item-total correlations
Intrinsic Motivation – Experience Stimulation (IMES)
IMES1 (item 1) .59 .53
IMES2 (item 8) .55 .50
IMES3 (item 15) .84 .70
IMES4 (item 22) .76 .63
Extrinsic Motivation – Identified (EMID)
EMID1 (item 3) .62 .34
EMID2 (item 10) .43 .44
EMID3 (item 17) .57 .56
EMID4 (item 24) .38 .30
Extrinsic Motivation – Introjected (EMIN)
EMIN1 (item 5) .72 .50
EMIN2 (item 2)* .59 .64
EMIN3 (item 12) .84 .71
EMIN4 (item 26) .72 .62
Extrinsic Motivation – External Regulation (EMER)
EMER1 (item 9) .77 .61
EMER2 (item 16) .70 .61
EMER3 (item 23) .71 .61
Amotivation (A)
A1 (item 7) .64 .54
A2 (item 19)* .54 .61
A3 (item 14) .70 .44
A4 (item 21) .72 .62
A5 (item 28) .67 .57
Correlated residual errors
item10 x item17 .26
item1 x item2 .18
item8 x item12 -.11
item4 x item13 .10
item7 x item23 -.11
Note: * items that were moved from their original factors 
The final part of the analysis included scale internal consistency test. Table 5 shows 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of each subscale and subscale intercorrelations; corrected 
item-total correlations are provided in the right handside column in Table 4.
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Table 5. GMS-28 subscale Cronbach’s alpha Coefficients and Subscale Intercorrelations 
Cronbach‘s 
α 2 3 4 5 6 7
 1 Intrinsic Motivation – To 
Know .85 .69
*** .47*** .42*** .08 .16** .00
 2 Intrinsic Motivation –  
Toward Accomplishment .72 .62
*** .53*** .21*** .37*** .07
 3 Intrinsic Motivation – 
Experience Stimulation .78 .47
*** .21*** .28*** .02
 4 Extrinsic Motivation – 
Identified .62 .16
** .41*** -.02
 5 Extrinsic Motivation – 
Introjected .80 .36
*** .47***
 6 Extrinsic Motivation – 
External Regulation .77 .34
***
 7 Amotivation .78            
Note: **correlation statistically significant when p < .01; ***correlation statistically significant when p < .001
According to Steiner (2003), for basic research tools the minimum alpha level of 
.80 is recommended, however, alphas from .50 to .60 are acceptable for the early stages 
of research. Based on the results of our study, all the subscales can be considered to 
have adequate internal consistency, their Cronbach alphas varying from satisfactory 
(Extrinsic Motivation–Identified subscale) to high (Intrinsic Motivation–To Know 
subscale) (see Table 5). Moreover, as seen in Table 4, corrected item-total correlations 
are all positive, ranging from .30 (EMID4 – item 24) to .76 (IMK3 – item18). 
Subsequently, the results have shown that subscale intercorrelations range from 
nearly zero to .69. In this case, a specific pattern can be discerned – subscales tend to 
intercorrelate more strongly in their own category (i.e. intrinsic-intrinsic, extrinsic-
extrinsic). It is important to note that all of the intrinsic motivation subscales have rather 
high correlations with the Extrinsic Motivation–Identified subscale. While this subscale 
is categorized under the extrinsic motivation label, the above-mentioned results are 
not unexpected, as this subscale can be considered to be ‘transitional’ on the intrinsic-
extrinsic motivation continuum. Finally, the Amotivation subscale is correlated with 
the Extrinsic Motivation–Introjected and Extrinsic Motivation–External Regulation 
subscales, which is quite logical as well. 
Discussion
The findings of this study are relevant both from the practical and from the 
scientific point of view. First of all, this study has confirmed the seven factor solution 
of the Lithuanian version of the GMS-28, providing proof that this scale can be used 
without major modifications to measure motivation in Lithuanian studies. 
Looking from a cross-cultural perspective this is an important finding because 
not all research instruments are easily transferred from one culture to another. As 
the worldwide practice shows, a number of corrections might be necessary before an 
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instrument developed in a foreign culture and/or language can be applied in a different 
context (Van de Vijver  & Hambleton, 1996). This is often the case in Lithuanian 
psychological research – a number of recognized research instruments (e.g., NEO-FFI; 
Bagdonas & Kairys, 2012; HEXACO-PI-R; Truskauskaite, Kaniusonyte, Krataviciene & 
Krataviciute-Alisauskiene, 2011; ATTS; Skruibis, Gailiene & Labanauskaite, 2008) had 
to be modified to obtain acceptable reliability and validity indicators of their Lithuanian 
versions before they could be used in research or practice. 
GMS-28 is aimed to measure motivation. Based on the concept of motivation as 
a complex and multi-layered construct, it is logical to presume that it might manifest 
slightly differently in the different regions of the world. Moreover, although aimed 
at measuring the motivational continuum, GMS-28 has a quite rigorous structure 
encompassing seven types of motivation (or behaviour regulation). Therefore, 
comparing the structure of the Lithuanian version of the GMS-28 to the original scale 
and an attempt to replicate it is of the utmost importance before applying it in further 
research.
According to the results, the initial seven factor scale structure was retained in the 
Lithuanian sample and it makes the Lithuanian version similar to the original French 
and English scales (Guay et al., 2003). However, the results of this study are not easily 
comparable to other findings. Despite that the GMS-28 is based on a well-recognized 
Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; 2008a) and the Hierarchical Model of 
Motivation (Vallerand & Ratelle, 2002; Vallerand, 2000), empirical evidence on wider 
applicability of this scale is rather scarce.
The seven factors obtained in this study are not absolutely ‘clean’ (see Table 4), but 
this is quite natural and could reflect peculiarities in the manifestation of motivation 
(behavioural regulation) in the analyzed sample. The most interesting finding concerns 
the Extrinsic Motivation–Identified subscale. In theory this motivational type would 
be classified as reflecting the extrinsic motives. However, in this study the Extrinsic 
Motivation–Identified is more strongly and significantly correlated to the ‘intrinsic’ 
motivational types (see Table 5) and could not be strictly placed on the ‘extrinsic’ side of 
the continuum. Looking at the findings of this study it would probably be most accurate 
to call it a ‘transitional’ type of motivation, reflecting the transition point from intrinsic 
to extrinsic motives. 
Moreover, the Extrinsic Motivation–Identified subscale has the lowest internal 
consistency score (see Table 5) and relatively small item-total correlation coefficients. 
Again, this could be explained by item phrasing within the subscale – it is plausible 
that in the Lithuanian version these items reflect both intrinsic and extrinsic motives of 
behaviour and, therefore, are not very consistent. 
The rest of the factors (Intrinsic Motivation–To Know, Intrinsic Motivation–
Toward Accomplishment, Intrinsic Motivation–Experience Stimulation, Extrinsic 
Motivation–Introjected, Extrinsic Motivation–External Regulation, Amotivation) are 
quite clearly distinguished, adequately inter-correlated and internally consistent. In 
terms of internal consistency, Cronbach alphas obtained in the current study ranged 
from .62 to .85 (in the original study by Guay et  al., 2003, the reported coefficients 
ranged from .75 to .91). The structural model fit indices in the Lithuanian study were 
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quite acceptable too (χ2 = 931.85; df = 329; p < .001; RMSEA = .07; CFI = .86 for the 
base model; χ2 = 746.71; df = 324; p < .001; RMSEA = .06; CFI = .90 for the final model). 
In their original study, Guay et al. (2003) report them as follows: χ2 = 1088.38; df = 329; 
p  <  .001; RMSEA  =  .05; CFI  =  .95. Therefore, it can be stated that the preliminary 
psychometric properties of the Lithuanian GMS-28 are acceptable and the scale should 
adequately reflect the range of motivational types as described in SDT (Deci & Ryan, 
2000; 2008a) and the Hierarchical Model of Motivation (Vallerand  & Ratelle, 2002; 
Vallerand, 2000). However, a comparison between the current and the original study 
mentioned above should be made with extreme care as the latter contained a much 
larger sample (N = 1039); moreover, the findings in the Lithuanian study are based on 
the corrected model. 
Findings of this study are particularly relevant in the methodological sense. GMS-28 
measures global motivation and could be used as a basis for development of other, 
possibly more specific, motivation measures (in the Hierarchical Model of Motivation, 
the concepts of global, life domains, and situational motivation are based on the same 
internal-external behaviour regulation framework). Moreover, regarding the increasing 
popularity of SDT it is extremely important to have valid tools to measure motivational 
constructs. If proven that the propositions of SDT work in the Lithuanian context and 
that Lithuanian SDT-based motivation scales have good psychometric properties, this 
could serve as a basis for further research in the field. Therefore, we consider this study 
and its findings as a little step further in the application of theoretical self-determination 
models in Lithuanian research.
Limitations and further research implications. Inevitably, findings of this study have 
limitations and should be interpreted with caution. Although the results have shown 
the Lithuanian GMS-28 to have adequate psychometric properties (i.e. factorial validity 
and scale reliability) it should be noted that these findings are preliminary and might be 
bound to the analyzed sample. In order to cross-validate the scale, it should be retested 
in other samples in the future. A more detailed validity check, such as testing convergent 
and / or discriminant validity, would be desirable as well. Due to the lack of adequate 
measures, these forms of validity were not analyzed in this study.
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Abstract
The aim of the present study was to explore the formation of cognitive appraisal of job loss by 
socio-demographic, contextual factors and beliefs. Coping self-efficacy, the general and personal 
belief in a just world, cognitive appraisal dimensions (challenge, loss, threat, reversibility) of the 
unemployment situation, as well as socio-demographic variables were measured in a sample of 
209 unemployed people aged over 45 years. The results showed that 13% of the variance in loss 
appraisal is explained by the duration of unemployment, monthly income per family member 
and coping self-efficacy. Seventeen % of the variance in threat appraisal is explained by the 
duration of unemployment, monthly income per family member and self-efficacy of emotion-
focused coping. The variance of 25% in challenge appraisal is explained by the general belief in a 
just world, age and relationship status. The 9% of variance in reversibility is explained by age and 
the duration of unemployment. Implications for interventions based on cognitive restructuring, 
drawn from these results, are discussed.
Keywords: depression, cognitive appraisal of unemployment situation, coping self-efficacy, belief in 
just world
Introduction
During a time of economic crises (e.g., 2009–2011 in Latvia), unemployment affects 
a substantial portion of the population. Job loss is a life event that is closely associated 
with depression and other mental health consequences in both the theoretical literature 
and empirical research (McKee-Ryan, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005), however, not all thus 
affected become depressed. What helps some people to cope better than others under 
relatively similar circumstances? 
Researchers who study unemployment have looked for the answer to this question 
among different social and demographic variables (Creed & Klisch, 2005; McKee-Ryan, 
Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005; Paul & Moser, 2009). Scant research has dealt with cognitions 
as the main determinant of mental health risks in the unemployed (McKee-Ryan, 
Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005). This is surprising since the mechanism of the development 
of mental disorders, including the role of both personality and environment, has been 
generally explained by the widely recognized cognitive vulnerability – stress model 
1 Proofs and reprint requests should be sent to maruta.ludane@gmail.com
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(Beck, 1976; Ingram, Miranda,  & Segal, 1998; Monroe,  & Simons, 1991). Awareness 
of the cognitions involved in stress reactions to job loss would certainly help to tailor 
interventions that are focused on cognitive restructuring and are appropriate for 
unemployed people as well as for clients who face other kinds of critical life events.
Even though studies of the cognitive vulnerability within a community sample of 
the unemployed are scarce, in a relatively recent meta-analytical study (McKee-Ryan, 
Wanberg & Kinicki, 2005) authors come to the conclusion that psychological variables 
are of greater consequence to mental health than socio-demographical or contextual 
ones. Authors propose the transactional stress perspective (Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984) 
as a promising theoretical ground for studying the psychological mechanism involved 
in stress reaction following job loss. 
Similar to the cognitive vulnerability – stress models, the transactional stress theory 
(Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 2000) places an emphasis on cognitions as a crucial 
element in the chain of stress reactions following a critical life event. Cognitive appraisal 
can be most readily understood as the process of categorizing the encounter and its 
various aspects, with respect to its significance for well-being (Lazarus,  & Folkman, 
1984, p. 31). Lazarus makes a distinction between primary and secondary cognitive 
appraisal. Primary appraisal refers to an evaluation of the potential danger of a situation, 
it relates to such questions as: “Am I in trouble… and in what way (Lazarus, & Folkman, 
1984, p. 31)?” Secondary appraisal includes an evaluation of one’s coping capacity and 
can be summarized by the question: “What if anything can be done about it (Lazarus, & 
Folkman, 1984, p. 31)?” Lazarus (Lazarus, 2000) refers to loss, threat and challenge as the 
basic dimensions of stressful primary cognitive appraisal. Loss can be understood as an 
appraisal of harm already suffered by individual; threat as harm which may or may not 
be reversible; challenge refers to the assumption that even though there are obstacles on 
the way to one’s goal, those may be overcome with persistence and confidence. 
Cognitive appraisal depends on the situation and personal resources. Basically, 
cognitive appraisal is an interaction point between stress (situation, event, circumstance) 
and individual personality dispositions. Situations differ in their novelty, predictability, 
event uncertainty, imminence, duration, temporal uncertainty, ambiguity and the 
timing of stressful events in the life cycle (Lazarus,  & Folkman, 1984). In this study 
situational differences are measured in terms of different social, demographic and 
contextual variables, which distinguish one “job loss” from another. Among personality 
factors Lazarus and Folkman (Lazarus,  & Folkman, 1984) mention goals and their 
hierarchy, and personal beliefs. Personal beliefs are more stable cognitions than 
cognitive appraisals, and thus more descriptive of the personality disposition. 
The concept of cognitive appraisal as defined by Lazarus and Folkman (Lazarus, & 
Folkman, 1984) allows for the role of personality and situation to be assessed in the 
appraisal of a stressful life event. Even though the main assumption of the cognitive 
vulnerability – stress model is that, for example, in order for depression to occur both 
a certain level of cognitive vulnerability and a stressful life event must be present. 
Research related to the stress component or to the interaction of different levels of 
cognition (Hankin, Fraley, & Abela, 2005) is scarce. 
This study helps to identify the kinds of situations and personality-related aspects 
which have the greatest influence on several dimensions of cognitive appraisal of job 
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loss. It helps to understand the reasons why the loss of a job may pose a major threat 
for some people, yet be seen as a challenge by others. This article is a partial description 
of the results obtained in a study of Latvian unemployed people aged over 45 years, 
conducted from November 2011 through March 2012.
To provide an overview of several important aspects of this study, including the 
sample choice, the main variables are described below. 
The unemployed aged over 45 years
The unemployment rate among the general population of Latvia shrank from 16% 
in 2009 to 11.5% at the end of 2011; however the proportion of unemployed people over 
45 years of age grew significantly (NVA, 2012, Izvērstā statistika par bezdarba situāciju 
Latvijā un reģionos/ Statistics about unemployment in Latvia from State Agency of 
employment in Latvia).
It has been shown that various physical and cognitive abilities decline with age 
(Craik & Jennings, 1992; Czaja & Sharit, 1993; Forteza & Prieto, 1994). However, the 
assumptions about the impact of age on working capacity tends to be exaggerated 
(Hedge, Borman, & Lammlein, 2006). That may be a reason for discrimination of the 
older work force. When analyzing the situation in Latvia, it is important to keep in 
mind that people who are now over 45 were raised, received their education and started 
their careers in a different social and economic system. That might be an important 
reason why a part of this group is less successful at adjusting to the different demands 
of the labor market, especially with increasing competition in the work force during an 
economic crisis.
Developmentally, a new period of life begins after 40, characterized by such aims 
as becoming stable in most areas of life and demonstrating a clear professional field of 
competence (Mallinckrodt, & Fretz, 1988), which is hard to achieve for the unemployed. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the unemployed at the period of pre-retirement are one of 
the groups with a particularly serious risk of becoming depressed (Liwowsky, Kramer, 
Mergl, Bramesfeld, et al., 2009). 
The preceding arguments indicate that job loss can be considered as a critical life 
event for people over 45 in Latvia during the period from 2011 to 2012. 
Cognitive appraisal of job loss
There have been several studies considering cognitive appraisal as a key factor in 
stress reactions following a job loss (Feather & Davenport, 1981; Gowan, Riordan, & 
Gatewood, 1999; Leana  & Feldman, 1990; 1991), however, in previous research 
cognitive appraisal of the unemployment situation has not been assessed in terms of 
loss, challenge and threat, the dimensions which Lazarus and Folkman (Lazarus,  & 
Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 2000) refer to as being the main dimensions of primary stress 
appraisal. Reversibility, as it has been measured in previous studies (Gowan, Riordan, & 
Gatewood, 1999; Leana and Feldman, 1992), however, is rather similar to the secondary 
cognitive appraisal as defined by Lazarus and Folkman (Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984). As 
far as the authors of the current study are informed, there have been no studies in which 
challenge has been measured as a potential dimension of primary cognitive appraisal, 
however, as with any crisis, job loss may also prove to be beneficial.
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In the study by Gowan, Riordan and Gatewood (1999) education, financial re-
sources and social support were assessed as potential determinants of reversibility, 
however, only education was significantly and positively related to reversibility, whereas 
financial resources and social support were not. 
The current study expands the extant research not only by adding previously 
uninvestigated determinants to the list of the potential predictors of cognitive ap-
praisal (beliefs and other social demographic variables), but also by including dif-
ferent di mensions of cognitive appraisal, which have not been inspected in previous 
unemployment studies. 
Beliefs
Two kinds of individual beliefs are mentioned by Lazarus and Folkman (Lazarus, & 
Folkman, 1984) as being particularly relevant to the critical life events appraisal process. 
The first are beliefs related to control and the second are existential beliefs. 
One of the important beliefs about control is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977; 1997) is one’s belief in his or her abilities to perform certain tasks. When facing a 
job loss an individual encounters a number of different unemployment-related stressors, 
among them – potential financial hardships, harm to family and marital life, social 
contacts, future career, etc. (Fryer, 1997; Jahoda, 1982), so various coping activities are 
needed to deal successfully with this critical life event. That is why coping self-efficacy 
in a broader sense will be measured in this study. Coping self-efficacy (Chesney et al, 
2006) is the belief about one’s ability to perform specific coping tasks, and previous 
studies confirm that it is an important determinant associated with depression among 
people who face life threatening illness (Chesney et al., 2003) as well as in the general 
population in the United Kingdom (Colodro et al., 2010). 
Belief in a just world means believing in a world in which people get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner, 1980). In recent decades there has been 
much research demonstrating that the belief in a just world is an important resource 
both when dealing with daily problems (Dalbert,  & Schneider, 1995; Dalbert, 2001; 
Ritter, Benson, & Snyder, 1990), as well as after encountering such critical life events 
as natural disasters, accidents, rape and job loss (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Dalbert, 
1997; Dalbert, 2002; Lerner & Somers, 1992; Otto et al., 2006).
People who strongly believe in a just world are motivated to maintain this belief 
even when facing seemingly unjust events (Dalbert, 2002). They strive to reestablish 
justice either in real life or psychologically. As research on the belief in a just world as a 
coping resource has been advanced, general and personal beliefs have been divided, the 
first being defined as the belief that events in one’s own life are just, while the general 
belief in a just world reflects the belief that, basically, the world is a just place (Dalbert, 
1999; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002; Otto et al., 2006). The personal belief in a just world has 
been more closely related to successful coping than the general belief in a just world in 
previous studies (Dalbert, 1999; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002).
Social, demographic and contextual variables
Based on the findings of previous studies (Creed  & Klisch, 2005; McKee-Ryan, 
Wanberg  & Kinicki, 2005; Paul  & Moser, 2009), in this study such variables as the 
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duration of unemployment, the duration of employment in the last job, relationship 
status, monthly income per family member, gender, education level and age were 
measured and included as potential determinants of the dimensions of cognitive 
appraisal. 
Based on the preceding considerations, the research question is: Which socio-
demographic factors and beliefs predict each of the cognitive appraisal dimensions 
(challenge, loss, threat, and reversibility) of job loss?
Method
Participants
The research was conducted based on 209 completed questionnaires (the faulty 
ones were disregarded), filled out by respondents conforming to all of the following 
conditions: over 45 years of age, with high-school education (or higher), with sufficient 
knowledge of Latvian language to complete the questionnaire. The respondents were 
aged 45 to 61, with an average age of 51 (SD = 4.70), 23% (49) were male, 77% (160) were 
female. Out of all respondent 70% had a high-school or a technical secondary education, 
1% were university students, and 29% had a university education. The duration of 
employment among the participants varied from 1 to 43 years, with the average of 
27.55 years (SD = 8.05; Mode 30 years). The respondents had been unemployed for a 
period of less than 1 month to 60 months. The average duration of unemployment was 
9 months. Among the respondents who had specified their marital status (n  =  160), 
26% were single, 3% had been in a relationship for less than 3 years, 64% had been in a 
relationship for more than 3 years, and 6% had been divorced.
Measures 
Demographic indicator survey assessed the respondents’ age, gender, educational 
level, duration of previous employment (in years), duration of unemployment (in 
months), relationship status (single; partnership for less than 3 years, partnership for 
more than 3 years; divorced), the monthly income per family member, the time period 
spent at the last job position.
Coping Self-Efficacy Scale (Chesney, Neilands, Chambers, Taylor,  & Folkman, 
2006; Colodro et  al., 2010) consists of 26 items that also measure 3 sub-factors of 
coping self-efficacy: self-efficacy for problem-focused coping (SEPFC; 12 items), which 
assesses perceived self-efficacy concerning the use of coping strategies aimed at solving 
or eliminating situations that generate stress; self-efficacy for emotion-focused coping 
(SEEFC; 9 items), which assesses perceived self-efficacy concerning the use of coping 
strategies aimed at the regulation of cognitive and affective responses linked to stress; 
and self-efficacy for social support (SESS; 5 items), which assesses perceived self-
efficacy of seeking and using social resources for coping with problems and mitigating 
or eliminating stress. Reliability index α of the English version of the general coping 
self-efficacy scale is .94 (Colodro et al., 2010), while for the Latvian version .93 (Ludāne, 
2013). Reliability index α for subscales varies from .8 – .9 (Colodro et al., 2010) for the 
English version and .63 – .9 for the Latvian version. 
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Adaptation results of Coping Self-Efficacy Scale in detail have been described 
elsewhere (Ludāne, 2013). As the reliability for the subscale self-efficacy for social 
support did not reach satisfactory internal consistency level (.63), potential causes of 
it were analyzed. It was detected that exclusion of one culturally difficulty perceivable 
item would increase internal consistency for subscale from .63 to .71, which is still less 
than for the original, however, at least a satisfactory reliability coefficient. However, the 
unsatisfactory reliability of this subscale would not influence the validity of this study, 
as it will not be used separately in any of the analyses. At the same time, this issue must 
be addressed before application of this scale in other studies. 
The Belief in a Just World was assessed by the use of the General Belief in a Just 
World scale (Dalbert et  al., 1987), which consists of 6 statements (α  =  .78), and the 
Personal Belief in a Just World scale (Dalbert, 1999), which consists of 7 statements 
(α = .86). These methods were adapted during the course of the master’s thesis of Maruta 
Ludāne (2008). Cronbach’s α for the General Belief in a Just World is .78 (n  =  243). 
Cronbach’s α for the Personal Belief in a Just World scale is .81(n = 243).
Cognitive appraisal of job loss. The measurement of cognitive appraisal in this 
study was developed upon the basis of Lazarus’ (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) approach to 
the dimensions of stressful primary cognitive appraisal (threat, loss and challenge) and 
classification of the primary and the secondary appraisal. Similarly as in other studies 
(Gall, 2000; Gowan, Riordan, & Gatewood, 1999; Leana & Feldman, 1990; 1991), the 
dimensions of cognitive appraisal were measured with ratings on 1 to 5 statements for 
each dimension of cognitive appraisal. The statements were related to various aspects 
of unemployment, such as the financial situation, partner relationships, social status 
and social contacts, which have been noted as significant for the mental health of the 
unemployed in both theory and previous researches (Jahoda, 1982; Warr, 1987; McKee-
Ryan, Wanberg & Kinicki, 2005; Paul & Moser, 2009). 
The cognitive appraisal of reversibility of job loss, applied in previous research 
related to job loss (Leana,  & Feldman, 1990; Gowan, Riordan,  & Gatewood, 1999) 
was also used in this study, and is considered to be a secondary appraisal. Finally, 
four dimensions of cognitive appraisal of the unemployment situation included such 
aspects as threat (4 statements, Cronbach’s alpha .79; e.g., “It threatens my family life/
personal relationships”), loss (5 statements, Cronbach’s alpha .70; e.g., “I have lost my 
social status along with my job”), challenge (4 statements, Cronbach’s alpha .82; e.g., “My 
current unemployment might have positive implications for my future”); reversibility of 
unemployment (3 statements, Cronbach’s alpha .54; e.g., “My previous work experience 
provides me with a good chance of finding a new job.”). The respondents were asked 
to assess the statements on the scale of 1 to 6 (1 – totally disagree; 6 totally agree). The 
reliability of the reversibility dimension is not satisfactory, which probably is due to the 
minimal amount of items in the scale. This may endanger the internal validity of the 
results and must be taken into the account when analyzing the generalizability of results. 
Procedure
The respondents completed the questionnaires individually or in small groups 
on the premises of the Riga branch office of the National Employment Office from 
November 2011 through March 2012. It took approximately 15 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire.
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Results
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Socio-demographic variables,  
Beliefs and Dimensions of Cognitive Appraisal of Job Loss
M SD
Age 52.11 4.71
Length of Service (Years) 27.55 8.05
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) 9.41 12.10
Time Period Spent in Last Position 131.61 112.52
Coping Self-Efficacy (Full Scale) 15.22 47.56
Self-Efficacy for Emotion-Focused Coping 50.44 19.18
Self-Efficacy for Problem-Focused Coping 71.01 22.30
Self-Efficacy for Social Support 29.25 12.06
Personal Belief in a Just World 3.57 .95
General Belief in a Just World 3.69 .92
Loss (Cognitive Appraisal of Unemployment Situation ) 3.77 1.21
Threat ( Cognitive Appraisal of Unemployment Situation ) 3.70 1.18
Challenge ( Cognitive Appraisal of Unemployment Situation ) 3.75 1.07
Reversibility ( Cognitive Appraisal of Unemployment Situation ) 3.31 .95
Correlation analysis was carried out among dimensions of cognitive appraisal 
of job loss, coping self-efficacy, general and personal belief in just world and social, 
demographic variables (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients of Socio-demographic variables, Beliefs and  
Dimensions of Cognitive Appraisal of Job Loss
Cognitive appraisal of job loss
Loss Threat Challenge Reversibility
Age .10 .09 -.23** -.23**
Length of Service (Years) -.03 -.04 -.15* -.14*
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) .19** .25** -.17* -.10
Monthly Income per Family Member -.32** -.34** .25** .20**
Time Period Spent in Last Position .12 .11 -.06 .14*
Relationship Status -.18* -.16* .31** .19*
Personal Belief in a Just World -.12 -.14* .34** .20**
General Belief in a Just World -.08 -.1 .38** .15*
Coping Self-Efficacy (Full Scale) -.21** -.21** .23** .12
Self-Efficacy for Problem-Focused Coping -.16* -.17* .19** .12
Self-Efficacy for Emotion-Focused Coping -.21** -.22** .17* .10
Self-Efficacy for Social Support -.21** -.16* .23** .08
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
To establish which socio-demographic variables and beliefs predict specific 
dimensions of the cognitive appraisal of job loss, hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis was carried out separately for the threat, loss, challenge and reversibility 
dimensions as dependent variables. Predictors for regression analysis were chosen 
based on results of the correlation analysis.
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For the loss dimension as a dependent variable, the duration of unemployment 
and the income per family member were included, as they had statistically 
significant correlations with the loss dimension. Such a model was statistically 
significant, explaining 12% of variance in loss appraisal. R2 = 0.13, adjusted R2 = 0.12 
(F(2.183) = 13.48; p < 0.001), as both variables were statistically significant contributors. 
In the next step, coping self-efficacy was included. Such a model was statistically 
significant and explained an additional 2% of loss variance, R2 = 0.15, adjusted R2 = 0.13 
(F(3.182) = 10.37; p < 0.001), however coping self-efficacy contribution was marginally 
significant. The largest part of variation in the cognitive appraisal of loss in this model 
was explained by the monthly income per family member (see table 3.).
Table 3. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Loss Cognitive Appraisal  
as Dependent Variable
Models B SE B β
1 (Constant) 4.18*** .21
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) 0.02 .005 .21**
Monthly Income per Family Member -0.21 .06 -.25**
2 (Constant) 4.64*** .31
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) 0.01 .005 .20**
Monthly Income per Family Member -0.18 .06 -.21**
Coping Self-Efficacy -0.003 .002 -.14*
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
To determine the predictors of the threat dimension of cognitive appraisal, the 
length of unemployment and income per family member were included in the first 
step of the regression analysis. This model was statistically significant and explained 
16% of threat, R2 = 0.17, adjusted R2 = 0.16 (F(2.183) = 18.31; p < 0.001). In the next 
step emotion-focused coping self-efficacy was included, as it has a higher correlation 
with threat than the full scale of coping self-efficacy. Such a model was statistically 
significant, explaining an additional 2% of threat variance, R2 = 0.19, adjusted R2 = 0.17 
(F(3.182) = 13.96; p < 0.001), all the independent variables being statistically significant 
determinants. The widest variation of threat was explained by the monthly income per 
family member (see table 4.).
Table 4. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Threat Cognitive Appraisal  
as Dependent Variable
Models B SE B β
1 (Constant) 4.18*** .19
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) .02 .005 .23**
Monthly Income per Family Member -.23 .06 -.28***
2 (Constant) 4.59*** .27
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) .02 .005 .22**
Monthly Income per Family Member -.22 .06 -.27***
Self-Efficacy for Emotion-Focused Coping -.01 .004 -.14*
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
For the challenge dimension as a dependent variable, the age, monthly income per 
family member and the relationship status were included. Such a model was statistically 
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significant, explaining 12% of the variance in the challenge appraisal, R2 = 0.14, adjusted 
R2 = 0.12 (F(3.137) = 7.10; p < 0.001), however, only age and relationship status were 
statistically significant contributors in this regression model. In the next step, the 
general belief in a just world and coping self-efficacy were included. This model was 
statistically significant and explained an additional 15% of challenge variance, R2 = 0.28, 
adjusted R2 = 0.25 (F (5.135) = 10.54; p < 0.001). Statistically significant determinants 
of challenge appraisal in this regression model are the general belief in a just world, age 
and the relationship status, the largest part of variation being explained by the general 
belief in a just world (see table 5.).
Table 5. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Challenge Cognitive Appraisal  
as Dependent Variable
Models B SE B β
1 (Constant) 4.71*** 1.03
Monthly Income per Family Member .11 .06 .15
Relationship Status .53 .19 .24**
Age -.04 .02 -.18*
2 (Constant) 3,19** 1,00
Monthly Income per Family Member .05 .06 .08
Relationship Status .48 .17 .21**
Age -.04 .02 -.19*
General Belief in a Just World .38 .08 .35***
Coping Self-Efficacy .003 .002 .14
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
To detect which model predicts the reversibility dimension of the cognitive 
appraisal of job loss, in the first step of regression analysis, the age, the duration of 
unemployment and the monthly income per family member were included. This model 
explained of 8% of the variance in the reversibility dimension, R2  =  0.09, adjusted 
R2 = 0.08 (F(3, 179) = 6.07; p < .01), and all of the independent variables were statistically 
significant determinants. In the second step, the personal belief in a just world was 
included, explaining an additional 2% of the variance of reversibility, R2 = .11, adjusted 
R2 = 0.09 (F(4, 178) = 5.45; p < .001), however, the monthly income per family member 
and the personal belief in a just world were not statistically significant contributors to 
the model (see table 6.).
Table 6. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of Reversibility cognitive Appraisal  
as Dependent Variable
Models B SE B β
1 (Constant) 4.87*** .69
Age -.03 .01 -.18*
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) -.01 .004 -.18*
Monthly Income per Family Member .10* .05 .15*
2 (Constant) 4.46*** .72
Age -.03 .01 -.18**
Duration of Unemployment (in Months) -.01 .004 -.16*
Monthly Income per Family Member .09 .05 .14
Personal Belief in a Just World .13 .07 .14
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
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Discussion
As the aim of this study was to illuminate the point of interaction between the 
situation and the person, or stress and cognitive vulnerability in the formation of stress 
reactions, cognitive appraisal of job loss was chosen as the potential area of interaction. 
The purpose of this study was to assess which are the strongest predictors of each 
dimension of the cognitive appraisal of job loss. 
Results showed that the lower one’s income per family member was and the longer 
the unemployment period was, the greater the loss seemed. Coping self-efficacy also 
slightly shaped the loss appraisal – the greater one’s belief in his/her capacity to cope 
with stress, the lesser the individual’s tendency to appraise unemployment as a loss. 
Similarly, the monthly income per family member and the length of unemployment 
determined threat appraisal. Additionally, people who believed in their capacity to cope 
with negative thoughts and emotions (self-efficacy for emotion-focused coping) were 
less prone to appraise job loss as a threat.
While in the case of loss and threat appraisal socio-demographical and contextual 
factors played a more significant role, it was a completely different situation with 
challenge appraisal. The general belief in a just world was the strongest determinant of 
the challenge appraisal. Unemployed people who believed that in general situations are 
fair and law-governed, also tended to see the potential gain of current unemployment, 
appraising it as a challenge. In addition, it was easier to appraise job loss as a challenge 
for those who were in a relationship and who were relatively younger.
Regarding the reversibility appraisal of unemployment, the younger the unemployed 
person and the shorter the period of unemployment, the greater was the individual’s 
tendency to appraise a job loss as reversible. Taking into account that the reversibility 
dimension has been analyzed in previous studies (Gowan, Riordan, & Gatewood, 1999; 
Leana & Feldman, 1990; 1991), it is important to note that in this case there were no 
significant correlations between reversibility and the education level as it had been 
established in a previous study (Gowan, Riordan, & Gatewood, 1999). However, in the 
current study only respondents with a high school degree or a higher education degree 
were included, therefore the variance of education was probably too restricted to see 
any differences based on the educational level, whereas the link between reversibility 
and the length of unemployment and age had not been assessed previous research. A 
limitation to generalizability of the findings regarding the reversibility dimension is the 
unsatisfactory internal consistency of this scale. Probably this is due to the few items 
used for this scale, even if a similar practice was used also in other studies (Gowan, 
Riordan, & Gatewood, 1999; Leana & Feldman, 1990; 1991). In the future studies the 
cognitive appraisal dimension of reversibility must be reevaluated and items added 
or reformulated to increase the internal validity of the findings. Otherwise, it is not 
unequivocal that the reversibility measure in this study actually comprises the appraisal 
of the reversibility of job loss.
In general, these results have shown how different socio-demographic, contextual 
factors and general beliefs are related to cognitive appraisal of job loss. Appraisal of job 
loss is not one-dimensional, and different aspects of appraisal are influenced by the 
interaction of various factors. Similarly as the emotional and somatic reactions to job 
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loss are rather diverse, the results demonstrate that so are the cognitions related to the 
appraisal of unemployment. The unique combination of socio-demographic factors and 
beliefs forms a unique appraisal of job loss in each specific case. Speculations about 
the possible influence of the cognitive appraisal on emotional and somatic reactions 
of the unemployed is beyond the scope of this article and even the study, however, 
the findings of the present study certainly confirm the importance of evaluating the 
cognitive appraisal of critical events. It shows why social, demographic and contextual 
characteristics of the unemployed are not always the best determinants of stress 
reactions after a job loss: the mental health of the unemployed is probably influenced 
neither by the duration of unemployment nor income per se but rather by the cognitive 
appraisal of the situation, shaped by these factors. 
Several specific findings of the study might have some rather practical implications. 
It has been discovered that loss and threat appraisals, for instance, can be better 
explained by such contextual factors as the length of unemployment and the material 
wealth of an individual, whereas the challenge appraisal depends more on the belief in 
a just world than on any of the socio demographic or contextual variables. In addition, 
coping self-efficacy predicts (reversely) threat and loss appraisal, however it does not 
determine the appraisal of challenge and reversibility. Consequently, these findings 
shed light on potential directions for cognitive restructuring of job loss appraisal. It is 
usually difficult or even impossible to change most socio-demographic variables, but 
as appraisal depends also on the individual’s belief system, it is possible to strengthen 
coping self-efficacy and the belief in a just world, thus facilitating challenge appraisal 
and reducing the perceived loss and threat of job loss.
It is still an open question if belief in a just world is changeable in the therapeutic 
process since studies demonstrate its stability in time even after traumatic incidents 
(Dalbert, 2001; Dalbert  & Schneider, 1995; Overcash, Calhoun, Cann  & Tadeschi, 
1996). However, understanding the role of beliefs about justice certainly may help to 
predict reactions of individuals who are facing critical life events. On the other hand, 
knowledge of the role of coping self-efficacy, when dealing with critical life events, allows 
very specific therapeutic interventions, as the main sources of self-efficacy are clear 
(Bandura, 1997), and coping self-efficacy as a resource has already been demonstrated 
in its role in therapy (Chesney et al., 2003). According to the results of this study job loss 
can be appraised as less of a threat and a loss by facilitating the belief in one’s personal 
ability to cope and one’s sense of control (coping self-efficacy), whilst strengthening the 
belief in a just world may help to perceive a job loss as a challenge.
Limitations and future directions
It is important to note that this branch of research would benefit if additional 
determinants of cognitive appraisal would be included, as it would allow explaining an 
even broader part of the cognitive appraisal variance. The models of the current study 
explained only 9-25% of different dimensions of cognitive appraisal, therefore, most 
probably, there are different socio-demographic, contextual and cognitive variables, 
which explain the cognitive appraisal of job loss, but were not included in this study. 
In addition, in regard to personality factors, in this study only beliefs were assessed, 
however, individual goals and their hierarchy are, most probably, equally important 
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contributors, since Lazarus (Lazarus, 2000) described them as personality factors that 
influence cognitive appraisal along with the individual belief system.
One specific danger to the internal validity of the study was the unsatisfactory 
reliability of the measure of reversibility cognitive appraisal dimension. In the future 
the measure must be reevaluated and reformulated to increase validity of conclusions 
regarding appraisal of reversibility of job loss.
Conclusions
The cognitive appraisal of job loss is shaped by socio-demographic and contextual 
factors as well as by the individual belief system. The appraisal of loss and threat is 
determined mostly by income and the duration of unemployment, while the main 
determinant of challenge appraisal is the belief in a just world. Facilitation of coping 
self-efficacy in therapeutic interventions might help to decrease the perceived threat 
and loss; however, challenge appraisal might be facilitated by strengthening of belief in 
a just world. As the models in the current study explained only a portion of the different 
dimensions of cognitive appraisal, this field of research would benefit if additional 
variables were evaluated as potential predictors of cognitive appraisal. In the future also 
the measure of the reversibility dimension of cognitive appraisal must be improved, as 
currently its internal consistency is unsatisfactory. 
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Abstract
The main aim of the study was to examine effects of computer-mediated information on the use of 
unshared information during group discussion. In Experiment 1, the participants (N = 77) were 
psychology students (37 men and 40 women with a mean age of 28.4) that were randomised into 
three different conditions, IT based on writing, IT based on talking and face-to-face interaction. 
The result indicate that IT based on writing affects the use of unshared information but not IT 
based on talking, as compared to face-to-face interaction. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 72) 
were randomised in three conditions, writing only, talking only and combining writing and 
talking during group discussion. Result indicate that writing only enhances information sharing 
during group discussions. Discussion of these results is provided.
Keywords: Interpersonal Communication; Technology Communication; Human Computer 
Interaction; Group Performance; Group Discussion; Virtual teams.
In virtual group meetings, people tend to communicate differently using text as 
compared to voice. For example, based on observations, students may communicate 
more directly and a bit braver when writing instead of talking. The study was conducted 
in order to find out whether the communication medium (writing versus talking) could 
affect group performance.
The aim of the study
The use of information technology is increasing at the workplace and in education. 
As information and communication technologies are introduced for a widening range 
of activities in the workplace and the home, we need research to understand how 
complex processes such as coordination and collaboration are achieved, and how 
information technology (IT) systems should be designed to support them effectively 
(see e.g. Olson, Finholt,  & Teasley, 2000; Olson, Malone,  & Smith, 2001; Schrum  & 
Benson, 2002).
There exist a large body of research systems designed to support group writing, 
group editing, command and control applications and program meetings. In preparing 
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this paper the literature search was, however, limited to research within the field of 
psychology or to that outside this field if the research had direct relevance to the subject 
of unshared information.
There exists a relatively large body of research on comparisons between electronic 
brainstorming (EBS) and face-to-face (FTF) brainstorming (see e.g. Derosa, Smith & 
Hanula, 2007; Valacich, Dennis, & Nunamaker, 1992), and specific methods to increase 
group performance, GDSS (see e.g. Vathanophas & Liang, 2007; Lam & Schaubroeck, 
2000), but there are fewer studies comparing interaction based on information 
technology (IT) outside the domain of brainstorming and group support systems. The 
present study was conducted with the purpose of further understanding how knowledge 
communication or information exchange is affected by the use of information 
technology. 
Unshared information, the common knowledge effect
One possible resource for groups, compared to single individuals, is the diverse 
store of knowledge held by group members, due to differences in background and 
experience. But this resource will only come to good use if the group manages to pool 
the unique information that their members hold. However, evidence suggests that the 
information which group members choose to mention during discussion is influenced 
by the information which other members have already mentioned (see e.g., Fisher & 
Ellis, 1990). The common knowledge effect (Stasser & Titus, 1985) is a well documented 
bias, groups have been found to be deficient at bringing out the unshared information. 
This tendency to make use of the information that is available to every member of the 
group more than information which is available only to one group member has been 
found in several studies (see e.g. Stasser & Stewart, 1992). The main theoretical basis 
for the present study concerns the concept of shared information (common knowledge) 
and unshared information (unique knowledge). Some of the more important studies on 
this topic are described in detail below.
Stasser and Titus (1985) designed a study that would control for both informational 
and normative influence. The design, known as the hidden profile, is created when a 
set of information is developed such that, when considered as a whole, it points to an 
optimal solution. However, information is distributed across members such that some 
of the information is shared (i.e., given to all members) and the remainder is unshared 
or unique (i.e., given to just one member), and the information each member receives 
(which consists of both shared and unique units) points to a suboptimal solution. Thus, 
the design produces an initial distribution of preferences that would lead members to 
make a poor choice if there were no subsequent discussion. The unique information, 
which in combination with the unique information from other group members points 
to the optimal solution or away from the suboptimal ones, would influence deliberations 
by permitting the group to develop complete assessments of each of the decision 
alternatives. That is, it increases the likelihood that the group will select the best choice. 
The groups in Stasser and Titus’s (1985) study performed poorly. Especially noteworthy 
are the findings from the conflict condition (in which the hidden profile created two 
subgroups, each favoring a different suboptimal decision), where groups not only failed 
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to discover the hidden profile but also failed to chose the optimal solution. For research 
on group support systems and hidden profiles, see Mennecke (1997).
Subsequent research (Stasser, Taylor,  & Hanna, 1989) investigated the content 
of discussion, reporting that shared information was mentioned and repeated more 
frequently than was unique information (see also e.g. Larson, 1997; Wittenbaum, 1999). 
Following a model proposed by Zajonc and Smoke (1959), Tindale and Sheffey (2002) 
assessed the effects of information assignment redundancy and group interaction on group 
memory performance. Participants (college students) in 5-person groups either 
received a full list of consonant-verb-consonant trigrams to memorize, or a partial 
list with each trigram distributed to 2 group members. Groups recalled the trigrams 
as either coacting or interacting groups. In terms of correct recall, coacting groups 
outperformed interacting groups, and partial redundancy produced better recall than 
total redundancy. However, intrusion errors were greatly reduced by group interaction 
and/or a reduction in the cognitive load on the individual group members (i.e. partial 
redundancy). Groups in the partial redundancy condition tended to perform near 
optimal levels (Tindale & Sheffey, 2002). This result indicates that the use of unshared 
information is essential for group performance. 
Wittenbaum and Park (2001) have also found that decision-making groups prefer 
to discuss shared information which all members already know instead of unshared 
information that a single member knows. This preference for discussing shared 
information may stem from group members’ positive evaluations of each other’s task 
capabilities when shared information is communicated. Members who already are 
perceived as capable (i.e., those high in status, experts, and leaders) need not bolster 
their image by communicating shared information. Instead, they discuss unshared 
information more often than members perceived as less capable. As members low in 
status gain respect by communicating shared information, they may risk mentioning 
unshared information later during discussion. Assigning group leaders, informing 
members of their expert roles, and allowing ample time for discussion may increase the 
group’s discussion of unshared information (Wittenbaum & Park, 2001). 
Stasser, Vaughan and Stewart (2000) designed an experiment whereby three-
person groups read descriptions of three hypothetical candidates for the student-body 
president. Each member of the group received more information about one of the 
candidates, making him or her relatively expert about that candidate. The identity of this 
candidate was revealed to members in half of the groups before they read the materials 
(expertise forewarning). For half of the forewarned and the not-forewarned groups, 
members’ expertise was publicly identified at the onset of discussion (expert-role 
assignment). During collective recall, groups mentioned substantially more shared than 
unshared information. This sampling bias favouring shared information was reduced 
by expert-role assignment but not by forewarning. However, forewarning did increase 
the likelihood that unshared information would be retained on a written protocol once 
it was mentioned during discussion. Past research attributed the role-assignment effect 
to coordinated recall prompted by expert-role enactment, but the authors found no 
evidence of this kind of division of labour. Other possible mediating processes for these 
effects were explored (Stasser, Vaughan & Stewart, 2000).
70
Per Eisele
To summarize, research on shared and unshared information have showed that it is 
common in groups to focus too much on shared information and that this unwarranted 
bias can have harmful effects on performance.
Explanations of the common knowledge effect
Researchers have offered three general explanations for the failure of members 
to mention unique information (Stasser  & Titus, 2003; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead  & 
Botero, 2004). The first is the collective information sampling model (CIS), in which 
it is assumed that shared information is more likely to be discussed by the group 
because of its distributional advantage over unique information. Imagine that all four 
members of a four-person group know (or have been given to memorize) information 
Item A, and that information Item B has been given to just one member. Assuming 
random sampling, Item A is more likely to appear in discussion because there are more 
opportunities for it to be selected. As Wittenbaum et al. (2004) noted, the CIS is meant 
to show that probability can account, to some extent, for the tendency of groups to 
discuss shared information. 
The second explanation for the shared information bias is preference consistency. 
The hidden profile, by design, creates an initial preference that favors a suboptimal 
decision, and that shared information, again by design, is instrumental in developing 
the initial preference. It is reasonable to assume then that members more positively 
evaluate knowledge that is consistent with their initial preferences, and that members 
will present such knowledge during discussion as evidence or support for their claims. 
Because unique information is designed to contradict initial preferences, it is less likely 
to be produced; members tend to make arguments in favor of their positions, not against 
them. That is, because shared knowledge is largely consistent with initial preferences, it 
has a built-in advantage over unique information in terms of being mentioned more 
often. Finally, the social comparison explanation posits that the discovery that one 
has information in common with others grant a sense of legitimacy and credibility on 
that knowledge, as well on the persons who mentions it (e.g., Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & 
Zuckerman, 1999). Those who present unique information, however, because such 
information cannot be verified, incur some type of social cost (Stasser & Titus, 2003). 
The social cost could be that the bearer of unique information is perceived as less 
credible, which in turn results in caution to speak again, or a general disinclination for 
other members to provide that member with more speaking turns, or both.
Information technology and unshared information
Studies on the pooling of unshared information that included IT have been con-
ducted within two major frameworks, group decision support system (GDSS) and 
electronic brainstorming (EBS). A Group Decision Support System (GDSS) is an in-
teractive, computer-based system that helps teams to make decisions or solve problems 
(see e.g., DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Huber, 1984). It is a computerized version of the 
manual brainstorming technique. It can be supported by an electronic meeting system 
(EMS) or make use of simpler techniques such as email or internet chat systems. 
There is some evidence that EBS is superior to face-to-face brainstorming but 
the support of the hypothesis that it is superior to nominal brainstorming is weak 
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(Pinsonneault, Barki, Gallupe, & Hoppen, 1999). Within the framework of comparing 
group decision support system (GDSS) with face-to-face (FTF) group discussion, Lam 
and Schaubroeck (2000) found that participants given conflicting information tended to 
share more of their unique data when using GDSS than when meeting FTF. But GDSS is 
created for the purpose of enhancing performance between interacting group members. 
Perhaps GDSS should be compared with techniques with the purpose of making FTF 
meetings more effective (e.g. NGT, see for example Fox, 1989). To my knowledge this 
particular comparison has not been done within the common knowledge framework.
Within the framework of group idea generation tasks studies have been conducted 
with the purpose of examining differences between electronic brainstorming (EBS) 
and traditional face-to-face (FTF) brainstorming. In general, EBS groups have been 
shown to be more productive and more satisfied with interaction processes than FTF 
groups. But while large EBS groups outperform nominal groups, small nominal groups 
outperform EBS groups (DeRosa, Smith & Hantula, 2007).
Gallupe and colleagues (Gallupe et  al., 1991) compared the performance of 
traditional brainstorming groups with that of electronic brainstorming groups and 
found that the performance of the latter greatly exceeded that of the former. Electronic 
brainstorming groups are probably more similar to nominal groups than interacting 
groups; hence we might expect better performance (Pennington  & Hastie, 1993). 
However Dennis  & Valacich (1993) reported that electronic brainstorming increased 
creativity compared to nominal groups for 12-person groups but not 6-person groups.
The differences between EBS and FTF can be explained by the loss of productivity 
as found in studies on brainstorming groups (Stroebe  & Diehl, 1994). In electronic 
brainstorming each member of the group can input his or her own ideas without waiting 
to speak or take turns and then send these ideas to the others in the group. The screen 
then displays all the other group members’ ideas as well as the individual operating the 
computer.
To better understand differences between communication based on information 
technology and face-to-face communication it is important to compare IT other than 
GDSS and EBS with different kinds of face-to-face interaction. Bonito (2003) examined 
whether features of mediated group discussion were related to participatory judgements. 
Discussion was coded for units that constituted shared or unique information. Bonito 
(2003) investigated two different kinds of computer text environments (Chat Circles 
and basic text) but didn’t compare IT with FTF.
Purpose and hypotheses
Experiment 1 of the present study examined information exchange with and 
without IT, without any technique designed to improve the interaction process. The aim 
of Experiment 1 was to examine if computer-mediated information exchange affects the 
use of unshared information during group discussions. The writing vs. speaking variable 
was included in the study because the effects of the medium have been neglected in this 
line of research.
Based on own observations of text based communication during group discussions 
and previous literature review, the following hypotheses were examined:
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There is a difference in the use of unshared information during group discussion 
between IT-based interaction and face-to-face interaction.
There is a difference in the use of unshared information during group discussion 
between the “talking medium” as compared to the “writing medium”.
Experiment 1
Method
In a pilot study with 23 participants, the use of unshared (unique) versus shared 
information during IT interaction and face-to-face interaction was examined. The main 
purpose of the pilot study was to test the rating procedure, that is, the rating of the 
amount of shared versus unshared information during interaction.
Participants
Students (N = 77) were asked to participate in the study during a course on research 
methods. The sample consisted of 37 men and 40 women with a mean age of 28.4. In 
the population the gender proportion was not the same as in the sample, but about 65% 
women and 35% men. That is, more men than women volunteered to take part in the 
study.
Material and design
The experimental design consisted of three conditions: IT based on writing (n = 26); 
IT based on talking (n  =  26); and face-to-face interaction (n  =  25). The information 
technology used in the study was the MSN chat program. The participants were told to 
interact only by writing or talking, respectively.
The dependent variable was the number of utterances scored as unshared (unique) 
information. Unshared information was determined by each group members presumed 
knowledge of three main type of research methods: experiment, interview and 
observation.
The tests on research methods were of equivalent length.
The coding procedure
One briefly trained observer who took part in the same bachelor course as the 
raters transcribed all information discussed during the interaction in the face-to-face 
groups. Two raters read independently the transcribed conversations from all groups 
without knowing whether the data come from face-to-face groups or net based 
discussion groups. The raters scored the number of utterances which they estimated as 
being unique for each group member. That is, the raters simply counted the number of 
statements that they scored as being unique from each single group member (unshared 
information) and statements regarded as not unique (shared information).
Procedure
The participants were asked to read a text about research methods. A general text 
was the same for all participants. A specific text was unique for each member of each 
73
Pooling Unshared Information: Comparing Computer-Mediated Group Discussion ...
three-person group. The unique text was about one of three research methods, one 
text about experiment, one text about interview, and one text about observation. After 
reading this text alone in a classroom, the participants were formed into three-person 
groups. 
The participants were randomised in three different experimental conditions, IT 
writing, IT talking and FTF. Groups in the face-to-face interaction were seated together 
around a small table with three chairs. Groups in the two IT conditions were seated 
in three different computer rooms and separated from each other. Groups using the 
writing medium were told to communicate only in writing without talking. Groups 
using the talking medium were instructed only to talk without writing.
All group members were informed that the group task was to discuss different 
research methods’ advantages and disadvantages, a task that was a scheduled course 
assignment. After all groups completed the discussion, participants were seated in one 
classroom and informed about the purpose of the study.
For the purpose of avoiding too cumbersome transcriptions a time limit of 20 
minutes was set for all groups.
In the post-experiment phase, the participants were asked about the group work 
from their personal perspective. That is, they were asked to briefly evaluate their own 
contribution to the group work.
Results
The scoring of unshared information by the two independent raters had an overall 
inter-rater reliability of .69, and the scoring of shared information had an inter-rater 
reliability of .54. Descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables are reported in 
Table 1.
The hypotheses testing was analysed by a simple one-way ANOVA.There were no 
differences between the IT-based interaction and face-to-face interaction either for 
unshared or shared information. For unshared information, there was a significant 
difference between the communication medium F 6.36 (2, 74), p = .003. The Tukey B 
post hoc test showed that it was the writing condition that made use of more unshared 
information than both IT talking and face-to-face interaction. That is, hypothesis one 
was not supported but the second hypothesis was.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Two Dependent Variables across Three Conditions.
Conditions 
Dependent variables Writing IT Talking IT Face-to-face interaction
Shared information M 13.05
SD 3.77
M 13
SD 3.40
M 12.4
SD 3.67
Unshared information M 6.4
SD 1.62
M 4.96
SD 1.1
M 5.2
SD 1.86
Hypotheses one was not supported: there was no difference in the use of unshared 
information during group discussion between IT-based interaction and face-to-face 
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interaction. Hypotheses two was supported: there was a difference in the use of unshared 
information during group discussion between the talking medium as compared to the 
writing medium.
Post-experimentally the participants were asked if they tired to contribute to the 
discussion by adding information about “their” research method, that is, the research 
method they had a responsibility to read about prior to thegroup interaction. Almost all 
of the participants said that they tried, but also mentioned that it is was difficult to keep 
focus on the specific task. There were no differences across conditions in this feedback 
from participants.
Discussion
One alternative hypothesis was that writing is more simultaneous than speaking, 
and, therefore, the writing groups may outperform talking groups. That is, the writing 
medium can add something to the interaction, e.g. simultaneity. But it is also possible 
that writing has a positive effect on interaction because it reduces some potential 
negative effects of talking, e.g. dominant group members or evaluation anxiety. To 
further investigate effects of the medium, writing vs. talking, a second experiment was 
conducted.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted with the purpose of examining differences between 
the writing and the talking medium. The hypothesis put forward was that writing 
during group discussion in virtual groups would increase performance.
Method
Participants and design
The participants were 72 (52 men and 19 women) with a mean age of 28.3 
(SD 10.9), chess players who volunteered to take part in the study, and were randomised 
in three conditions. In one condition the participants communicated to each other 
only by writing during the fulfilment of the group task (n = 24), in another condition 
they only talked during interaction (n = 24), and in the third condition the participants 
combined writing and talking (n  =  24). Each group consisted of three members. 
Dependent variables were the number of generated ideas, unshared information and 
shared information.
Material
The information technology used in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experi-
ment 1: the MSN chat program. The material in Experiment 2 was an idea-generation 
task. Different chess positions were selected to fit the task of generating ideas. 
These (4  different) chess positions were to be evaluated collectively by each group.
Transcriptions were made during group interaction. Independent raters counted the 
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number of ideas generated by each group member, statements by participants which 
were scored as shared information, and statements scored as unshared information.
Procedure
The participants were recruited from an internet chess community 
(www.playchess.com), and they volunteered to take part in the study. After all participants 
were randomised in the three conditions and three-person groups were created, each 
group agreed upon a time to meet and fulfil the task. The experiment leader observed 
all groups during their meeting without interrupting, besides telling the participants 
when the next chess position to be evaluated appeared on the screen. 
The participants viewed the chess positions and were told that their task was to 
come up with as many ideas for both players (white and black) that could be expressed 
verbally. That is, not simply suggesting single moves but expressed ideas on how to play 
the game.
Each group member was prior to interaction individually given instructions on 
each of three different aspects of chess theory: pawn structure; piece activation; and 
field control (e.g. centre control). The participants were told that they had personal 
responsibility for one of these aspects during group interaction. That is, each group 
consisted of one member responsible to give information about pawn structure, one 
about piece activation, and one about field control.
After all groups completed the experiment the participants were informed about 
the purpose of the study.
Results
The scoring of unshared information by the two independent raters had an 
overall inter-rater reliability of .69, the scoring of shared information had an inter-
rater reliability of .52, and the reliability of the scoring of generated ideas was r = .61. 
Descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables are reported in table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables across three conditions.
Conditions
Dependent variables Writing Talking Writing and talking
Shared information M 11.7
SD 2.9
M 13.7
SD 5.7
M 14.4
SD 2.8
Unshared information M 5.6
SD 0.9
M 4.8
SD 0.8
M 4.6
SD 0.5
Generated ideas M 4.6
SD 1.2
M 2.9
SD 0.3
M 3.2
SD 0.5
The inferential analysis was made with one-way ANOVA statistics. There were 
no significant differences regarding shared information. For unshared information 
and generated ideas there were significant differences between the three conditions, 
F (2, 68) = 12.6, p < .0001 and F (2, 68) = 31.6, p < .0001 respectively. For both dependent 
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variables, post hoc analyses with Tukey B showed that it was the writing condition that 
was different from the two other conditions (talking and writing & talking).
Thus the hypothesis was confirmed: writing had a positive effect on performance 
in virtual groups both regarding unshared information and number of generated ideas.
General discussion
The result of Experiment 1, that interacting with IT writing was different from 
the two talking conditions, but no differences were found between IT talking and 
face-to-face interaction was interesting and important. However, there are many dif-
ferent explanations to this finding. The writing medium constitutes interaction that is 
characterized by a slower speed. However, the writing medium minimizes production 
blocking (see e.g. Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijk, 2003) since all group members can par-
ticipate simultaneously, and in the third group making it possible to alternate between 
writing and reading. Although the group members were aware of each other’s names 
(through the student login identity), the writing medium evokes a certain feeling of 
anonymity. Since anonymity lessens evaluation anxiety (see e.g. Valacich, Jessup, Den-
nis, & Nunamaker, 1992) it has a potential positive effect on group performance. Thus, 
there are at least three different explanations to the result found in the present study. 
Experiment 2 was conducted with the purpose of examining these different 
explanations, although a single experiment not is enough to rule out any one 
explanation. The result that the writing only condition was different from both 
the talking only condition and writing plus talking condition, provides a hint in the 
direction toward explanations that emphasise decrease of production blocking (see e.g. 
Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijk, 2003). This is because in the writing plus talking condition 
the group members also work simultaneously. It seems that talking during interaction 
simply reduces team effectiveness. However, it could very well be that a combination of 
writing and talking is better if people make use of both medium in an optimal way, for 
example writing first and then discuss vocally. This is indeed one of the main objectives 
for future research together with exploring different types of information technology.
The everyday use of IT is a neglected area within group performance research 
which constitutes the reason for the design of the present study. Future research will 
nevertheless be done with the aim of making full comparisons between FTF with or 
without different techniques with the purpose of enhancing group performance (e.g. 
NGT, stepladder) with IT with and without use of techniques (e.g. GDSS, EB). 
To conclude, despite the weaknesses of the present study it added valuable 
knowledge and evoked many ideas for future research.
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Abstract
Performance on intelligence tests is generally considered to be influenced by the environment, 
however, some tests are referred to as culture-fair (CF). These tests endeavour to eliminate 
culture influence as far as possible. One of the most popular tests is the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (RPM). Unfortunately, some authors use CF tests for cultural comparison, and this can 
lead to misleading results. In this preliminary study we have examined the potential of RPM to 
measure native culture-independent cognitive ability using two groups of children coming from 
different socio-cultural backgrounds (Czech and Roma). This CF potential was evaluated using 
a dynamic testing approach (i.e., pretest, training phase, and retest). Czech children were on the 
average more successful both at pretest and retest. However, the level of improvement (i.e., retest 
minus pretest) was significantly higher in the group of Roma children. These results seem to 
reflect factors such as socio-cultural background. In summary, these preliminary data indicate 
that RPM success is determined by multiple factors. Thus the performance on intelligence 
tests, including CF tests, must be considered within the context of the specific socio-cultural 
background of the participants.
Keywords: Matrices, fluid intelligence, culture-fair test, Roma children, dynamic testing 
Introduction
The matrices tests are well-known and widely used tests of analytic reasoning. They 
can be used separately, like the Bochumer Matrizentest, or as a part of an intelligence 
scale battery, such as the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales. No doubt the most famous 
separate intelligence test is Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM), originally developed 
by John C. Raven in 1936. The RPM are available in three different forms based on 
participant ability. In addition to the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), two others 
forms of the RPM have been developed. The Coloured Progressive Matrices were 
designed for younger children, elderly persons and people with learning difficulties, and 
the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) were designed for adults and adolescents of 
above average intelligence. 
The RPM are a convenient measure of g. Spearman himself declared RPM as likely 
the best measurement of g (Spearman, 1946). Traditionally RPM are also one of the best 
measurements of fluid intelligence (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Gray & Thompson, 
2004; Kane  & Engle, 2002). Cattell (1967) defined the term fluid intelligence (Gf) as the 
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innate cognitive ability to solve novel problems independent of acquired knowledge. 
According to Cattell (1987/1971) the development of Gf depends mainly on biological 
factors (i.e., genetic factors, diet quality and health; Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger 
1999; Gray & Thompson, 2004). In addition to Gf exists crystallised intelligence (Gc), 
which is defined as the ability to use experience and knowledge. Gc is in contrast to Gf 
more influenced by the environment. According to theory of culture-fair testing, RPM 
measure an innate culture-independent ability to solve cognitive tasks. Cattell and Horn 
have extended the Gf-Gc theory to include seven additional factors: visual processing 
abilities (Gv), short-term comprehension and retrieval (Gsm), long-term storage and 
retrieval (Glr), speed processing (Gs), auditory processing (Ga) and quantitative ability 
(Cq). Tusing and Ford (2004) add the factor reading/writing ability (Grw). Currently, 
the most influential theory is the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory that connects Cattell and 
Horn’s Gf-Gc theory with Carroll’s three-stratum theory (McGrew, 2005). 
The interpretation of the performance on RPM is influenced by the theoretical 
approach to innateness of intelligence and g. Many contemporary researchers (the 
first group) have adopted RPM to measure innate intelligence and evaluate culture-
independent cognitive ability (e.g., Klauer, Willmes, & Phye, 2002; Shaunessy, Karnes, & 
Cobb, 2004). Although some authors have criticised this approach, more than 1,000 
studies have used RPM as an intelligent test (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). In addition, 
some research teams have adopted the matrices in cultural comparison of intelligence 
assuming that they are culturally fair. For example, Rushton, Čvorovič and Bons (2007) 
examined whether the Roma people of Serbia scored lower on IQ tests than other 
Europeans using the SPM. They found that the average IQ score of the Roma people 
in Serbia was approximately 70, and they speculated on the impact of the culturally 
disadvantaged conditions of Roma children. However, an item analysis revealed that 
this test measured the same construct in both groups (i.e., the same items were either 
easy or difficult for both groups). These authors concluded that the lower IQ scores of 
the Roma people reflected g more than culturally specific ways of thinking. Many studies 
assert that Gf predicts income (Lynn, 2010), education (Lynn, 2010), health (Reeve & 
Basalik, 2009) and religiosity (Reeve  & Basalik, 2009, Rhuston  & Čvorovic, 2009). 
Therefore, some researchers equate performance on the matrices with many aspects of 
life. In other words, IQ determines the environmental context but not vice versa. These 
authors predominantly contend that intelligence is an unchangeable quantity. This type 
of research is equivalent to various cross-cultural investigations accomplished in the last 
century (Cole, 2000).
Naturally, there is also a group of researchers with a different opinion (i.e., the 
second group). Although these authors do not deny the relationship between some 
aspects of life (e. g. income, education, health) and IQ performance, they do not agree 
that IQ is a predictor of life conditions. Their view is opposite in that they explain lower 
IQ performance as a consequence of different life conditions such as the inaccessibility of 
quality education (Felice & Giugliano, 2011; Tzuriel, 2000) or the lower level of mediated 
experiences from child-adult interactions (Cole, 2000; Málková; 2008, Vygotsky, 
1986). In addition, recent researchers have argued that certain interventions can 
increase performance on Gf tasks. These authors assume that basal cognitive function 
training can cause transfer to higher cognitive processes. This transfer has been shown 
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between Gf and working memory (WM) (Büchel, 2006; Shelton, Elliott, Matthews, 
Hill, & Gouvier, 2010; Unsworth & Engle, 2006; 2007) and between Gf and executive 
functions (Banich, 2009; Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000). Klingberg, Forssberg and Westerberg (2002) were among the first to 
study this topic when they investigated whether a new type of computerised cognitive 
training could improve WM capacity and whether the prospective improvement of 
WM influenced performance on the progressive matrices. An improvement in WM 
capacity and increased performance on the progressive matrices was demonstrated and 
subsequently confirmed by other researchers (Jeaggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides,  & Perrig, 
2008; Klingberg, et al., 2005; Olesen et al., 2004).
Clearly, the attitude towards performance on RPM differs across groups of 
researchers and is connected with the researchers’ respective approaches to intelligence 
and its theory. In short, the first group interprets RPM performance in terms of cultural 
independence. According to this view, the RPM measure a culture-independent 
cognitive ability and thereby this is a culture-fair test. Conversely, the second group 
considers RPM performance to be influenced by the environment. According to this 
view, the RPM are similar to other intelligence tests in that this is not a culture-fair test. 
Therefore, the aim of this study was to verify whether children from a lower level 
socio-cultural background can improve their RPM performance by dynamic training. 
In case the gains of these children are higher than the gains of children coming from 
higher levels of socio-cultural background, this will indicate that the use of RPM as a 
culture-fair test is problematic; i.e. the poorer performance of children coming from the 
lower socio-cultural background will not imply a cognitive inferiority, but rather will be 
a reflection of their background.
To test this hypothesis, we compared the RPM performances of children of two 
different backgrounds – Czech and Roma children. In addition, we compared the 
benefits of the dynamic training phase in both groups.
Methods
Study design
Two sets of analogical matrices were chosen from SPM and APM. The first set was 
used as a pretest (i.e., the static test), and the second was used as a retest. In addition, 
we designed three sets of matrices based on the analogical principles used in the SPM 
and APM matrices (i.e., the principles of operation matrices: addition, subtraction, 
supplement, and supplemental breakthrough; and the principles of collection matrices: 
different matrix complexities according to the number of parameters and their values). 
These sets were employed during the dynamic training phase. The order of the study 
was (1) pretest, (2) three days of training sessions (ca. 0.5 hour per day) and (3) retest. 
The participants were tested in small groups according to the SPM manual (Raven´s 
progressive matrices manual, 1991). 
Each child completed the training phase individually. During the training phase, 
the children were asked to say or draw the missing item in an empty matrix field. The 
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children were provided feedback for correct solutions. When an answer was incorrect 
or missing, children received a clue at the lowest level (e. g. the contents of the matrice 
were enumerated); as necessary the clue level was increased, based on the child’s 
performance. 
Participants 
Forty children were recruited from primary schools (17 females, 23 males). The 
age of the children were approximately 13 year (M = 13.2 and SEM = 0.43). Twenty-two 
children were Roma1, and 18 children were Czech. There were no significant between-
group age differences. 
We included Roma children in the study because the socio-cultural background 
and social exclusion levels of Roma families are the lowest of all the minorities in the 
Czech Republic (Pekárková, Lábusová, Rendl, & Nikolai, 2010): they generally perform 
lower on intelligent tests (Bakalář, 2004; Pekárková et al., 2010; Rushton et al. 2007), and 
are the most discussed and most numerous minority in the Czech Republic (Jakoubek & 
Hirt, 2004). 
Analyses
The Shapiro-Wilk W tested data normality. A normal distribution was not found; 
therefore, nonparametric methods were used. The Mann-Whitney U test was used to 
examine the differences between Roma and Czech children. The Wilcoxon paired test 
was used to evaluate the difference between pretest and retest performances. A value of 
p < .05 was considered significant. 
Results
Children were asked to solve 15 matrices (in two analogical forms) at pretest and 
retest. As shown in Fig. 1, the mean values of correctly solved matrices were M = 5.30 
and SEM = 0.84 (40) at pretest and M = 9.38 and SEM = 1.48 (40) at retest. The gain 
score (retest minus pretest) was M = 4.10 and SEM = 0.65 (40). The effect of training 
was significant (p < .05).
1 Most Roma families in the Czech Republic do not claim Roma nationality. The primary inclusion 
criterion for the Roma group was a teacher’s comment. We are aware of the restrictions that this 
procedure implies; however, we assume that the stereotypes (e.g. skin colour) did not influence teachers, 
and they identified the children correctly. Children in our study were recruited from smaller schools, 
and the teachers knew the families. 
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Figure 1. Improvement in solving matrices after the dynamic training phase 
The data summarize the mean values of correctly solved matrices in the pretest and after the dynamic phase (retest). 
The data are given as the means ± SEM of 40 children. p < 0.05.
Because the matrices in the retest and pretest contained analogical principles (first 
matrices, second matrices etc.), the analogical pairs of matrices could be combined and 
compared with regard to how they were solved. A significant effect (p < .05) of training 
was found on performance in 9 of 15 pairs at retest. The analysis of matrix complexity 
revealed that the training effect was predominantly in pairs with moderate level of 
complexity. 
Figure 2. Improvement in solving analogical pairs of matrices.
The pretest and retest matrices were coupled to analogical pairs and compared mutually. The significant effect  
(p < 0.05) of dynamic training phase on performance in retest was found in 9 pairs of 15. The data are given as the 
means of gain point in the concrete matrix ± SEM of 40 children.
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At pretest, Czech children were able to solve on average M = 6.72 and SEM = 0.80 
(18) matrices correctly, whereas Roma children solved only M = 4.09 and SEM = 0.66 
(22) correctly. In other words, the Czech children solved 1.64 more problems than the 
Roma children (p < .05). 
At retest Czech and Roma children on average solved M = 10.28 and SEM = 0.46 
(18) and M = 8.64 and SEM = 0.58 (22) matrices correctly, respectively. In other words 
Czech children solved 1.19 more problems than the Roma children (p < .05).
Although the Czech children solved significantly more problems at pretest and 
retest than the Roma children, the difference at retest was only marginally significant 
(retest: p = .04; pretest: p = .01). The benefits of the training phase were greater for Roma 
children than for Czech children.
Table1. The significance of individual benefits in group of Roma children
Participant Pretest Retest p
R_1 1 6 .09
R_2 5 6 .59
R_3 2 9 .02*
R_4 1 5 .07
R_5 1 7 .05*
R_6 6 7 .93
R_7 6 14 .01**
R_8 1 9 .01**
R_9 1 8 .02*
R_10 3 10 .02*
R_11 1 7 .03*
R_12 0 8 .01**
R_13 9 11 .39
R_14 5 12 .02*
R_15 1 4 .11
R_16 6 10 .21
R_17 7 9 0.11
R_18 4 12 0.03*
R_19 5 9 0.21
R_20 10 12 0.37
R_21 9 11 0.36
R_22 6 4 0.53
    *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
85
The Problematic Nature of Culture-Fair Testing: Training Effect Differences ... 
Table 2. The significance of individual benefits in group of Czech children
Participant Pretest Retest     p
C_1 2 10 .01**
C_2 2 10 .01**
C_3 2 9 .02*
C_4 8 10 .36
C_5 9 11 .45
C_6 8 11 .11
C_7 7 8 .69
C_8 12 10 .78
C_9 4 10 .59
C_10 6 12 .04*
C_11 8 11 .11
C_12 7 9 .46
C_13 5 11 .03*
C_14 12 13 .67
C_15 10 13 .46
C_16 9 9 .48
C_17 1 5 .14
C_18 9 13 0.14
This conclusion is confirmed by the statistical analysis of individual benefits. As 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, significantly increased individual benefits (p  <  .05) were 
found for the Roma children (by 50%). It was also found that the percentage level of 
improvement of Roma children was 262%, while only 119% in the group of Czech 
children1. The effect sizes between Czech and Roma children in pretest and retest were 
calculated using Cohen’s d (with pooled standard deviation). The effect size was 1.01 
in pretest, whereas only 0.53 in retest, it means that the large effect size was changed to 
medium one by training. This finding confirms that the training benefits were higher in 
Roma than Czech children.
It was also tried to compare effect sizes between Czech and Roma children in 
pretest and retest. The effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d (with pooled dtandard 
deviation). It was found, that the effect size was 1.01 in pretest, whereas only 0.53 in 
retest. The large effect size was changed to medium effect size by training. This fact also 
confirms that the training benefits were higher in group of Roma children.
1 Percentage level of improvement was found by the formula 100/pretest score*(retest-pretest score). 
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Figure 3. A comparison of the training benefit between Czech and Roma children.
The originally lower performance of the Roma children in the pretest (A) was compensated in retest (B) due to dynamic 
training phase. 
In summary, the data indicate that the training gains of Roma children were higher 
than in the group of Czech children. It appears that the performance in RPM is not 
influenced only by innate factors, but it is also influenced by other factors, mainly socio-
cultural background. We discuss this point in detail below.
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Figure 4. An example of the collection 
matrices. The matrix is the example of the 
collection of two parameters – big and small 
shapes. Each of the parameter is created by 
three values. 
Figure 5. An example of the operational 
matrices. The matrice is the example 
of the additional matrice. The final 
shape is created by the addition of two 
preceding shapes. 
Discussion
This study demonstrated that training significantly improved performance on 
progressive matrices. Several principles are contained in the study matrices. The 
progressive matrices can be divided into two groups (DeShon et al., 1995; Páchová & 
Rendl, 2013; Páchová, 2009; Rendl, 2002): the collection matrices and the operation 
matrices. Parameters (e.g., colour or shape) and their values (e.g., black or circle) 
characterise the collection matrix elements (Fig. 4). Solving these types of matrices 
requires the classification of values. On the other hand, solving operational matrices 
requires mathematical operations (e.g., addition) within whole elements (Fig. 5). These 
matrix principles are general principles that occur in our daily lives. In Euro-American 
scholastic society children encounter these principles in their families as well as at 
kindergarten and primary school (Pekárková et al., 2010). Parents implicitly or explicitly 
stimulate the abilities that their children use to deal successfully with the demands of 
school and intelligence tests. The cognitive abilities of typical Euro-American child 
are trained constantly. Parents provide their children with different cognitive tasks, 
teach them to categorise (e.g., colours, shapes, and numbers), buy them numerous 
didactic toys, talk with them, correct their understanding of word meaning and their 
pronunciation, explain how the world works, and so on. Clearly, adult mediation is 
not identical in all families. Generally, children from families of lower socio-cultural 
background levels have fewer mediated experiences. Many Roma children in the Czech 
Republic come from low socio-cultural backgrounds. Many of these families live in 
social exclusion (Pekárková et  al., 2010). Parents of these children often only have a 
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primary-level education and are unemployed1. Compared with the typical Euro-
American child, children from families of low socio-cultural backgrounds generally 
do not receive the same cognitive stimulation. Their parents do not provide them with 
different cognitive tasks, teach them to categorise, or buy them many didactic toys. They 
might talk with them, but they do not correct their understanding of word meaning or 
pronunciation, they do not explain how the world works and so on (Pekárková et al., 
2010).  They do not perform these tasks because they do not consider them important 
(Jakoubek  & Hirt, 2004). These aspects limit the performance of Roma children in 
school and on intelligent tests. Their experience with matrix principles is less frequent 
then that of the average Euro-American child. 
Given the level of improvement in performance due to training and the differential 
experiences with matrix principles in these groups of children, it follows that children 
from families with lower sociocultural backgrounds (e.g., Roma children) are 
disadvantaged at solving RPM.
The performance at pretest was significantly lower in Roma than Czech children, 
however, it was still unclear whether the Roma children had potential for improvement. 
We analysed, therefore, the dynamic training benefits and showed that the 
improvement of the Roma children was higher. This indicates that Roma children 
compensated for their baseline performance. We presume, therefore, the connection 
of test performance to the socio-cultural background differences described above. 
Institutionalised pre-school education cannot eliminate these disadvantages because 
most Roma children are not enrolled (Ministry of Education, 2010); furthermore, 
there is a high rate of primary-education absences among Roma children (Ministry 
of Education, 2010). The poor progressive matrix performance of the Roma children 
probably is not connected with cognitive inferiority as some authors have supposed 
(Bakalář, 2004; Herrnstein  & Murray, 1994; Lynn, 2002, 2010; Rushton et  al., 2007; 
Rushton & Čvorovič, 2008); rather, it is due to their lack of experience with the matrix 
principles (Cole, 2000; Felice & Giugliano, 2011; Málková, 2008; Tzuriel, 2000; Vygotsky, 
1986). We assume that Roma children have a higher level of unrealised potential with 
regard to the zone of the proximal development due to a lack of mediated experiences 
(Vygotsky, 1986). For example, imagine two children: one Roma and one Czech. The 
performance of both children is similar at pretest, but their experience with general 
cognitive principles differs. The improvement of the child without such experiences will 
be higher because of his or her higher level of unrealised potential with regard to the 
zone of the proximal development. 
In summary, the results of this study imply that both innate cognitive ability and 
participant’s level of experience with general cognitive principles determined his or 
her original performance in our group of participants. Our preliminary study showed 
that the progressive matrices do not measure a culture-independent ability. Regarding 
Cattell and Horn’s Gf-Gc theory (Tusing  & Ford, 2004), the progressive matrices 
measure not only Gf (Carpenter et al., 1990; Gray & Thompson, 2004; Kane & Engle, 
1 These facts were typical also in our group of Roma children. Only two fathers of Roma children were 
apprenticed (the rest of parents had achieved only primary-level education), while only one mother of 
the Czech Children had not reached apprenticeship certificate or secondary school-leaving exam. 
89
The Problematic Nature of Culture-Fair Testing: Training Effect Differences ... 
2002) but also Gc. Further experiments with more participants must be done to verify 
the factors playing a role in the performance. Although our conclusions are based on 
preliminary results and is difficult to generalise, it seems to be evident that use of RPM 
as a culture-fair test can lead to misleading conclusions.
Conclusion
We found that RPM performance is modulated by factors of different quality. 
We assume that apart from Gf an important factor is socio-cultural background. It 
was shown, that cognitive enrichment is higher in children from lower socio-cultural 
background because they have a higher unrealised potential with regard to the zone of 
the proximal development. The finding indicates the problematic nature of RPM use as 
a culture-fair test. 
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Abstract
Two studies were conducted to examine some psychometric properties of the Beliefs About 
Psychological Services [BAPS] scale (Ægisdóttir & Gerstein, 2009) on a Latvian undergraduate 
students’ sample. The participants were 312 students from several universities in Latvia 
(M = 22.26, SD = 3.32; 84.94% female) matched by age, gender, years of study at the university and 
psychological counseling experience to the original sample. Forward and backward translation 
was used to develop the Latvian version of the BAPS scale. Based on the results of the Study 1, 
which revealed low reliability of the Expertness factor, the scale was revised and complemented 
with additional items to be better suited for people in the Latvian cultural context. In Study 2, 
exploratory factor analysis revealed a three-dimensional solution similar to that found in the 
original English version. Reliability coefficients for the BAPS subscales ranged from .67 to .86 
(Cronbach alpha). Confirmatory factor analysis and several model fit tests demonstrated a 
reasonably good fit. 
Keywords: beliefs, psychological services, Beliefs About Psychological Services scale, Latvian 
language, adaptation
Introduction
Attitudes toward seeking psychological services have been found to significantly 
predict willingness to seek psychological help (Vogel  & Vester, 2003), counseling 
avoidance (Meyer, 2001), and also counseling satisfaction (Constantine, 2002). Therefore, 
they have been widely researched in the past decades (e.g., Chang, 2007; Hamid, 
Simmonds, & Bowles, 2009; Koydemir-Ozden, 2010; Masuda, Suzumura, Beauchamp, 
Howells, & Clay, 2005; Nam, et al., 2010; Turkum, 2005). In Latvia because of political, 
social and economic changes, psychological services have become available relatively 
recently. During the Soviet period counseling services were virtually non-existent due 
to political and ideological reasons. Very few people received training in psychological 
counseling, and their services were not accessible to the general public. Latvia regained 
its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and before that time 
in Latvia there were no more than 40 psychologists (Renge, 2003). In the last 20 years 
the availability of professional psychological help has increased rapidly. Now there are 
approximately 1500 active psychologists (with master’s degree or higher) in the country 
(Renge  & Draguns, 2012). However, no official statistics have been collected to date.
1 Aleksandra Makarova, makarova.alexa@gmail.com
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Because of the lack of research in this domain do not have information about 
attitudes towards psychologists in Latvia in general, or about the specific reasons 
why people are willing or not to use psychological services. Therefore, the attitudes of 
society toward mental health professionals has to be investigated in Latvia by using an 
appropriate and objective research tool. 
One of the most popular instruments for measuring psychological help seeking 
attitudes is the Attitudes Toward Seeking Psychological Help (ATSPPH; Fischer  & 
Turner, 1970) scale. The short version of this instrument, which includes 10 items, is also 
widely used (Fischer & Farina, 1995). However, the ATSPPH measure has a number of 
weaknesses, for example, some terms are outdated, items have been generated only by 
the developers of the scale and clinical psychologists, but not by potential help seekers. 
And most important – it has questionable factorial validity. Because of all of the reasons 
mentioned above, Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009) have constructed a new scale – Beliefs 
About Psychological Services (BAPS), which is an alternative instrument designed for 
measurement of attitudes toward psychologists and their services. While some of the 
items have been taken from the ATSPPH, the new scale is updated with new items 
obtained from interviews with undergraduate students and psychologists. 
BAPS is a reliable and valid 18-item instrument including three subscales: Intent, 
Stigma Tolerance and Expertness. This structure is based on Ajzen’s (1985, 1987) 
Theory of Planned Behavior. The Stigma Tolerance factor corresponds to the normative 
beliefs component, and can be characterized as a person’s perception of the barriers in 
society and negative views toward seeking psychological services, as well as their ability 
to overcome these barriers. The Intent factor represents the intention component of 
planned behavior. Finally, the Expertness factor is similar to Ajzen’s general attitude 
construct. It has to be noted that the latter dimension did not appear in the previously 
developed instruments (e.g., ATSPPH, Ægisdóttir & Gerstein, 2009).
Although the construct is quite new its adaptation has already taken place in several 
countries – Iceland (Ægisdóttir & Einarsdóttir, 2012), Turkey (Ægisdóttir & Cinarbas, 
in preparation), and South Korea (Ægisdóttir  & Choi, in preparation). Because of 
the critique of other instruments assessing beliefs about psychological services, and 
the more thorough development and acceptable reliability of BAPS, we chose this 
instrument for adaptation in Latvia. 
In this article we present the psychometric properties of the BAPS adaptation 
in Latvia. The process of the adaptation was done following the recommendations of 
Hambleton, Merenda, and Spielberger (2005).
Study 1
Method
Participants
The sample for Study 1 consisted of 100 students (85% female) from the University 
of Latvia enrolled in various study programs with ages ranging from 18 to 44 years 
(M  =  22.5; SD  =  4.2). The sample was matched by age, gender, years of study at the 
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university and psychological counseling experience to the original sample used for 
developing the scale in the USA (Ægisdóttir& Gerstein, 2009). We used χ2 to test the 
equivalence of the matched samples in terms of gender, years of study and counseling 
experience and t-test for age. The results confirmed the similarity in these demographic 
characteristics in both samples (p > .05). Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the 
sample’s demographics.
Table 1. Demographic information of the participants in the Study 1 and 2
Study 1 (N = 100) Study 2 (N = 213)
n % n %
Sex
   Men 15 15 32 15
   Women 85 85 180 84
Year in university
   Freshman 23 23 30 14
   Sophomore 31 31 71 33
   Junior 24 24 76 35
   Senior 22 22 35 16
Counselling experience
   Yes 33 33 69 32
   No 67 67 143 67
Instrument
Beliefs About Psychological Services (BAPS; Ægisdóttir  & Gerstein, 2009) scale 
was translated to Latvian using the committee approach and the forward and backward 
translation technique described by Brislin (1986). Five English and Latvian speaking 
experts translated the original English scales into Latvian using a committee approach. 
This version was translated back into English and re-evaluated by two other English and 
Latvian speaking experts. Translators were asked to verify the conformity of the both 
versions. Item wordings can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Wording of BAPS original, revised and additional items
No Wording of the item
Intent
1 If a good friend asked my advice about a serious problem, I would recommend that he/she see a 
psychologist.
2 I would be willing to confide my intimate concerns to a psychologist.
3 Seeing a psychologist is helpful when you are going through a difficult time in your life.
4 At some future time, I might want to see a psychologist.
6 If I believed I were having a serious problem, my first inclination would be to see a psychologist.
12 I would see a psychologist if I were worried or upset for a long period of time.
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No Wording of the item
Stigma Tolerance
5 I would feel uneasy going to a psychologist because of what some people might think.
8 Going to a psychologist means that I am a weak person.
10 Having received help from a psychologist stigmatizes a person’s life.
10revised Having received help from a psychologist makes the person who asked for it feel ashamed.
11 There are certain problems that should not be discussed with a stranger such as a psychologist.
13 Psychologists make people feel that they cannot deal with their problems.
15 Talking about problems with a psychologist strikes me as a poor way to get rid of emotional 
conflicts.
17 It is difficult to talk about personal issues with highly educated people such as psychologists.
17revised It is difficult to talk about personal issues with a psychologist because you begin to feel that he 
“sees through you”.
18 If I thought I needed psychological help, I would get this help no matter who knew I was 
receiving assistance.
18revised If I needed psychological help, I would get this help no matter what other think.
Expertness
7 Because of their training, psychologists can help you find solutions to your problems.
7revised Professional training allows psychologists to help others find solutions to their problems.
9 Psychologists are good to talk to because they do not blame you for the mistakes you have made.
14  It is good to talk to someone like a psychologist because everything you say is confidential.
14revised It is good to talk to a psychologist because maintaining confidentiality is his professional duty.
16 Psychologists provide valuable advice because of their knowledge about human behavior.
19new Due to his or her professional skills, a psychologist is able to make contact with different people.
20new Due to his or her education, a psychologist has deep and comprehensive knowledge about 
human behavior and emotions.
BAPS is an instrument which assesses beliefs about psychologists and psychological 
services. It consists of 18 items that are evaluated on a 6-point Likert-type scale 
(1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Moderately Disagree, 3 – Rather Disagree, 4 – Rather Agree, 
5  – Moderately Agree, 6 – Strongly Agree). Seven items are negatively worded (e.g., 
“Going to a psychologist means that I am a weak person”) and have to be reversed by 
subtracting the accorded value from 7. The higher score represents more positive beliefs 
about psychological services.
BAPS consists of three subscales: Intent (6 items), Stigma Tolerance (8 items) and 
Expertness (4 items). The Stigma Tolerance subscale can be characterized as a person’s 
perception of the barriers in society and negative view toward seeking psychological 
services (e.g., “Having received help from a psychologist stigmatizes a person’s life”), 
the Intent subscale refers to behavioral intent (e.g., “I would see a psychologist is I were 
worried or upset for a long period of time.”), and Expertness subscale refers to positive 
and negative characteristics about psychologists and their services (e.g., “Because of 
their training, psychologists can help you find solutions to your problems”). 
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Procedure
The Latvian adaptation of the BAPS scale was coordinated with the authors of the 
original instrument (Ægisdóttir  & Gerstein, 2009). Participants were recruited using 
the mailing list of the university. All respondents were informed that participation in 
the study was voluntary and confidential, and it could be discontinued at any time. The 
BAPS questionnaire together with the demographic questionnaire (questions about 
age, gender, years of study, study program, and psychological counseling experience), 
detailed instructions and basic information about the researchers and purpose of the 
study was administered online using the Google Forms service. Students received no 
compensation for participation in the study.
Results and Discussion
All items of the translated BAPS scale demonstrated acceptable item-total 
correlations. However, there was a tendency for several items to demonstrate extreme 
values (see Table 4). Specifically, items 8 and 10 (please see Table 2 for the full wording 
of the items) demonstrated the floor effect with very few participants choosing a 
response other that “Strongly Disagree”. Item 18 demonstrated the opposite, ceiling 
effect, with most participants choosing to respond “Strongly Agree”. It can be suggested 
that the problematic items had been very categorically formulated and thus prompted 
respondents to choose extreme values. To solve this issue, it was suggested that these 
items be rephrased using less extreme and emotionally saturated words.
Table 4. Item Statistics for the Latvian Version of the the BAPS Scale in Study 1
Factors
Intent Stigma Tolerance Expertness
Items Corrected item-total correlations M SD
1 .65 3.78 1.30
2 .71 3.91 1.46
3 .55 4.54 1.18
4 .52 4.52 1.45
6 .61 2.66 1.35
12 .50 3.65 1.29
5 .34 4.78 1.36
8 .51 5.41 1.00
10 .23 5.70 0.83
11 .37 4.39 1.52
13 .54 4.96 1.33
15 .33 4.73 1.35
17 .40 4.57 1.35
18 .36 5.07 1.16
7 .44 4.47 0.99
9 .50 4.57 1.22
14 .23 4.59 1.40
16 .20 4.07 1.47
a items have been reversed
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The internal consistencies of the three factors in Study 1 were .82, .69 and .54, 
respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha value for the first factor, Intent, corresponds to that 
reported by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009) (cf., .82-.83). However, internal consistencies 
for the latter two factors were considerably lower than in the original study (cf., .78-.81 
for Stigma Tolerance and .69-.72 for Expertness). This finding points to the weakness of 
the Expertness factor obtained in this study.
Eighteen items of the translated BAPS scale were submitted to a preliminary 
confirmatory factor analysis using a principal component method and rotated to simple 
structure using Varimax rotation (orthogonal solution) with Kaiser normalization 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the BAPS Scale in Study 1
Items Factors
a
Intent Stigma Tolerance Expertness
Intent items
1 .73 .10 -.09
2 .80 .21 .00
3 .62 .19 .16
4 .58 .10 .19
6 .67 .19 -.20
12 .69 -.15 -.01
Stigma Tolerance items
5 -.06 .76 .14
8 .30 .64 .20
10 -.12 .74 -.26
11 .41 .20 -.39
13 .44 .46 .16
15 .55 .10 -.06
17 .38 .29 -.01
18 .30 .41 .11
Expertness items
7 .73 .20 .24
9 .45 .24 .52
14 .28 .42 -.11
16 -.03 .05 .83
Eigenvalues 4.63 2.49 1.46
Percentages of variance 25.72 13.83 8.12
Number of items 6 8 4
M 23.06 39.61 17.70
SD 5.84 5.65 3.32
Cronbach’s alpha .82 .69 .54
a loadings greater than .4 are shown in bold
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The determinant of the three-factor model was t =  .002, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) is .82, and the Barlett’s test of Sphericity is 
χ2 (153) = 553.59, p < .001. Altogether, these results demonstrate that the relationship 
among variables is strong enough to proceed with a factor analysis for the data. Three 
factors explained 47.67% of the total variance (25.72%, 13.83%, and 8.12%, respectively). 
These results are similar to those reported by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009). The authors 
of the scale also found a three-factor solution in which each factor accounted for 35.21% 
(Intent), 6.74% (Stigma Tolerance), and 5.25% (Expertness), respectively. 
However, the structure observed in this study was considerably different from the 
solution shown by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009) with one Expertness item loading on 
the Intent factor (item 7) and one on the Stigma Tolerance factor (item 14), and three 
Stigma Tolerance items loading on the Intent factor (items 11, 15 and 17). This resulted 
in a very weak Expertness factor consisting only of two items. It could indicate that the 
original items do not describe the expertise of psychologists in a way suitable for Latvian 
culture due to differences in perceptions of the profession and the qualification involved. 
It might be possible that the confidentiality of conversations with a psychologist, and 
the extensive training involved are not commonly known features of the profession in 
Latvia, due to the novelty of this field. 
Thus, it was decided that different items should be developed to be included in the 
Expertness scale. Although the factorial structure was acquired in a small sample of 
only 100 respondents, the inability to demonstrate similar structure to the one originally 
reported by the authors of the scale (Ægisdóttir & Gerstein, 2009), suggests that several 
items might work differently in the Latvian culture. However, this finding should be 
replicated in a bigger sample.
To summarize, the obtained results suggested that the original structure of the 
American version of the BAPS scale was not replicated in a sample of Latvian students. 
Therefore, the problematic items should be rephrased and additional items shoule be 
developed to strengthen the weak Expertness factor. To improve the scale, we conducted 
the Study 2.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Two hundred and thirteen students (84.51% female) from several universities 
in Latvia and different study programs participated in this study. The ages of the 
participants ranged from 19 to 41 years (M = 22.3, SD = 3.3). The sample was matched 
by age, gender, years of study at the university and psychological counseling experience 
to the original sample used for developing the scale in the USA (Ægisdóttir& Gerstein, 
2009). Inferential statistical tests revealed no differences between the samples in terms 
of demographic variables (p > .05). Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the 
sample’s demographics.
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Instrument
The Latvian translation of the BAPS scale (Ægisdóttir & Gerstein, 2009) obtained 
in the Study 1 was enriched with 4 additional items designed to complement the 
Expertness factor as it demonstrated the weakest internal consistency in the Study 
1. Items were developed using a committee approach based on beliefs typical for 
Latvian culture (e.g., Item 19. “Due to his or her education, a psychologist has deep 
and comprehensive knowledge about human behavior and emotions.”). In addition, 
seven of the original items were rephrased to avoid floor or ceiling effects, as well as to 
better suit Latvian culture. For example, as the profession of the psychologist in Latvia 
is not typically considered particularly intellectually demanding and requiring special 
knowledge, item 17, “It is difficult to talk about personal issues with highly educated 
people such as psychologists,” was rephrased as item 17revised, “It is difficult to talk about 
personal issues with a psychologist because you begin to feel that he ‘sees through you’.” 
The new and revised items that were included in the final model (7 items in total) are 
shown in the Table 2.
Procedure
Participants were recruited from several higher education institutions in Latvia by 
contacting the administration, which forwarded the advertisement about the study to 
students. The procedure was identical to the procedure reported for the Study 1.
Results and Discussion
Twenty seven items including 14 items used in Study 1, 9 revised and rephrased 
items from the original BAPS scale (7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17 (two versions), and 18) and 4 
newly developed items were used in the exploratory factor analysis using the principal 
component method with Varimax rotation. Inspection of the loadings revealed that 
several items had loadings lower than .35 on their common factor and/or substantial 
secondary loadings. In order to increase factorial validity of the instrument, these 
items were removed. From two similar items (e.g., 10 and 10revised) with slightly different 
wordings, the one with the lowest loading was removed.
The remaining 18 items (including 11 original items, 5 rephrased items and 
2 competely new items) were again submitted to a principal component analysis and 
rotated to simple structure using Varimax rotation (orthogonal solution) with Kaiser 
normalization. The determinant of the three-factor model was t  =  .002, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) is .85, and the Barlett’s test of 
Sphericity is χ2 (153) = 1321.77, p <  .001. Thus, the relationship among variables was 
strong enough to proceed with a factor analysis for the data. The results of the second 
exploratory factor analysis can be seen in Table 5. The three obtained factors together 
explain 51.66% of the total variance (21.24%, 17.27%, and 13.18%, respectively). These 
results correspond and even slightly exceed those of the original three-factor solution 
in the American sample which explained 47.24% of the total variance (Ægisdóttir  & 
Gerstein, 2009).
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Table 5. Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Revised BAPS Scale in Study 2
Items
Factorsa
Intent Expertness Stigma Tolerance
2 .81 .14 -.04
3 .78 .18 .07
4 .76 .19 .11
1 .73 .11 -.07
6 .70 .16 .11
12 .62 .27 .22
19new .11 .82 .05
20new .36 .76 .01
16 .38 .71 -.01
9 .11 .64 -.07
14revised .01 .59 .13
7revised .38 .59 -.05
5 -.05 .08 .70
10revised .15 -.11 .66
17 -.02 .01 .65
8 .28 -.02 .61
17revised -.13 -.02 .55
18revised .13 .18 .50
Eigenvalues 3.82 3.11 2.37
Percentages of variance 21.24 17.27 13.18
Number of items 6 6 6
M 20.55 26.1 28.43
SD 6.49 5.34 4.97
Cronbach’s alpha .86 .81 .67
a loadings greater than 0.4 are shown in bold
The subscales obtained in the Study 2 are similar to the structure observed by 
Ægisdóttir  & Gerstein (2009), so we retained the original factor names. The Intent 
factor contained the same items as the original Intent factor (items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 12); 
the Expertness factor consisted of two original items (9 and 16), two rephrased items 
(7revised and 14revised) and two additional items (19new and 20new); the Stigma Tolerance 
consisted of three original items (5, 8, and 17) and three rephrased items (10revised, 17revised 
and 18revised).
Cronbach’s values were .86 for the Intent subscale, .81 for the Expertness subscale 
and .67 for the Stigma Tolerance subscale. These results indicate acceptable to good 
reliability for the developed instrument. The internal consistency value for the Intent 
factor is comparable to that reported by Ægisdóttir  & Gerstein (2009) (cf., .82-.83), 
however, value for the Stigma Tolerance is lower than in the original study (cf. .78-.81). 
Due to strengthening the Expertness factor with two additional items, its reliability is 
considerably higher than in the original study (cf. .69-.72).
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The problem with obtaining the ceiling effect for some items was mostly solved 
in Study 2 (see Table 6). Only item 8 was prone to extremely low values (most of the 
participants reported that they strongly disagree with this statement). However, 
this item showed even higher values (after recoding the item) in the original study 
(M = 5.19-5.40) and was retained by the authors of the original scale. It should be noted 
that the sample used in this study consisted of a younger generation with potentially 
more positive attitudes towards psychological services. According to several previous 
studies older adults compared to younger adults have more negative attitudes towards 
mental health help-seeking (Dupree, Herrera, Martinez Tyson, Jang, & King-Kallimanis, 
2010; ten Have et  al., 2010), and in a recent study conducted in Latvia it was found 
that older adults compared to younger adults hold more negative stereotypes about 
psychologists (Katšena & Dimdiņš, 2013). Therefore, in a sample with generally more 
negative attitudes we expect to observe higher general agreement with this statement.
Table 6. Item Statistics for the Revised Latvian Version of the the BAPS Scale in Study 2
Factors
Intent Expertness Stigma Tolerance
Items Corrected item-total correlations M SD
2 .70 3.32 1.50
3 .69 4.09 1.34
4 .68 4.08 1.48
1 .62 3.37 1.37
6 .62 2.39 1.35
12 .59 3.29 1.43
19new .66 4.58 1.15
20new .74 4.47 1.20
16 .67 4.35 1.20
9 .48 4.08 1.25
14revised .39 4.33 1.36
7revised .56 4.31 1.25
5 .48 4.60 1.59
10revised .45 4.94 1.17
17 .43 4.61 1.30
8 .44 5.14 1.24
17revised .32 4.20 1.37
18revised .32 4.94 1.37
CFA of the developed instrument was conducted using IBM SPSS Amos v.20.0. 
The parameter estimates of the standardized solution can be seen in Figure 1. All 
factor loadings are higher than .35. Factor variances were fixed. Factor covariances 
were estimated. Model fit was tested statistically via the χ2 test (Bollen, 1989). We also 
considered the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI; McDonald & Marsh, 1990), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA; Hu  & Bentler, 1998). For the CFI and TLI, values equal to or higher 
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than .90 indicate acceptable fit. For the RMSEA values equal to or lower than .08 can 
be interpreted as good fit (Browne  & Cudeck, 1993; Hu  & Bentler, 1998; Jöreskog  & 
Sörbom, 1996). Results of the model fit test were as follows: χ2 (132) = 223.12, p < .001; 
CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = .06. These results indicate that the model fits the data 
reasonably well. 
Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis
General Discussion
The purpose of the two studies described in this paper was to adapt the Beliefs 
About Psychological Services [BAPS] scale developed by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009) 
in the USA to the Latvian cultural context, as well as to evaluate some psychometric 
properties of the scale in Latvian sample. Two successive studies involving the total of 
312 participants were conducted to evaluate the factorial validity and reliability of the 
Latvian version of the BAPS scale. 
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The factorial validity of the developed instrument was analyzed via exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses. The results revealed a slightly different structure of the 
Latvian version of the instrument. Study 1 resulted in a structure that did not replicate 
the original structure reported by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009), and demonstrated a 
number of problems, including a weak Expertness factor and several items that showed 
very little response variation. Therefore, the wording of several items was improved and 
additional items were introduced in Study 2 in order to stabilize the Expertness and 
the Stigma Tolerance factors, as well as to avoid the ceiling effect of several items. The 
final model, consisting of 18 items (6 per each subscale), demonstrated good internal 
consistency for all factors and a reasonably acceptable model fit. Factorial structure 
obtained in this study (Intent, Expertness and Stigma Tolerance factors) corresponded 
to the structure reported by Ægisdóttir & Gerstein (2009). To sum up, the construct as 
demonstrated in the Latvian cultural context is similar to the construct demonstrated 
in the American study, and the psychometric properties of the Latvian version of the 
BAPS confirm that it is a reliable instrument for use in Latvia. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the population validity of the current 
findings is limited by the low frequency of male participation. Furthermore, all of the 
participants were students, and most of them were young adults. Because of this the 
current results should be interpreted with caution, as they may not accurately reflect 
the attitudes toward seeking psychological help of other social groups (e.g., males, older 
people). 
We wish to point out that adapting a scale aimed at measuring beliefs and attitudes 
towards psychological counseling has high relevance in Latvia. As psychological 
counseling was underdeveloped during the Soviet period, professional psychological 
help in Latvia can be considered a relatively new service. Therefore, attitudes towards 
any kind of psychological services or psychotherapy were not studied before, which 
leads to the lack of information about the current situation in Latvian society as a whole, 
as well as within specific social groups (e.g., older generation). Further research of this 
construct could shed light on possible barriers and negative stereotypes preventing 
people from getting the necessary professional help. As attitudes towards psychological 
services have been shown to predict help-seeking behavior (Meyer, 2001; Vogel  & 
Vester, 2003), adapting the BAPS scale can be considered an important first step on the 
way of clarifying and improving the current situation.
Further research with Latvian samples will have to deal with the test-retest reliability 
of the BAPS scale, which was not tested in the current study. Additional studies are 
also needed to replicate the findings in samples different that the undergraduate student 
samples. In our samples a relatively large number (32% to 33%) of respondents admitted 
having some kind of psychological counseling experience. In Latvia students at several 
universities have excellent access to psychological services (e.g., free psychological 
counseling regarding life crisis or other issues). This opportunity to receive free 
counseling at their institutions of higher education distinguishes students from other 
social groups, for whom exposure to psychological services is much more limited. 
Especially in Latvia, due to various historical reasons, a considerable generation gap is 
expected to be observed in terms of attitudes and beliefs about psychological services. 
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Due to the historical reasons described above, the older generation in Latvia had 
no access to any kind of psychological services for the major part of their lives. This 
experience could be a reason to expect a strikingly different structure of beliefs about 
psychological services within the older generation, therefore, we strongly encourage 
further research in this population. 
To summarize, the adapted instrument shows reasonably good psychometric 
properties in an undergraduate student sample. It is the first instrument of its kind to 
be adapted in Latvia, as attitudes or beliefs towards seeking psychological services have 
never been researched before in this country. We hope that the BAPS will be further 
used for research in the Latvian cultural context exploring attitudes of the general public 
and of different social and clinical groups, as well as used in cross-cultural research.
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Abstract
This research aims to investigate pubertal timing and self-perceived pubertal timing, comparing 
one’s pubertal processes with those of one’s peers, and associations with internalizing and 
externalizing symptoms in early adolescence. A non-clinical group of 11-13 year-old girls 
(N = 205) participated in the research. The results showed that the perceived pubertal timing 
is associated with the internalization and externalization of symptoms. Ratings of perceived 
pubertal timing were shown to have more associations with girls’ self-reported emotional 
problems in early adolescence, than self-reported ratings of pubertal timing. Girls who perceive 
their puberty as occurring earlier or later than most adolescents in comparison to those, who 
perceive their puberty to be the same as others, reported having more internalizing symptoms, 
such as depression, withdrawal, anxiety and somatic complaints, as well as thought, attention 
and social problems. 
Key words: emotional and behavioral problems, early adolescence, pubertal timing, perceived 
pubertal timing
Adolescence is a period of major and relatively fast physical, cognitive and 
emotional change. A major change in early adolescence is puberty. It is a universal 
biological event, although the process may vary significantly across the population. One 
of the characteristics of puberty is pubertal timing. Marshall and Tanner (1969) define it 
as a “variation in the chronological age at which adolescence begins and different stages 
of physical maturity are reached” (Marshall, & Tanner, 1969, p. 291). 
The timing of puberty and its association with behavioral and emotional problems 
in adolescence has attracted the attention of many researchers. Different studies have 
shown that girls’ early pubertal timing is linked with internalizing difficulties such as 
depressive symptoms (Mendle et  al., 2010, Ge et  al., 2006), anxiety (Ge et  al., 2006) 
and body dissatisfaction (Crockett  & Petersen, 1987, Siegel et  al., 1999, Dorn et  al., 
1988). Moreover, early maturing girls present more difficulties with self-esteem, are 
more concerned with their appearance, and are less satisfied with their weight (Dorn 
et al., 1988).
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There have been various attempts to explain connections between pubertal timing 
and internalizing difficulties. One of these is the maturational disparity hypothesis 
which postulates that the gap between physical and psychological maturation places 
early-maturing adolescents at risk of psychopathology (Ge  & Natsuaki, 2009). Since 
girls mature earlier than boys, the earlier maturing girls are in the most vulnerable 
position of entering puberty unprepared. The risk of difficulties may also implicate 
impaired social skills of early maturing girls, due to the fact that they enter puberty 
with less time to develop the skills needed to cope with the challenges of adolescence. 
However, this hypothesis could explain only the effects of early puberty on internalizing 
symptoms. 
In contrast to the maturational disparity hypothesis, there are many findings that 
late puberty, as well as early puberty, is associated with adaptation difficulties. For 
example, early maturing girls and late maturing boys show more depressive symptoms 
and are less satisfied with their bodies (Siegel et  al., 1999). Since girls mature earlier 
than boys, the earlier maturing girl and the later maturing boy deviate most widely from 
their overall peer group (Petersen & Crockett, 1985). It is possible that they may feel 
the most out of sync with their peers and this may create additional distress during 
adolescence. This is called the off-time hypothesis. According to this hypothesis we 
might postulate that the way in which an adolescent perceives and evaluates their 
pubertal timing may be the key to understanding the links between pubertal timing 
and emotional problems. However, feeling out of sync with one’s peers is a subjective 
interpretation of one’s pubertal timing. To separate the objective pubertal timing from 
the adolescent’s evaluation of it, the construct of perceived pubertal timing has been 
developed. Perceived pubertal timing reflects the pubertal timing as evaluated by the 
adolescent, comparing oneself to his/her peers (Dorn et al., 2006). This construct seems 
to be closely linked with actual pubertal timing, since it is assumed that the adolescent 
evaluates his or her own perceived pubertal timing based on objective characteristics of 
one’s pubertal status. However, it seems that many other variables might influence this 
evaluation, so it may differ significantly from pubertal timing. 
If feeling out of sync with one’s peers regarding one’s puberty has a considerable 
effect on emotional problems, we assume that the perceived pubertal timing would 
have a stronger connection with such problems, compared to actual pubertal timing. 
Moreover, both early and late perceived pubertal timing would be linked to additional 
distress. Previous researchers have not addressed these issues, therefore, our study aims 
to investigate the significance of perceived pubertal timing and its effects on emotional 
problems in adolescence.
Pubertal timing has some connection with behavioral problems as well as emotional 
ones. Early puberty is associated with higher risk of conduct problems, symptoms of 
ADHD (Ge et al., 2006), aggression and delinquency for both males and females (Lynne 
et al., 2007). Early maturing girls show significantly higher rates of disruptive behavior 
disorders and elevated antisocial personality traits in young adulthood (Graber 
et al., 2004). 
Explanations of the associations between early pubertal timing and externalizing 
problems are mostly based on early matures’ adult-like appearance. This hypothesis 
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states that early matures look older than their same-age peers and because of this 
they are more likely to be treated differently and may initiate behaviors perceived as 
typical to older adolescents. This might lead to disruption of social networks with 
same-age peers, and increase the risk of affiliation with older delinquent groups of 
adolescents. This explanation has some support, since it was found that early maturers 
are significantly more likely to affiliate with delinquent peers (Ge et  al., 2002; Lynne 
et  al., 2007). Moreover, earlier studies report that girls, who perceive their pubertal 
timing to be earlier, are more likely to engage in such behaviors as alcohol drinking 
and smoking if their pubertal status is relatively high (Bratberg et al., 2006). Another 
study also highlights the importance of including perceived pubertal timing, since it 
was found to be the key factor to understanding early pubertal timing associations with 
externalizing behavior (Carter et  al., 2011). However, it remains unclear whether the 
association between pubertal timing and externalizing symptoms is present in early 
adolescence, and whether it is more closely linked to adolescent’s perception of oneself 
as maturing early. Our study may partly answer these questions by establishing different 
links between externalizing symptoms and pubertal timing as well as externalizing 
symptoms and perceived pubertal timing. 
Patterns of internalizing problems differ significantly among adolescent girls and 
boys. Research shows that adolescent girls report having more depressive symptoms 
than boys (Siegel et al., 1999), they also report more anxiety and somatic complaints 
(Žukauskienė & Malinauskienė, 2008). Studies of connections between the process of 
puberty and its links with various aspects of adaptation also reveal significant differences 
between male and female respondents (Crockett & Petersen, 1987, Mendle et al., 2010, 
Blumenthal et  al., 2011, Dorn et al., 1988). For these reasons we decided to examine 
only the girls’ population. 
The main question is as follows: which – pubertal timing or perceived pubertal 
timing is more strongly associated with the emotional and behavioral problems of 
early adolescent girls. This research aims to investigate the emotional and behavioral 
problems in early adolescent girls, and their relation with pubertal timing and perceived 
pubertal timing. To establish the difference between these constructs, we also examine 
the associations between perceived pubertal timing and pubertal timing, and investigate 
whether these associations depend upon the age of the adolescent. 
Method
Participants
Participants in this study were 205 girls, ages 11-13 (M  =  12.01, SD  =  .795), 
recruited from three urban schools. The number of participants according to age was as 
follows: 30.7% (n = 63) – age 11; 37.1% (n = 76) – age 12; 21.2% (n = 66) – age 13. 
Most participants (79.5%, n  =  163) reported living in a full family; meanwhile 
13.17% (n = 27) reported living with single mother; 6.34% (n = 13) living with mother 
and stepfather; and .98% (n  =  2) living with single father. Of the participants 24.4% 
(n = 50) had at least one older sister; and 25.9% (n = 53) had a younger sister or sisters. 
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Measures
Pubertal status and timing. A self-administered rating scale for pubertal development 
(Carskadon  & Acebo, 1993) was used to gather the information about the pubertal 
status of participants. Research has shown that the correlation between adolescents’ 
self-reports and medical examination of pubertal development indicators vary between 
.72 and .82 (Brooks-Gunn et al., 1987), thus the self-report measure can be considered 
as an adequate index of pubertal status. The self-administered rating scale for pubertal 
development consists of closed questions about secondary sexual characteristics (breast 
development, pubic and underarm hair), growth spurt, skin changes and menarche. 
On a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (has not begun) to 4 (development completed), girls 
indicated the extent to which they had experienced pubertal growth. Classification of 
the responses allows one to divide the participants into five stages of development: pre-
pubertal, early pubertal, mid-pubertal, late-pubertal and post-pubertal. 
Pubertal timing was established through the standardization of the pubertal status 
by age (11, 12 and 13 years old) within the sample, and the trichotomization of timing 
(i. e. early, on-time, late), based on conventional cut-offs (± 1 SD). Values of greater 
than 1 SD above the mean within the age group were classified as early (n = 37), and 
values less than 1 SD (n = 32) below the mean were classified as late (according to Ge 
et al., 2006, Blumenthal et al., 2011). Pubertal timing between these cut-off points were 
classified as on-time (N = 136). 
Carskadon and Acebo (1993) reported Cronbach alpha coefficient at .70 
(Carskadon  & Acebo, 1993) of the scale. According to our sample, Cronbach alpha 
coefficient is .724, indicating acceptable reliability. 
Perceived pubertal timing. This variable was measured by ratings on a 5-point 
Likert scale in answer to the question: “Would you say that your puberty, compared to 
most girls your age, would be: much earlier / a little earlier / the same as others / a little 
later / much later “. 
To evaluate the possible differences between different age groups and their 
perceived pubertal timing, Kruskal-Wallis index was used. No differences were found 
between the age groups (Chi-square .012, p > .05). 
Emotional and behavioral problems. The Youth Self Report, YSR 11/18, was used 
to evaluate emotional and behavioral problems (Achenbach  & Rescorla, 2001). The 
questionnaire consists of 112 statements, participants are asked to evaluate every 
statement. Each statement is on a 0-2 scale, and items within each scale are summed, 
the higher score indicating greater problems. Internalizing and externalizing symptom 
scales each consist of several subscales, where anxiety/depression, withdrawal/
depression and somatic complaints compose the internalizing symptom scale, and 
rule-breaking behavior with aggressive behavior form the externalizing symptom 
scale. Additionally, social problem, thought problem and attention problem subscales 
are included. The YSR demonstrated good reliability in the current sample (Cronbach 
Alpha ranging from .74 to .90 for the different subscales). 
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Procedure
The study was conducted at the schools. Girls were contacted and provided with 
information about the study, and those who agreed to participate were given written 
parental consent forms to be signed by their parents/guardians. In this way parental 
consents were obtained, and the partners/guardians were provided with full information 
about the study, its aims and procedure. 
Participants completed the questionnaires in small groups, with the researcher 
being available at any time for questions. Duration of the procedure varied from 45 to 
60 minutes.
Results
Pubertal timing and perceived pubertal timing
Considering that pubertal timing represents the classification of timing according to 
pubertal status within the age group, and perceived pubertal timing – girls’ evaluations 
comparing one’s pubertal timing to that of one’s peers, we aimed to reveal the strength 
of the links between these constructs. 
Table 1 presents Spearman correlations between pubertal timing and the perceived 
pubertal timing in the different age groups. The results show that pubertal timing 
correlates with perceived pubertal timing in the 12 and 13 year-old girls’ groups, and 
the correlation is moderate. In the group of 11 year-olds, the association between these 
constructs is not statistically significant. 
Table 1. Spearman correlation between pubertal timing and perceived pubertal timing in 
different age groups
Perceived pubertal timing
Age 11 Age 12 Age 13
Pubertal timing
Age 11 (N = 63) .23
Age 12 (N = 76) .36**
Age 13 (N = 66) .39**
** p < .01
Pubertal timing and perceived pubertal timing connections with emotional and 
behavioral problems. 
To evaluate the pubertal timing and perceived pubertal timing connections with 
symptom scales, one-way ANOVA was used. Table 2 presents the results. 
The total symptom score did not differ for the different pubertal timing groups. 
However, the five perceived pubertal timing groups differ significantly on the total 
symptom score (F = 12.57, df = 4, p < .001): post hoc test revealed that the lowest mean 
of the symptom score is observed in the group of girls, who perceive their puberty as 
on-time (M = 36.28). It differs significantly from the “much earlier” (M = 75.90) and 
“much later” (M = 65.90) perceived pubertal timing group (p < .01). 
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Statistically significant differences between early, on-time and late pubertal timing 
groups, were found only in thought difficulties subscale (F  =  4.16, df  =  2, p  <  .05). 
Comparing these groups by post hoc test revealed that late pubertal timing group differs 
from on-time (p < .05). The mean score of late pubertal timing group was significantly 
lower. No other differences were found comparing means of symptom scales scores in 
different pubertal timing groups. 
Perceived pubertal timing groups differ significantly on the internalizing symptoms 
scale (F = 20.08, df = 4, p < .001) and all of the subscales it consists of : anxiety/depression 
(F = 19.69, df = 4, p <  .001), withdrawal/depression (F = 17.18, df = 4, p < .001) and 
somatic complaints (F = 8.37, df = 4, p < .001). Post hoc test revealed that “much earlier” 
and “much later” perceived pubertal timing groups differ significantly from “the same 
as others” (p < .001), but do not differ from each other. The perceived pubertal timing 
groups’ mean scores on the total scale range is a statistically significant quadratic trend 
(F = 27.48, df = 1, p < .001), indicating that girls, who perceived their pubertal timing to 
be the same as others, had lowest symptom scores and those, who rated themselves as 
“much earlier” or “much later” had the highest scores. The same patterns of a quadratic 
trend were observed on internalizing symptoms scale (F  =  47.25, df  =  1, p  <  .001), 
anxiety/depression subscale (F = 43.25, df = 1, p < .001), withdrawal/depression subscale 
(F = 43.91, df = 1, p < .001), somatic complaints subscale (F = 19.21, df = 1, p < .001), 
social problems subscale (F  =  37.39 , df  =  1, p  <  .001), attention problems subscale 
(F = 18.35, df = 1, p < .001) and thought problems subscale (F = 21.77, df = 1, p < .001). 
Mean scores of the perceived pubertal timing groups on internalizing and 
externalizing symptoms scales and the total score are graphically presented in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Emotional and behavioral problem comparison in perceived pubertal timing 
groups
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Discussion
This research showed that perceived pubertal timing has significant association 
with emotional, but not behavioral problems in girls’ early adolescence. At this age the 
construct of perceived pubertal timing differs significantly from pubertal timing and, 
therefore, has to be evaluated separately when establishing the various links between 
pubertal timing and difficulties in early adolescence. 
Earlier studies have found various pubertal timing associations with adaptation 
difficulties (Mendle et al., 2010, Ge et al., 2006, Crockett & Petersen, 1987, Siegel et al., 
1999, Lynne et  al., 2007), with the particular risk factor – early pubertal timing for 
girls (Graber et al., 2004). However, the construct of perceived pubertal timing has not 
been of particular interest in most of the research, despite the fact that it is one of the 
explanations about mediating effects on pubertal timing associaitons with emotional 
and behavioral problems. In particular, the maturational disparity hypothesis relies on 
the assumption that the perception of being out of sync with other adolescents is a risk 
factor. Moreover, as Dorn and colleagues (2006) have noticed, pubertal timing evaluated 
by the adolescent himself/herself should be referred to as perceived pubertal timing, in 
order to avoid the inaccuracy of the construct. We intended to clarify the difference 
between pubertal timing and perceived pubertal timing by measuring their associations 
with emotional and behavioral problems in adolescence. 
The results showed that the perceived pubertal timing is associated with pubertal 
timing, however, the correlation was observed only in the group of older girls, and it was 
not very high. This indicates that perceived pubertal timing does not reflect the objective 
pubertal maturation, and should be evaluated as a different construct, regarding its 
links with various aspects of adaptation. The previous research on perceived pubertal 
timing in comparison to pubertal timing has reported that the self-ratings of pubertal 
development are very closely linked to the actual pubertal timing (Siegel et al. 1999). Our 
research findings partly contradict with Siegel’s study and the difference might depend 
on the age of the participants. In the previous study, girls’ age varied from 12 to 17 years 
old, whereas the age of participants in our study was from 11 to 13. Our findings suggest 
that the associations between perceived pubertal timing and pubertal timing emerge 
only in the 12 and 13 year old group. This corresponds to previous research which 
states that the subjective measure of pubertal timing is more accurate (comparing to 
objective measures of pubertal timing) at a later point of pubertal development (Dubas 
et al., 1991). It is possible that the younger the adolescent, the more the self-evaluation 
depends on variables other than the objective pubertal maturation. These variables 
might include the girls’ knowledge about the pubertal maturation processes, attitudes, 
friends’ and siblings’ pubertal maturation. It seems that during the process of pubertal 
maturation girls acquire more information about puberty, and have more experience 
with evaluating one’s own and others’ pubertal maturation. 
Our study did not confirm the association of pubertal timing or perceived pubertal 
timing with externalizing symptoms. This might be due to the fact that our study 
included only early adolescents, while the associations in previous studies were found 
in the group of older adolescents (Bratberg et al., 2006). Other findings about the early 
pubertal timing risk of externalizing symptoms for girls were based on studies with 
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minority groups (in particular, Lynne et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2011). The difference of 
the results between the latter studies and ours might be explained by the accentuation 
hypothesis. It states that stressful transitions accentuate behavioral problems only 
among predisposed individuals, and has gathered some plausible evidence (e. g. Caspi & 
Moffitt, 1991). Being out of sync with one’s peers might be interpreted as a stressful 
condition, however, the externalizing symptoms may arise only in a small part of the 
population, together with other risk factors.
Our research showed that the perceived pubertal timing, rather than the actual 
pubertal timing, is linked with internalizing symptoms. We found that the girls who 
evaluate their pubertal timing as earlier or later than others, have more symptoms of 
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, and somatic complaints. Links with social, thought and 
attention problems were also found. The results showed that girls who perceive their 
pubertal timing to be the same as others have less symptoms, than those who perceive 
it to be either earlier or later than others. As we have mentioned, several theories have 
been developed to explain pubertal timing’s effects on adaptation in adolescence. The 
first – maturational disparity hypothesis – postulates that early maturing adolescents 
(especially girls, because they enter puberty earlier) enter puberty less prepared to 
cope with the new challenges of adolescence. This explanation is based on the potential 
asynchrony between physical, cognitive, social and emotional maturity (Negriff  & 
Susman, 2011). Our results do not confirm this hypothesis, since no pubertal timing 
effects on emotional and behavioral problems were found (except for association 
with thought problems). The off-time hypothesis proposes that the effect lies in the 
idiosyncrasy of those who are earlier or later than most adolescents. Having in mind our 
findings that perceived pubertal timing does not fully reflect the actual pubertal timing, 
but has quite strong associations with internalizing symptoms, we might postulate 
that perceiving one to be out of sync with others might be a stressful condition in 
puberty. However, previous research on the cognitive model of internalizing problems 
in adolescence proposes that low self-worth is associated with a vulnerability to 
depressive symptoms (McCarty et al., 2007). It is possible that girls with low self-worth 
might be prone to perceive themselves as different from others in the area of pubertal 
development, and also be more prone to internalizing symptoms. 
Besides the relevant results shown in our study there are some limitations. The 
construct of perceived pubertal timing was measured by one question. Therefore, 
further research would be needed to clarify the beliefs underlying girls’ perceived 
pubertal timing in early adolescence. As findings are based on a sample of Lithuanian 
adolescent girls living in an urban area, the results may not be generalizable across 
cultures and other residential areas. Further research should study the results across 
cultures. It would be also valuable to measure emotional and behavioral difficulties in 
adolescence not only by self-report measures, but include the perspectives of parents 
and teachers. It would be valuable to take these considerations into account in future 
research. 
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Abstract
Various studies have shown that both negative cognitions and panic attacks can be significant 
in the maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and that there is a 
significant comorbidity between panic attacks and PTSD. The aim of the present study was to 
examine the relationship of posttraumatic negative cognitions, panic attack and PTSD symptoms. 
Participating in the study were 152 adult respondents who had suffered from trauma. They 
completed the: Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory, PTCI (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 
1999), Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale, PDS (Foa, 1995), Panic and Agoraphobia Scale, 
PAS (Bandelow, 1999). The results of the study showed that panic attacks, PTSD and negative 
cognitions are multi-directionally interrelated. Panic attack symptoms partially mediated the 
effect of negative cognitions on PTSD; PTSD symptoms partially mediated the effect of negative 
cognitions on panic attacks; PTSD partially mediated the effect of panic attacks on negative 
cognition ratings. Results are discussed in relation to psychotherapy treatment approaches. 
Key words: trauma-related cognitions, posttraumatic stress disorder, panic attacks
Introduction
Traumatic events are an unavoidable fact of life. Everyone is subject to the possibility 
of a traumatic experience (a road accident; emotional, physical or sexual abuse; a life-
threatening disease). As one of the more severe consequences of a traumatic event, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may develop. PTSD is a complicated condition which 
is related to serious health issues, a high risk of disability and hindered adaptability 
(Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 2000).
Post-traumatic stress disorder develops as a delayed or prolonged response to 
a psychotraumatic situation (short-term or long-term) of a highly threatening or 
catastrophic nature, capable of causing anyone a difficult emotional experience. During 
the period from 1980 (DSM-III, 1980) until the publication of the revised diagnostic 
manual in May of 2013 (DSM-5, 2013) symptoms of PTSD had traditionally been 
characterized by three symptom groups: intrusion of memories associated with the 
traumatic event; persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event; 
marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic event. 
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In the newly published diagnostic manual negative alterations in cognitions and 
mood associated with the traumatic event are included as a fourth symptom group 
characterizing PTSD. 
According to information processing theory the traumatic event is encoded 
in memory as a special occurrence, and incomplete information processing of this 
experience becomes a risk for psychopathology. The importance of integrating the 
trauma-related information into the broader memory-system is accentuated (Foa  & 
Kozak, 1986; Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991). The development of a 
cognitive schema involving a significant fear network has also been suggested, implying 
that PTSD differs from other types of anxiety by its attribution of excessive significance 
to the traumatic event, thereby undermining preceding notions of safety (Foa et  al., 
1991). The PTSD fear network is responsible for activating emotional and somatic 
reactions, such as increased heart-rate, which are more pronounced in PTSD than for 
other anxiety disorders. 
In their work with physical and sexual abuse victims Foa and colleagues expanded 
the fear network theory, developing it in several directions (Foa et  al., 1991). The 
relationship between PTSD and cognitions about the self and the world which have 
developed before, during and after the trauma was examined in detail. Their research 
showed that people who have held rigid beliefs prior to the trauma are more prone to 
PTSD. The cognitions before, during and after the trauma were considered to interact 
to strengthen fundamental negative schemas, including the self-image of being an 
incompetent person, and a vision of the world as highly dangerous, thereby forming the 
cognitive basis of chronic PTSD symptoms. For people suffering from PTSD, structures 
of the fear network are readily activated by any trauma-related information, due to the 
low activation threshold of this network in response to a multitude of various stimuli 
from the environment which have become associated with the information incorporated 
in these cognitive structures. Attempts to avoid fear activation leads to the development 
of the avoidance symptom (Foa, Riggs, Massie  & Yarczower 1995; Zoellner, Foa,  & 
Fitzgibbons, 2004).
Explanations of the development of PTSD are enhanced by the dual representation 
theory of a double memory system. According to this theory two memory systems 
operate simultaneously, either one of which can become dominant in certain situations. 
In response to the trauma, an oral or written narration of the trauma becomes a part of 
the verbal memory system or verbally accessible memory (VAM), as suggested by Brewin 
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin & Holmes, 2003). The VAM system reflects 
in its function the integration of a narrative account of the traumatic memories together 
with prior autobiographical memories, and this allows for these memories to be easily 
accessible and recollected in case of need. The VAM of a trauma presents itself in the 
context of the entire sequence of the autobiographical memories, including those of the 
past, present and envisioned future. The VAM system memories include experience and 
information observed by the person before, during and after the traumatic event. Such 
information has been sufficiently and consciously processed so that it is stored in long-
term memory and can be easily and consciously recalled afterwards. These memories 
can be verbally communicated to others, although the content of the narration is limited 
to consciously processed information.
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Flashbacks or intrusive memories are considered to originate from the situationally 
accessible memory (SAM) system. As a result of this memory system, certain situations 
which remind one of the trauma, can provoke recurrent experiences. The SAM system 
consists of information obtained on the sensory-perceptual level, including sights and 
sounds perceived too briefly or traumatically to be attended to consciously and to be 
registered in the VAM system. The SAM system also stores information about the 
somatic reaction to trauma, such as changes in heart-rate or body temperature, blushing, 
and pain. As a result, the recurrent memories are much brighter, more detailed and 
emotionally saturated than normal memories.
Due to the non-verbal nature of the SAM system, these memories are difficult 
to communicate to others, and they do not necessarily interact among themselves or 
with other autobiographical information. SAM memories are difficult to control as it 
is impossible for the person to constantly regulate the sights, sounds or smells in the 
environment that may remind him or her of their trauma. 
It has been suggested on the basis of the dual representation theory, that PTSD 
is a hybrid disorder, potentially combining two different pathological processes: one 
aims to prevent negative cognitions and related emotions, the other is concerned 
with the prevention of flashbacks (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Recovery depends on the 
results of changes within both processes. First, the intensity of the negative emotions 
which are experienced as the result of the cognitive assessment of the trauma, must 
be decreased by intentionally regaining a sense of control. Second, the automatic 
activation of trauma-related SAM must bet prevented. It is suggested that this may be 
achieved by forming a new SAM, which serves to block access to the previous trauma 
memory. Exposure techniques and a cognitive reconstruction of the meaning of the 
traumatic event can facilitate the development of new SAM, which includes trauma-
related sensory information, but without the traumatic experience, thereby decreasing 
excitability and the intensity of emotional reactions.
Discoveries from cognitive neuroscience in relation to this theory emphasize the 
role of the amygdala in the activation of fear reactions, and the role of the various 
neurotransmitter pathways which may be delivering trauma-related information to 
the amygdala (Taylor, 2009). Neurotransmitter pathways which allow for information-
processing in the hippocampus facilitate narrative representations of the traumatic 
experience that are integrated, have been logically examined and are coherent within 
the spatial and temporal context. These representations can be consciously recalled 
in a manner similar to other VAM memories. Nevertheless, information can reach 
the amygdala directly without an involvement of the hippocampus. It is impossible 
to consciously recall memories which are formed on the basis of activity within these 
alternative neurotransmission pathways, or to place them into a broader temporal and 
spatial context – these memories are involuntarily activated by various reminders and 
especially by stimuli that are similar to those encoded in the trauma memory (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003).
One of the most popular PTSD theories today is the cognitive model developed by 
Ehlers and Clark (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). They focused on a PTSD paradox – patients 
with PTSD are anxious about future, even though the trauma occurred in the past. 
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These researchers have suggested that pathological reactions to trauma arise when the 
individual processes traumatic information in a manner that provokes a constant sense 
of an imminent internal or external threat to their safety and future. The two main 
mechanisms exerting such influence are a negative cognitive assessment of the trauma 
and its consequences, and the character of the trauma-related memories at the sensory-
perceptual level.
Ehlers and Clark have expanded on the work of other researchers (Foa & Rothbaum, 
1991; Jones & Barlow, 1990) by identifying various types of trauma assessments. Some 
assessments focus on the traumatic event and overgeneralize the danger (“others will 
always perceive me as a victim”), some focus on a negative self-evaluation (“I deserve 
all the bad things that have happened to me”). Other assessments are related to the 
consequences of the trauma, such as emotional numbing (“I will never experience 
mutual understanding”), other people’s reactions (“they all think that I am too weak 
to manage on my own”), or future prospects (“my body is forever damaged”). The 
various assessments of trauma and its consequences explain the wide range of emotions 
reported by PTSD patients. The emergence of negative assessments is facilitated by 
the cognitive processes which take place during and after the trauma, as well as by 
previous convictions and experience. As a consequence of the trauma other physical 
and psychological disorders can also develop, such as addictions, vegetative disturbance 
and panic attacks (Feldner et al., 2009).
Panic disorder by definition involves frequently occuring panic attacks. A panic 
attack is initiated with a sudden intense fear in anticipation of danger and a whole range 
of unpleasant physical sensations. These may include shortness of breath, palpitation, 
chest-pain, suffocation, vertigo, tingling sensation in hands and feet, hot and cold 
flashes, asthenia, shivers and detachment from reality (Dattilio & Kendall, 2010). People 
are normally aware of the source of such frightening somatic sensations, but in the case 
of panic attacks they become prominent without a discernible cause, are inexplicable 
and often the panic attack ends in despondency. Signs of panic can constitute the 
primary disorder or may accompany and complicate other disorders, such as PTSD 
(Roy-Byrne, Graske & Stein, 2006).
The main etiological explanations of panic attacks are both physiological and 
cognitive. Irrespective of which mechanism (physiological or cognitive) is dominant, 
several studies have been based on the main assumption that panic attacks are affected 
by a positive feedback loop whereby the somatic symptoms become asssociated with 
threat or danger, and as a result there is an increase in anxiety, which then increases the 
somatic symptoms (Clark et al., 1997). Individual predispositions and situational factors 
are among the probable developmental agents. Some authors also ascribe importance to 
childhood experiences, for example, attachment disorder, traumatic childhood events, 
the illness of a family member (Ehlers, 1993; Fava & Morton, 2009; Pilecki, Arentoft, & 
McKay, 2011). Panic attacks can greatly aggravate social, professional and physical 
problems. People with panic attacks or panic disorder make use of medical services 
much more often than people without the disorder.
Cognitive factors, including beliefs, thoughts, interpretations and assessments 
are very important in their contributions to the development of both PTSD and panic 
attacks. Research has shown that a negative assessment of external circumstances or 
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internal feelings may maintain symptoms of both PTSD and panic attacks. According 
to the Panic attack – PTSD model proposed by Hinton and colleagues, panic attacks 
occur when somatic sensations generate dysphoric associations, which in turn can be 
linked to fear networks of traumatic memories, catastrophic cognitions, metaphoric 
associations to trauma, or by conditioning to a sense of fear (Hinton, Hofmann, Pitman, 
Pollack, & Barlow, 2008). Upon the activation of any part of these fear networks, anxiety 
increases significantly, resulting in a panic attack, which, in turn, can increase the 
severity of PTSD. The treatment of panic attacks with cognitive behavioral therapy can 
have a partial mediatory effect during the treatment of PTSD, whereby the treatment 
and minimization of panic attack severity leads to improvement and minimization of 
PTSD severity (Hinton et al., 2008).
Several researchers have stated that the interrelation of PTSD and panic attacks 
needs to be studied more completely (Cougle, Feldner, Keough, Hawkins,  & Fitch, 
2010; Hinton et al., 2008). Also, although there have been a series of studies involving 
negative cognitions in relation to PTSD, there has been little study of negative cognitions 
in relation to panic attacks, nor have there been studies of these three phenomena 
in relationship to each other. The study by Hinton and colleagues involved a very 
specific traumatic experience of Cambodian refuges. The present study involves the 
consequences of traumatic experience in a very different sociocultural context, Latvia.
Previous researchers have indicated that there may be a „vicious circle” (Hinton, 
Nickerson,  & Bryant, 2011) whereby negative cognitions and PTDS symtoms 
have a tendency to impact and aggravate each other. It is known that the traumatic 
experience can result in negative cognitions about one’s self and the world, and that 
these negative cognitions can facilitate and uphold PTSD symptoms (Dalgleish, 2004; 
Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1991) by activating 
„fear networks” and promoting hypervigilance. In turn, the same authors propose that 
PTSD symptoms can facilitate further negative evaluations about onesself, for example, 
the extent to which one is able to cope with daily challenges related to PTSD. Negative 
cognitions have also been consistently implicated in the „Cognitive Approach to Panic” 
as proposed by Clark (1986), and later confirmed in experimental studies supporting 
the central role of cognitive misinterpretations in the panic attack cycle (Chambles, 
Beck, Gracely,  & Grisham, 2000; Clark, 1996; Meulenbeek, Spinhoven, Smit, van 
Balkom & Cuijpers, 2010). And, as mentioned above, the „Panic Attack – PTSD model” 
(Hinton et  al., 2008), predicts that panic attacks can augment the PTSD symptoms, 
and when cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy results in a decrease in panic attack 
symptoms, then this also affects a decrease in PTSD symptoms. Nevertheless, the above 
implied interrelationships between negative cognitions, panic attacks and PTSD, which 
may be connected in a „vicious circle” manner ( Hinton et  al., 2011), have not been 
empirically validated to date. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine the interrelationships 
of negative cognitions, panic and PTSD, and to explore the possible mediational models 
including these variables in order to verify the predictive power presented by each of 
these models. 
In this study the following research questions were posed: What are the relationships 
between symptoms of panic attacks, PTSD and post-traumatic negative cognitions? 
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In addition, on the basis of the finding by Hinton and colleagues that panic attack 
symptoms partially mediate PTSD symptom severity, in the present study an additional 
research question was posed: Are there any meditational effects between panic attacks, 
PTSD and post-traumatic negative cognitions?
Method
Participants
Questionnaires were completed fully by 152 adult research participants, all of 
whom had suffered from trauma and all of whom reported symptoms of PTSD. They 
were aged 19 to 59 years old (M = 32.56; SD = 8.64). The majority of participants were 
female (62%; n = 95), 38% (n = 57) were male. Higher education had been completed 
by 34,8% (n = 53) of the participants, 33,6% (n = 51) – secondary education or incom-
plete higher education, 30,9% (n = 47) – vocational education, un one person (0,7%) 
had only primary education compelted.
All of the research participants reported that they had experienced a major 
traumatic incident, which happened more than at least one month previously. Many 
of the respondents (43%) reported that the traumatic incident happened more than 
5 years ago. Participant responses to questions about the type of trauma they had 
experienced were categorized in six groups of traumatic event types. In the first group 
were those who had experienced a major automobile accident, 25.7% (n = 39). In the 
second group were those who had experienced physical abuse, including physical abuse 
from a stranger, known person or family member, 25% (n  =  38). In the third group 
were those who had experienced sexual abuse, including physical abuse from a stranger, 
known person or family member, in childhood or adulthood, 12.5% (n = 19). In the 
fourth group were those who reported major emotional abuse as the most traumatic 
even experienced, 15.8% (n = 24). In the fifth groups were those who marked illness and 
health related problems, for example, oncological illness, removal of an organ or limb, 
13.2% (n = 20). In the sixth group were people who as their most traumatic experience 
reported participating in a peace keeping military, 7.9% (n = 12).
Panic attacks were reported by 91 research participants (60%). Mild PTSD 
symptoms were reported by 30% of the participants (n = 46), moderate – 38% (n = 58), 
moderately severe – 28% (n = 42) and 4% (n = 6) of the participants reported severe 
level of PTSD symptoms. 
Research participants were recruited by distributing information about the study 
at several local hospital wards where there are patients who have suffered from different 
types of trauma, and also at several local crisis centers, and at a military base where 
there are soldiers who have suffered from trauma while serving abroad. 
Measures
Three assessment tools, previously unused in Latvia, were translated, adapted and 
used in this study. The measures were translated by forward-backward translation to 
both Latvian and Russian languages, and respondents completed the questionnaire in 
their preferred language.
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Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 
1999). This scale consists of 36 items which are rated using a 7-point Likert type 
scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The PTCI includes three sub-scales: 
„Negative Cognitions about Self ”, „ Negative Cognitions about the World” and „Self 
Blame”. Cronbach’s alpha for the PTCI scale and subscales in this study were are follows: 
total score, α = .97, negative cognitions about the self, α = .97, negative cognitions about 
the world, α = .90, self-blame scale, α = .84.
Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995). This is a 49-item self-
report scale, designed to aid in the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder. The 
PDS includes three symptom sub-scales (Reexperiencing, Avoidance, Arousal), with 
17 items, that can provide the basis for a diagnosis of PTSD and measures of overall and 
subscale symptom severity. Respondents rate each item on a 4-point scale (0 = not at 
all to 3 = very much) in evaluation of their symptoms over a period of the past month. 
A symptom is counted as present if a score of 1 or higher is selected. Cronbach’s Alpha 
for the 3 subscales in this study: α = .87 – .92.
Panic and Agoraphobia Scale (PAS; Bandelow, 1999). This is a 13-item scale, with 
the possible responses of 0 – 4, and is divided into 5 subscores (panic attacks, agora-
phobic avoidance, anticipatory anxiety, restriction of activities and quality of life, and 
worries about health). The total score indicates the severity of the disorder. Cronbach’s 
Alpha for this study were α = .96 – .97.
Demographic questionnaire included items concerning respondents’ age, gender, 
marital status, education, occupation and income level. 
Procedure 
Questionnaires were completed individually in the psychologist’s office at the 
hospital or crisis center. All participants completed the demographic questionnaire, 
Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale, Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory and the 
Panic and Agoraphobia Scale. Participants were informed about the nature of the study, 
and principles of voluntary participation and confidentiality. 
Data analysis
SPSS version 17.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to process 
the data. The data was analysed with correlation and regression analysis; mediation 
effect was tested with the Sobel test.
Results
To answer the first research question, “What are the relationships between 
symptoms of panic attacks, PTSD and post-traumatic negative cognitions?”, Spearman’s 
correlation analysis was applied. The correlation coefficients, reflected in the Table 1, 
indicate that statistically significant correlations are evident between all of the ratings of 
post-traumatic negative cognitions, panic attacks and PTSD symptoms.
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Table 1. Correlation Coefficients of Panic Attack, PTSD Symptom and Post-Traumatic 
Negative Cognition Ratings (n = 152)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Panic Attacks --
2. PTSD .49** --
3. Reexperiencing .55** .75** --
4. Avoidance .40** .88** .55** --
5. Hyperarousal .35** .81** .41** .64** --
6. NC1 Self .53** .56** .57** .53** .32** --
7. NC World .25** .41** .36** .34** .33** .55** --
8. NC: Self-blame .34** .30** .36** .25** .16* .65** .47**
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
Note. N.C.Self = Negative Cognitions About Self, N.C.World = Negative Cognitions About the World 
To answer the second research question, “Are there any meditational effects between 
panic attacks, PTSD and post-traumatic negative cognitions?” a series of regression 
analyses was carried out. 
An initial regression model was developed to examine panic attacks as a mediator 
between negative cognitions and PTSD. First, regression analysis was performed with 
panic attack ratings as the dependent variable, and negative cognition ratings as the 
independent variable. In the second step regression analysis was performed with PTSD 
ratings as the dependent variable, and negative cognition ratings as the independent 
variable. And, as the third step, regression analysis was performed with PTSD as the 
dependent variable, predicted by panic attacks and negative cognitions as independent 
variables. The regression analysis indicators show that the association between negative 
cognitions and PTSD indicators is statistically significant both in the second (β = .52; 
p  <  .001) and the third (β  =  .36; p  <  .001) regression equation, but the association 
decreases upon the introduction of panic attack ratings into the analysis. This indicates 
the independent contribution of negative cognitions and panic attacks in the prognosis 
of PTSD: negative cognitions account for 27% of the variation in PTSD ratings, 
and panic attacks account for an additional 13% of the variation for a total of 40% 
(F = 49.60; p < .001; R² = .40) of the variation explained. The application of the Sobel 
test to the mediation effect showed that a statistically significant change occurs upon the 
introduction of panic attacks into the mediation model (z = 2.5; p < .01). Nevertheless, 
negative cognitions maintain their prognosticative value, which indicates a partial 
meditational role of panic attack severity on PTSD symptom severity (see Figure 1).
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Panic attacks 
Negative cognitions
 
PTSD
 
.41***  .39***  
.36***  
(.52*** ) 
Figure 1. The partial mediation effect of panic attacks on the association of negative 
cognitions and PTSD ratings (n = 152).
The second mediational analysis was to examine PTSD symptom severity as 
a mediator between negative cognitions and panic attack severity. First, regression 
analysis was performed with PTSD ratings as the dependent variable, and negative 
cognition ratings as the independent variable. In the second step regression analysis was 
performed with panic ratings as the dependent variable, and negative cognition ratings 
as the independent variable. And, as the third step, regression analysis was performed 
with panic ratings as the dependent variable, predicted by PTSD and negative 
cognitions as independent variables. The regression analysis indicators show that the 
association between negative cognitions and panic ratings is statistically significant 
both in the second (β  =  .41; p  <  .001) and the third (β  =  0.17; p  <  .001) regression 
equation, but the association decreases upon the introduction of PTSD ratings into the 
analysis. This indicates the independent contribution of negative cognitions and PTSD 
in the prognosis of panic: negative cognitions account for 16% of the variation in panic 
ratings, and PTSD ratings account for an additional 15% of the variation, for a total 
of 31% (F = 33.99; p < .01; R² = .31) of the variation explained. The application of the 
Sobel test to the mediation effect showed that a statistically significant change occurs 
upon the introduction of panic attacks into the mediation model (z = 2.75; p <  .01). 
Nevertheless, negative cognitions maintain their prognostic value, which indicates a 
partial meditational role of PTSD severity on panic symptom severity (see Figure 2).
PTSD  
Negative cognitions
 
Panic attacks
 
.52***  .45***  
.17*  
(.41*** ) 
Figure 2. The partial mediation effect of PTSD ratings between negative cognitions and 
panic attack ratings (n = 152).
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A third mediational analysis was performed to examine mediational effects in 
predicting negative cognitions. Initial analysis showed that the partial mediational 
model was substantiated with the scale “Negative Cognitions of Self ”. In the first step, 
regression analysis was performed with negative cognitions of self as the dependent 
variable and panic attack ratings as the independent variable. In the second step 
regression analysis was performed with PTSD ratings as the dependent variable, and 
panic attack ratings as the independent variable. And, as the third step, regression 
analysis was performed with negative cognitions of the self as the dependent variable, 
predicted by panic attacks and PTSD as independent variables. The regression analysis 
indicators show that the association between panic attacks and negative cognitions of 
self is statistically significant both in the second (β = .49; p < .001) and the third (β = .27; 
p < .01) regression equation, but the association decreases upon the introduction of panic 
attack ratings into the analysis. This indicates the independent contribution of panic 
attacks and PTSD in the prognosis of negative cognitions of the self: panic attack ratings 
account for 24% of the variation in negative cognitions of slef ratings, and PTSD ratings 
account for an additional 12% of the variation for a total of 36% (F = 42.39; p <  .01; 
R² = .36) of the variation explained. The application of the Sobel test to the mediation 
effect showed that a statistically significant change occurs upon the introduction of 
panic attacks into the mediation model (z  =  4.47; p  <  .001). Nevertheless, negative 
cognitions maintain their prognosticative value, which indicates a partial meditational 
role of panic attack severity on PTSD symptom severity (see Figure 3).
PTSD  
Panic attacks
 Negative 
cognitions of self
 
.54***  .41***  
.27**  
(.49*** ) 
Figure 3. The partial mediation effect of PTSD ratings between panic attack and negative 
cognition ratings (n = 152).
Discussion
The interrelationship between ratings of negative cognitions, panic attack symptom 
severity and PTSD symptom severity was examined and confirmed. The results indicate 
that the three variables are interrelated as can be seen in several mediational models. 
Panic attack symptom severity had a partial mediational role between negative cognitions 
and PTSD; PTSD ratings had a partial mediational role between negative cognitions 
and panic attack severity; and PTSD symptom severity had a partial mediational 
role between panic attack severity and negative cognitions of self. This indicates that 
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both negative cognitions and panic attack ratings independently contribute to PTSD 
symptom severity; and negative cognitions and PTSD independently contribute to 
panic attack severity; and panic attacks and PTSD symptom severity independently 
contributes to negative cognitions of self. The implications of these results are that 
negative cognitions, panic attack symptom severity and PTSD symptom severity can 
serve to mutually reinforce each other. 
Until now there has been only one known study of the interrelationships between 
panic attacks, PTSD and negative cognitions (Hinton et  al., 2008), but the focus of 
this previous study was very specific in that it concerned the cultural peculiarities of 
PTSD and panic attack symptoms among Cambodian refugees. Also the cognitions 
examined in this study were specifically in regard to interpretations of the panic 
attack somatic reactions. Hinton and colleagues concluded their study by stating 
that these interrelationships between panic attacks, PTSD and negative cognitions 
should be further studied in other sociocultural contexts, as it has been done in the 
present study. Previous PTSD researchers typically have analyzed only the connection 
between PTSD and negative cognitions or between PTSD and panic attacks, but not 
the interrelationships of these three variables (Foa, et al., 1999; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Elwood  & Williams, 2007, Daie-Gabai, Aderka, Allon-Schindel, Foar,  & Gilboa-
Schechtman, 2011).
The understanding of the relationship between panic attacks, negative cognitions 
and PTSD can provide opportunity to develop more effective treatment strategies for 
people suffering from PTSD and panic attacks. The results of a previous study which 
examined the changes in ratings of negative cognitions and PTSD during and as a result 
of the process of cognitive behavioral psychotherapy, showed that the severity of PTSD 
symptoms is best decreased by changes in negative cognitions about the self (Karl, Rabe, 
Zoolner, Maercker, & Stopa, 2009). Previous research has concluded that decreasing the 
severity of panic attacks through cognitive behavioral therapy partially also decreases 
the severity of PTSD (Hinton et al., 2008). Another study has demonstrated that the use 
of interoceptive exposure, which is one of the basic treatment methods for panic attacks, 
activates the traumatic memories in people with PTSD, and as a result of habituation 
the anxiety threshold is decreased. Application of this method causes habituation 
to the memories and somatic reactions, thus reducing the severity of PTSD (Wald & 
Taylor, 2008). The implications of the results of the present study are that patients who 
are suffering both from PTSD and panic attacks would most likely benefit from a dual 
treatment approach, based upon the dual representation theory of memory, in order to 
facilitate symptom minimization or alleviation (Falsetti, Resnick, & David, 2008). That 
is, the results of this study imply that it would be most beneficial to engage the patients 
in a treatment program which would include cognitive restructuring in order to address 
the negative cognitions, which are a part of the VAM consciously and narratively based 
memory system, and also include exposure therapy in order to address the sensory-
perceptual associations of panic attacks and PTSD which are part of the SAM memory 
system. This would then result in the greatest benefit for the patients.
One of the limitations of this study is that only self-report questionnaires were used. 
It is most likely that by incorporating interview methods additional information would 
128
Jelena Harlamova, Sandra Sebre
have been attained. An interview situation would also have allowed for the possibility 
to motivate and encourage the study participants to answer in a more complete and 
elaborated manner. In the future it would also be of benefit to conduct longitudinal 
studies to look at the relationships and changes in the negative cognitions, panic attack 
and posttraumatic stress symptoms over time.
In sum, the findings from the present study point to the interrelationships between 
negative cognitions, panic attacks and PTSD severity ratings. The practical implications 
of the study results are that both cognitive restructuring of the negative cognitions, 
as well as exposure techniques which target symptoms within the sensory-perceptual 
domain would be essential for the most beneficial treatment of PTSD symptom severity. 
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